8 ideas
16010 | While faith is a passion (as Kierkegaard says), wisdom is passionless [Wittgenstein] |
Full Idea: Wisdom is passionless. But faith by contrast is what Kierkegaard calls a passion. | |
From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Culture and Value [1945], 53e) | |
A reaction: [Idea from SY] Personally I don't agree that wisdom is passionless. At the very least, Aristotle allows the wise person to be appropriately angry. [PG] |
4037 | Ockham's Razor is the principle that we need reasons to believe in entities [Mellor/Oliver] |
Full Idea: Ockham's Razor is the principle that we need reasons to believe in entities. | |
From: DH Mellor / A Oliver (Introduction to 'Properties' [1997], §9) | |
A reaction: This presumably follows from an assumption that all beliefs need reasons, but is that the case? The Principle of Sufficient Reason precedes Ockham's Razor. |
4027 | Properties are respects in which particular objects may be alike or differ [Mellor/Oliver] |
Full Idea: Properties are respects in which particular objects may be alike or differ. | |
From: DH Mellor / A Oliver (Introduction to 'Properties' [1997], §1) | |
A reaction: Note that this definition does not mention a causal role for properties. |
4029 | Nominalists ask why we should postulate properties at all [Mellor/Oliver] |
Full Idea: Nominalists ask why we should postulate properties at all. | |
From: DH Mellor / A Oliver (Introduction to 'Properties' [1997], §3) | |
A reaction: Objects might be grasped without language, but events cannot be understood, and explanations of events seem inconceivable without properties (implying that they are essentially causal). |
16025 | If things change they become different - but then no one thing undergoes the change! [Gallois] |
Full Idea: If things really change, there can't literally be one thing before and after the change. However, if there isn't one thing before and after the change, then no thing has really undergone any change. | |
From: André Gallois (Identity over Time [2011], Intro) | |
A reaction: [He cites Copi for this way of expressing the problem of identity through change] There is an obvious simple ambiguity about 'change' in ordinary English. A change of property isn't a change of object. Painting a red ball blue isn't swapping it. |
16026 | 4D: time is space-like; a thing is its history; past and future are real; or things extend in time [Gallois] |
Full Idea: We have four versions of Four-Dimensionalism: the relativistic view that time is space-like; a persisting thing is identical with its history (so objects are events); past and future are equally real; or (Lewis) things extend in time, with temporal parts. | |
From: André Gallois (Identity over Time [2011], §2.5) | |
A reaction: Broad proposed the second one. I prefer 3-D: at any given time a thing is wholly present. At another time it is wholly present despite having changed. It is ridiculous to think that small changes destroy identity. We acquire identity by dying?? |
16027 | If two things are equal, each side involves a necessity, so the equality is necessary [Gallois] |
Full Idea: The necessity of identity: a=b; □(a=a); so something necessarily = a; so something necessarily must equal b; so □(a=b). [A summary of the argument of Marcus and Kripke] | |
From: André Gallois (Identity over Time [2011], §3) | |
A reaction: [Lowe 1982 offered a response] The conclusion seems reasonable. If two things are mistakenly thought to be different, but turn out to be one thing, that one thing could not possibly be two things. In no world is one thing two things! |
4039 | Abstractions lack causes, effects and spatio-temporal locations [Mellor/Oliver] |
Full Idea: Abstract entities (such as sets) are usually understood as lacking causes, effects, and spatio-temporal location. | |
From: DH Mellor / A Oliver (Introduction to 'Properties' [1997], §10) | |
A reaction: This seems to beg some questions. Has the ideal of 'honour' never caused anything? Young men dream of pure velocity. |