9 ideas
| 4037 | Ockham's Razor is the principle that we need reasons to believe in entities [Mellor/Oliver] |
| Full Idea: Ockham's Razor is the principle that we need reasons to believe in entities. | |
| From: DH Mellor / A Oliver (Introduction to 'Properties' [1997], §9) | |
| A reaction: This presumably follows from an assumption that all beliefs need reasons, but is that the case? The Principle of Sufficient Reason precedes Ockham's Razor. |
| 15457 | Interdefinition is useless by itself, but if we grasp one separately, we have them both [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: All circles of interdefinition are useless by themselves. But if we reach one of the interdefined pair, then we have them both. | |
| From: David Lewis (Defining 'Intrinsic' (with Rae Langton) [1998], IV) |
| 15400 | We must avoid circularity between what is intrinsic and what is natural [Lewis, by Cameron] |
| Full Idea: Lewis revised his analysis of duplication because he had assumed that as a matter of necessity perfectly natural properties are intrinsic, and that necessarily how a thing is intrinsically is determined completely by the natural properties it has. | |
| From: report of David Lewis (Defining 'Intrinsic' (with Rae Langton) [1998]) by Ross P. Cameron - Intrinsic and Extrinsic Properties 'Analysis' | |
| A reaction: [This compares Lewis 1986:61 with Langton and Lewis 1998] I am keen on both intrinsic and on natural properties, but I have not yet confronted this little problem. Time for a displacement activity, I think.... |
| 15458 | A property is 'intrinsic' iff it can never differ between duplicates [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: A property is 'intrinsic' iff it never can differ between duplicates; iff whenever two things (actual or possible) are duplicates, either both of them have the property or both of them lack it. | |
| From: David Lewis (Defining 'Intrinsic' (with Rae Langton) [1998], IV) | |
| A reaction: This leaves me wondering how one could arrive at a precise definition of 'duplicates'. Can it be done without mentioning that they have the same intrinsic properties? |
| 15459 | Ellipsoidal stars seem to have an intrinsic property which depends on other objects [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: The property of being an ellipsoidal star would seem offhand to be a basic intrinsic property, but it is incompatible (nomologically) with being an isolated object. | |
| From: David Lewis (Defining 'Intrinsic' (with Rae Langton) [1998], V) | |
| A reaction: Another nice example from Lewis. It makes you wonder whether the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction should go. Modern physics, with its 'entanglements', doesn't seem to suit the distinction. |
| 4027 | Properties are respects in which particular objects may be alike or differ [Mellor/Oliver] |
| Full Idea: Properties are respects in which particular objects may be alike or differ. | |
| From: DH Mellor / A Oliver (Introduction to 'Properties' [1997], §1) | |
| A reaction: Note that this definition does not mention a causal role for properties. |
| 4029 | Nominalists ask why we should postulate properties at all [Mellor/Oliver] |
| Full Idea: Nominalists ask why we should postulate properties at all. | |
| From: DH Mellor / A Oliver (Introduction to 'Properties' [1997], §3) | |
| A reaction: Objects might be grasped without language, but events cannot be understood, and explanations of events seem inconceivable without properties (implying that they are essentially causal). |
| 4039 | Abstractions lack causes, effects and spatio-temporal locations [Mellor/Oliver] |
| Full Idea: Abstract entities (such as sets) are usually understood as lacking causes, effects, and spatio-temporal location. | |
| From: DH Mellor / A Oliver (Introduction to 'Properties' [1997], §10) | |
| A reaction: This seems to beg some questions. Has the ideal of 'honour' never caused anything? Young men dream of pure velocity. |
| 6316 | We translate in a way that makes the largest possible number of statements true [Wilson,NL] |
| Full Idea: We select as designatum that individual which will make the largest possible number of statements true. | |
| From: N.L. Wilson (Substances without Substrata [1959]), quoted by Willard Quine - Word and Object II.§13 n | |
| A reaction: From the Quine's reference, it sounds as if Wilson was the originator of the well-known principle of charity, later taken up by Davidson. If so, he should be famous, because it strikes me as a piece of fundamental and important wisdom. |