7 ideas
6601 | Science rules the globe because of colonising power, not inherent rationality [Feyerabend] |
Full Idea: Science now reigns supreme all over the globe; but the reason was not insight in its 'inherent rationality' but power play (the colonising nations imposed their way of living) and the need for weapons. | |
From: Paul Feyerabend (Against Method [1975], 3), quoted by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.5 | |
A reaction: A nice clear statement of ridiculous relativism about science. What gave the colonisers their power if it was not more accurate knowledge of how to manipulate nature? |
4037 | Ockham's Razor is the principle that we need reasons to believe in entities [Mellor/Oliver] |
Full Idea: Ockham's Razor is the principle that we need reasons to believe in entities. | |
From: DH Mellor / A Oliver (Introduction to 'Properties' [1997], §9) | |
A reaction: This presumably follows from an assumption that all beliefs need reasons, but is that the case? The Principle of Sufficient Reason precedes Ockham's Razor. |
4027 | Properties are respects in which particular objects may be alike or differ [Mellor/Oliver] |
Full Idea: Properties are respects in which particular objects may be alike or differ. | |
From: DH Mellor / A Oliver (Introduction to 'Properties' [1997], §1) | |
A reaction: Note that this definition does not mention a causal role for properties. |
4029 | Nominalists ask why we should postulate properties at all [Mellor/Oliver] |
Full Idea: Nominalists ask why we should postulate properties at all. | |
From: DH Mellor / A Oliver (Introduction to 'Properties' [1997], §3) | |
A reaction: Objects might be grasped without language, but events cannot be understood, and explanations of events seem inconceivable without properties (implying that they are essentially causal). |
2561 | For Feyerabend the meaning of a term depends on a whole theory [Feyerabend, by Rorty] |
Full Idea: For Feyerabend the meaning of a term depends on a whole theory containing the term. | |
From: report of Paul Feyerabend (Against Method [1975]) by Richard Rorty - Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature 6.3 |
4039 | Abstractions lack causes, effects and spatio-temporal locations [Mellor/Oliver] |
Full Idea: Abstract entities (such as sets) are usually understood as lacking causes, effects, and spatio-temporal location. | |
From: DH Mellor / A Oliver (Introduction to 'Properties' [1997], §10) | |
A reaction: This seems to beg some questions. Has the ideal of 'honour' never caused anything? Young men dream of pure velocity. |
7765 | The use of a sentence is its commitments and entitlements [Brandom, by Lycan] |
Full Idea: Brandom develops a particular conception of 'use', according to which a sentence's use is the set of commitments and entitlements associated with public utterance of that sentence. | |
From: report of Robert B. Brandom (Articulating Reasons: Intro to Inferentialism [2000]) by William Lycan - Philosophy of Language Ch.6 | |
A reaction: It immediately strikes me that a sentence could only have commitments and entitlements if it already had a meaning. However, the case of money shows how there might be nothing more to a thing's significance than its entitlements. |