8 ideas
| 6601 | Science rules the globe because of colonising power, not inherent rationality [Feyerabend] |
| Full Idea: Science now reigns supreme all over the globe; but the reason was not insight in its 'inherent rationality' but power play (the colonising nations imposed their way of living) and the need for weapons. | |
| From: Paul Feyerabend (Against Method [1975], 3), quoted by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.5 | |
| A reaction: A nice clear statement of ridiculous relativism about science. What gave the colonisers their power if it was not more accurate knowledge of how to manipulate nature? |
| 4037 | Ockham's Razor is the principle that we need reasons to believe in entities [Mellor/Oliver] |
| Full Idea: Ockham's Razor is the principle that we need reasons to believe in entities. | |
| From: DH Mellor / A Oliver (Introduction to 'Properties' [1997], §9) | |
| A reaction: This presumably follows from an assumption that all beliefs need reasons, but is that the case? The Principle of Sufficient Reason precedes Ockham's Razor. |
| 4027 | Properties are respects in which particular objects may be alike or differ [Mellor/Oliver] |
| Full Idea: Properties are respects in which particular objects may be alike or differ. | |
| From: DH Mellor / A Oliver (Introduction to 'Properties' [1997], §1) | |
| A reaction: Note that this definition does not mention a causal role for properties. |
| 4029 | Nominalists ask why we should postulate properties at all [Mellor/Oliver] |
| Full Idea: Nominalists ask why we should postulate properties at all. | |
| From: DH Mellor / A Oliver (Introduction to 'Properties' [1997], §3) | |
| A reaction: Objects might be grasped without language, but events cannot be understood, and explanations of events seem inconceivable without properties (implying that they are essentially causal). |
| 2561 | For Feyerabend the meaning of a term depends on a whole theory [Feyerabend, by Rorty] |
| Full Idea: For Feyerabend the meaning of a term depends on a whole theory containing the term. | |
| From: report of Paul Feyerabend (Against Method [1975]) by Richard Rorty - Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature 6.3 |
| 3158 | Theories of intentionality presuppose rationality, so can't explain it [Dennett] |
| Full Idea: Intentional theory is vacuous as psychology because it presupposes and does not explain rationality or intelligence. | |
| From: Daniel C. Dennett (Brainstorms:Essays on Mind and Psychology [1978], p.15?) | |
| A reaction: Virtually every philosophical theory seems to founder because it presupposes something like the thing it is meant to explain. I agree that 'intentionality' is a slightly airy concept that would probably reduce to something better. |
| 3159 | Beliefs and desires aren't real; they are prediction techniques [Dennett] |
| Full Idea: Intentional systems don't really have beliefs and desires, but one can explain and predict their behaviour by ascribing beliefs and desires to them. This strategy is pragmatic, not right or wrong. | |
| From: Daniel C. Dennett (Brainstorms:Essays on Mind and Psychology [1978], p.7?) | |
| A reaction: If the ascription of beliefs and desires explains behaviour, then that is good grounds for thinking they might be real features of the brain, and even if that is not so, they are real enough as abstractions from brain events, like the 'economic climate'. |
| 4039 | Abstractions lack causes, effects and spatio-temporal locations [Mellor/Oliver] |
| Full Idea: Abstract entities (such as sets) are usually understood as lacking causes, effects, and spatio-temporal location. | |
| From: DH Mellor / A Oliver (Introduction to 'Properties' [1997], §10) | |
| A reaction: This seems to beg some questions. Has the ideal of 'honour' never caused anything? Young men dream of pure velocity. |