7 ideas
| 4037 | Ockham's Razor is the principle that we need reasons to believe in entities [Mellor/Oliver] |
| Full Idea: Ockham's Razor is the principle that we need reasons to believe in entities. | |
| From: DH Mellor / A Oliver (Introduction to 'Properties' [1997], §9) | |
| A reaction: This presumably follows from an assumption that all beliefs need reasons, but is that the case? The Principle of Sufficient Reason precedes Ockham's Razor. |
| 7334 | Anti-realism needs an intuitionist logic with no law of excluded middle [Dummett, by Miller,A] |
| Full Idea: Dummett argues that antirealism implies that classical logic must be given up in favour of some form of intuitionistic logic that does not have the law of excluded middle as a theorem. | |
| From: report of Michael Dummett (works [1970]) by Alexander Miller - Philosophy of Language 9.4 | |
| A reaction: Only realists can think every proposition is either true or false, even if it is beyond the bounds of our possible knowledge (e.g. tiny details from remote history). Personally I think "Plato had brown eyes" is either true or false. |
| 3303 | For anti-realists there are no natural distinctions between objects [Dummett, by Benardete,JA] |
| Full Idea: Dummett says that anti-realism offers us a picture of reality as an amorphous lump not yet articulated into discrete objects. | |
| From: report of Michael Dummett (works [1970]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.2 | |
| A reaction: This might be called 'weak' anti-realism, where 'strong' anti-realism is the view that reality is quite unknowable, and possibly non-existent. |
| 4027 | Properties are respects in which particular objects may be alike or differ [Mellor/Oliver] |
| Full Idea: Properties are respects in which particular objects may be alike or differ. | |
| From: DH Mellor / A Oliver (Introduction to 'Properties' [1997], §1) | |
| A reaction: Note that this definition does not mention a causal role for properties. |
| 4029 | Nominalists ask why we should postulate properties at all [Mellor/Oliver] |
| Full Idea: Nominalists ask why we should postulate properties at all. | |
| From: DH Mellor / A Oliver (Introduction to 'Properties' [1997], §3) | |
| A reaction: Objects might be grasped without language, but events cannot be understood, and explanations of events seem inconceivable without properties (implying that they are essentially causal). |
| 9567 | Maths deals with quantities of physical significance, ignoring irrelevant features [Geroch] |
| Full Idea: Mathematics can serve to provide a framework within which one deals only with quantities of physical significance, ignoring other, irrelevant things. | |
| From: Robert Geroch (Mathematical Physics [1985], p.1), quoted by Charles Chihara - A Structural Account of Mathematics 9.8 | |
| A reaction: This is a modern physicist espousing abstractionism, as derided and dismissed by Frege and Geach. It's common sense, really. |
| 4039 | Abstractions lack causes, effects and spatio-temporal locations [Mellor/Oliver] |
| Full Idea: Abstract entities (such as sets) are usually understood as lacking causes, effects, and spatio-temporal location. | |
| From: DH Mellor / A Oliver (Introduction to 'Properties' [1997], §10) | |
| A reaction: This seems to beg some questions. Has the ideal of 'honour' never caused anything? Young men dream of pure velocity. |