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All the ideas for 'Introduction to 'Properties'', 'Intensional Logic' and 'Semantic Relationism'

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29 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
Ockham's Razor is the principle that we need reasons to believe in entities [Mellor/Oliver]
     Full Idea: Ockham's Razor is the principle that we need reasons to believe in entities.
     From: DH Mellor / A Oliver (Introduction to 'Properties' [1997], §9)
     A reaction: This presumably follows from an assumption that all beliefs need reasons, but is that the case? The Principle of Sufficient Reason precedes Ockham's Razor.
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 8. Intensional Logic
If terms change their designations in different states, they are functions from states to objects [Fitting]
     Full Idea: The common feature of every designating term is that designation may change from state to state - thus it can be formalized by a function from states to objects.
     From: Melvin Fitting (Intensional Logic [2007], 3)
     A reaction: Specifying the objects sounds OK, but specifying states sounds rather tough.
Intensional logic adds a second type of quantification, over intensional objects, or individual concepts [Fitting]
     Full Idea: To first order modal logic (with quantification over objects) we can add a second kind of quantification, over intensions. An intensional object, or individual concept, will be modelled by a function from states to objects.
     From: Melvin Fitting (Intensional Logic [2007], 3.3)
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 9. Awareness Logic
Awareness logic adds the restriction of an awareness function to epistemic logic [Fitting]
     Full Idea: Awareness logic enriched Hintikka's epistemic models with an awareness function, mapping each state to the set of formulas we are aware of at that state. This reflects some bound on the resources we can bring to bear.
     From: Melvin Fitting (Intensional Logic [2007], 3.6.1)
     A reaction: [He cites Fagin and Halpern 1988 for this]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 10. Justification Logics
Justication logics make explicit the reasons for mathematical truth in proofs [Fitting]
     Full Idea: In justification logics, the logics of knowledge are extended by making reasons explicit. A logic of proof terms was created, with a semantics. In this, mathematical truths are known for explicit reasons, and these provide a measure of complexity.
     From: Melvin Fitting (Intensional Logic [2007], 3.6.1)
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 8. Logic of Mathematics
Classical logic is deliberately extensional, in order to model mathematics [Fitting]
     Full Idea: Mathematics is typically extensional throughout (we write 3+2=2+3 despite the two terms having different meanings). ..Classical first-order logic is extensional by design since it primarily evolved to model the reasoning of mathematics.
     From: Melvin Fitting (Intensional Logic [2007], §1)
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
The usual Tarskian interpretation of variables is to specify their range of values [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: The usual Tarskian way of indicating how a variable is to be interpreted is to simply specify its range of values.
     From: Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], 1.B)
Variables can be viewed as special terms - functions taking assignments into individuals [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: The alternative Tarskian way of indicating how a variable is to be interpreted is that a variable x will be a special case of the semantic value of the term; it will be a function which takes each assignment into the individual which it assigns to x.
     From: Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], 1.B)
It seemed that Frege gave the syntax for variables, and Tarski the semantics, and that was that [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: Once Frege had provided a clear syntactic account of variables and once Tarski had supplemented this with a rigorous semantic account, it would appear that there was nothing more of significance to be said.
     From: Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], 1)
     A reaction: He later remarks that there are now three semantic accounts: the Tarskian, the instantial, and the algebraic [see xref ideas]. He offers a fourth account in his Semantic Relationism. This grows from his puzzles about variables.
In separate expressions variables seem identical in role, but in the same expression they aren't [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: When we consider the semantic role of 'x' and 'y' in two distinct expressions x>0 and y>0, their semantic roles seems the same. But in the same expression, such as x>y, their roles seem to be different.
     From: Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], 1.A)
     A reaction: [compressed] This new puzzle about variables leads Fine to say that the semantics of variables, and other expressions, is not intrinsic to them, but depends on their external relations. Variables denote any term - unless another variable got there first.
The 'algebraic' account of variables reduces quantification to the algebra of its component parts [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: In the 'algebraic' approach to variables, we move from a quantified sentence to the term specifying a property (the λ-term), and then reducing to the algebraic operations for atomic formulas.
