Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Introduction to 'Properties'', 'The Fragmentation of Value' and 'Autobiography'

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6 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
Ockham's Razor is the principle that we need reasons to believe in entities [Mellor/Oliver]
     Full Idea: Ockham's Razor is the principle that we need reasons to believe in entities.
     From: DH Mellor / A Oliver (Introduction to 'Properties' [1997], §9)
     A reaction: This presumably follows from an assumption that all beliefs need reasons, but is that the case? The Principle of Sufficient Reason precedes Ockham's Razor.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
Properties are respects in which particular objects may be alike or differ [Mellor/Oliver]
     Full Idea: Properties are respects in which particular objects may be alike or differ.
     From: DH Mellor / A Oliver (Introduction to 'Properties' [1997], §1)
     A reaction: Note that this definition does not mention a causal role for properties.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
Nominalists ask why we should postulate properties at all [Mellor/Oliver]
     Full Idea: Nominalists ask why we should postulate properties at all.
     From: DH Mellor / A Oliver (Introduction to 'Properties' [1997], §3)
     A reaction: Objects might be grasped without language, but events cannot be understood, and explanations of events seem inconceivable without properties (implying that they are essentially causal).
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 5. Abstracta by Negation
Abstractions lack causes, effects and spatio-temporal locations [Mellor/Oliver]
     Full Idea: Abstract entities (such as sets) are usually understood as lacking causes, effects, and spatio-temporal location.
     From: DH Mellor / A Oliver (Introduction to 'Properties' [1997], §10)
     A reaction: This seems to beg some questions. Has the ideal of 'honour' never caused anything? Young men dream of pure velocity.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
There is no one theory of how to act (or what to believe) [Nagel]
     Full Idea: To look for a single general theory of how to decide the right thing to do is like looking for a single theory of how to decide what to believe.
     From: Thomas Nagel (The Fragmentation of Value [1977], p.135)
     A reaction: Depends on your level of generality. Values and virtues are general guides which should be brought to every action, with 'higher' values guiding choice of what is relevant.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
Mill wondered if he would be happy if all his aims were realised, and answered no [Mill, by Critchley]
     Full Idea: Mill, in his crisis of 1827, asked himself whether he would be happy if all his objects in life were realised, and had to answer that he would not.
     From: report of John Stuart Mill (Autobiography [1870]) by Simon Critchley - Continental Philosophy - V. Short Intro Ch.3
     A reaction: The reply is either that happiness is in the striving, or that his aims in life were wrong, or that happiness is impossible. It seems to contradict Kant's definition (Idea 1452).