8 ideas
4037 | Ockham's Razor is the principle that we need reasons to believe in entities [Mellor/Oliver] |
Full Idea: Ockham's Razor is the principle that we need reasons to believe in entities. | |
From: DH Mellor / A Oliver (Introduction to 'Properties' [1997], §9) | |
A reaction: This presumably follows from an assumption that all beliefs need reasons, but is that the case? The Principle of Sufficient Reason precedes Ockham's Razor. |
4027 | Properties are respects in which particular objects may be alike or differ [Mellor/Oliver] |
Full Idea: Properties are respects in which particular objects may be alike or differ. | |
From: DH Mellor / A Oliver (Introduction to 'Properties' [1997], §1) | |
A reaction: Note that this definition does not mention a causal role for properties. |
4029 | Nominalists ask why we should postulate properties at all [Mellor/Oliver] |
Full Idea: Nominalists ask why we should postulate properties at all. | |
From: DH Mellor / A Oliver (Introduction to 'Properties' [1997], §3) | |
A reaction: Objects might be grasped without language, but events cannot be understood, and explanations of events seem inconceivable without properties (implying that they are essentially causal). |
16083 | Aristotelian matter seriously threatens the intrinsic unity and substantiality of its object [Gill,ML] |
Full Idea: On the interpretation of Aristotelian matter that I shall propose, matter seriously threatens the intrinsic unity, and hence the substantiality, of the object to which it contributes. | |
From: Mary Louise Gill (Aristotle on Substance [1989], Intro) | |
A reaction: Presumably the thought is that if an object is form+matter (hylomorphism), then forms are essentially unified, but matter is essentially unified and sloppy. |
4039 | Abstractions lack causes, effects and spatio-temporal locations [Mellor/Oliver] |
Full Idea: Abstract entities (such as sets) are usually understood as lacking causes, effects, and spatio-temporal location. | |
From: DH Mellor / A Oliver (Introduction to 'Properties' [1997], §10) | |
A reaction: This seems to beg some questions. Has the ideal of 'honour' never caused anything? Young men dream of pure velocity. |
168 | To understand morality requires a soul [Plato] |
Full Idea: Good and evil are meaningless to things that have no soul. | |
From: Plato (Letter Seven [c.352 BCE], 334) | |
A reaction: That is presumably psuché, and hence includes plants. Soulless things can still function well, but obviously that is not 'meaningful' to them. |
17006 | Prime matter has no place in Aristotle's theories, and passages claiming it are misread [Gill,ML] |
Full Idea: I argue that prime matter has no place in Aristotle's elemental theory. ..References to prime matter are found in Aristotle's work because his theory was thought to need the doctrine. If I am right, these passages will all admit of another interpretation. | |
From: Mary Louise Gill (Aristotle on Substance [1989], App) | |
A reaction: If correct, this strikes me as important for the history of ideas, because scholastics got themselves in a right tangle over prime matter. See Pasnau on it. It pushed the 17th century into corpuscularianism. |
16093 | Prime matter is actually nothing and potentially everything (or potentially an element) [Gill,ML] |
Full Idea: Prime matter is supposed to be actually nothing and potentially everything or, at any rate, potentially the simplest bodies - earth, water, air and fire. | |
From: Mary Louise Gill (Aristotle on Substance [1989], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: The view that the four elements turn out to be prime matter is distinctive of Gill's approach. Prime matter sounds like quark soup in the early universe. |