     From: Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], 1.C)
     A reaction: [Bealer is a source for this view] Fine describes it as an 'algebra of operations'. I presume this is a thoroughly formalist approach to the matter, which doesn't seem to get to the heart of the semantic question.
'Instantial' accounts of variables say we grasp arbitrary instances from their use in quantification [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: According to the 'instantial' approach to variables, a closed quantified sentence is to be understood on the basis of one of its instances; from an understanding of an instance we understand satisfaction by an arbitrary individual.
     From: Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], 1.D)
     A reaction: Fine comments that this is intuitively plausible, but not very precise, because it depends on 'abstraction' of the individual from the expression.
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
Cicero/Cicero and Cicero/Tully may differ in relationship, despite being semantically the same [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: There may be a semantic relationship between 'Cicero' and 'Cicero' that does not hold between 'Cicero' and 'Tully', despite the lack of an intrinsic semantic difference between the names themselves.
     From: Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], 2.E)
     A reaction: This is the key idea of Fine's book, and a most original and promising approach to a rather intractable problem in reference. He goes on to distinguish names which are 'strictly' coreferential (the first pair) from those that are 'accidentally' so.
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 3. Property (λ-) Abstraction
λ-abstraction disambiguates the scope of modal operators [Fitting]
     Full Idea: λ-abstraction can be used to abstract and disambiguate a predicate. De re is [λx◊P(x)](f) - f has the possible-P property - and de dicto is ◊[λxP(x)](f) - possibly f has the P-property. Also applies to □.
     From: Melvin Fitting (Intensional Logic [2007], §3.3)
     A reaction: Compare the Barcan formula. Originated with Church in the 1930s, and Carnap 1947, but revived by Stalnaker and Thomason 1968. Because it refers to the predicate, it has a role in intensional versions of logic, especially modal logic.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
Properties are respects in which particular objects may be alike or differ [Mellor/Oliver]
     Full Idea: Properties are respects in which particular objects may be alike or differ.
     From: DH Mellor / A Oliver (Introduction to 'Properties' [1997], §1)
     A reaction: Note that this definition does not mention a causal role for properties.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
Nominalists ask why we should postulate properties at all [Mellor/Oliver]
     Full Idea: Nominalists ask why we should postulate properties at all.
     From: DH Mellor / A Oliver (Introduction to 'Properties' [1997], §3)
     A reaction: Objects might be grasped without language, but events cannot be understood, and explanations of events seem inconceivable without properties (implying that they are essentially causal).
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
I can only represent individuals as the same if I do not already represent them as the same [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: I can only represent two individuals as being the same if I do not already represent them as the same.
     From: Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], 3.A)
     A reaction: A very nice simple point. If I say 'Hesperus is Hesperus' I am unable to comment on the object, but 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' has a different expressive power. Start from contexts where it is necessary to say that two things are actually one.
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
If Cicero=Tully refers to the man twice, then surely Cicero=Cicero does as well? [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: 'Cicero=Cicero' and 'Cicero=Tully' are both dyadic predications. It is unnatural to suppose that the use of the same name converts a dyadic predicate into a reflexive predicate, or that there is one reference to Cicero in the first and two in the second.
     From: Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], 3.A)
     A reaction: I am deeply suspicious of the supposed 'property' of being self-identical, but that may not deny that it could be a genuine truth (shorthand for 'the C you saw is the same as the C I saw'). Having an identity makes equality with self possible.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
Definite descriptions pick out different objects in different possible worlds [Fitting]
     Full Idea: Definite descriptions pick out different objects in different possible worlds quite naturally.
     From: Melvin Fitting (Intensional Logic [2007], 3.4)
     A reaction: A definite description can pick out the same object in another possible world, or a very similar one, or an object which has almost nothing in common with the others.
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 5. Mental Files
Mental files are devices for keeping track of basic coordination of objects [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: Mental files should be seen as a device for keeping track of when objects are coordinated (represented as-the-same) and, rather than understand coordination in terms of mental files, we should understand mental files in terms of coordination.
     From: Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], 3.A)
     A reaction: Personally I think that the metaphor of a 'label' is much closer to the situation than that of a 'file'. Thus my concept of Cicero is labelled 'Tully', 'Roman', 'orator', 'philosophical example'... My problem is to distinguish the concept from its labels.
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
You cannot determine the full content from a thought's intrinsic character, as relations are involved [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: There is no determining the full content of what someone thinks or believes from the individual things that he thinks or believes; we must also look at the threads that tie the contents of these thoughts or beliefs together.
     From: Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], Intro)
     A reaction: I'm not sure what 'full' content could possibly mean. Does that include all our background beliefs which we hardly ever articulate. Content comes in degrees, or needs an arbitrary boundary?
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 5. Abstracta by Negation
Abstractions lack causes, effects and spatio-temporal locations [Mellor/Oliver]
     Full Idea: Abstract entities (such as sets) are usually understood as lacking causes, effects, and spatio-temporal location.
     From: DH Mellor / A Oliver (Introduction to 'Properties' [1997], §10)
     A reaction: This seems to beg some questions. Has the ideal of 'honour' never caused anything? Young men dream of pure velocity.
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
The standard aim of semantics is to assign a semantic value to each expression [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: The aim of semantics, as standardly conceived, is to assign a semantic value to each (meaningful) expression of the language under consideration.
     From: Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], 1.G)
     A reaction: Fine is raising the difficulty that these values can get entangled with one another. He proposes 'semantic connections' as a better aim.
That two utterances say the same thing may not be intrinsic to them, but involve their relationships [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: In my 'Semantic Relationism' the fact that two utterances say the same thing is not entirely a matter of their intrinsic semantic features; it may also turn on semantic relationships among the utterances of their parts not reducible to those features.
     From: Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], Intro)
     A reaction: You'll need to read the book slowly several times to get the hang of this, but at least it allows that two different utterances might say the same thing (express the same proposition, I would say).
The two main theories are Holism (which is inferential), and Representational (which is atomistic) [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: For holists a proper theory will be broadly inferential, while for their opponents it will be representational in character, describing relations between expressions and reality. Representational semantics is atomist, holist semantics inferential.
     From: Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], Intro)
     A reaction: Fine presents these as the two main schools in semantics. His own theory then proposes a more holistic version of the Representational view. He seeks the advantages of Frege's position, but without 'sense'.
We should pursue semantic facts as stated by truths in theories (and not put the theories first!) [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: A 'semantics' is a body of semantic facts, and a 'semantic theory' is a body of semantic truths. The natural order is a theory being understood as truths, which state facts. Davidson, alas, reversed this order, with facts understood through theories.
     From: Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], 2.C)
     A reaction: [compressed; he cites Davidson 1967, and calls it 'one of the most unfortunate tendencies in modern philosophy of language, ..as if chemistry were understood in terms of formulae rather than chemical facts'].
Referentialist semantics has objects for names, properties for predicates, and propositions for connectives [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: The standard referentialist semantics for a language with names is that the semantic value of the name is the object, the content of a predicate is a property, and the content of a logical connective is an operation on propositions.
     From: Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], 2.F)
     A reaction: My particular bęte noire is the idea that every predicate names a property. It is the tyranny of having to have a comprehensive semantic theory that drives this implausible picture. And I don't see how an object can be a semantic value…
Fregeans approach the world through sense, Referentialists through reference [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: Fregeans emphasise an orientation towards the speaker: possession of sense makes language meaningful, and language relates to the world through sense. For the Referentialist its representational relationships make it meaningful, and relate it to the world
     From: Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], 2.G)
     A reaction: The Referentialist approach is for Kripkean fans of direct reference, rather than the Fregean reference through descriptions. I am inclined to favour the old-fashioned, deeply discredited, much mocked Fregean approach.
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics
I take indexicals such as 'this' and 'that' to be linked to some associated demonstration [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: Demonstrative uses of an indexical such as 'this' or 'that' should be taken to be anaphoric on an associated demonstration. It is a semantic requirement on the use of the indexical that it be coreferential with the demonstration.
     From: Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], Post 'Indexicals')
     A reaction: Similarly 'now' must connect to looking at a clock, and 'I' to pointing at some person. The demonstration could be of a verbal event, as much as a physical one.