Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Introduction to 'Properties'', 'Content Preservation' and 'Letter Seven'

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6 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
4037 Ockham's Razor is the principle that we need reasons to believe in entities [Mellor/Oliver]
     Full Idea: Ockham's Razor is the principle that we need reasons to believe in entities.
     From: DH Mellor / A Oliver (Introduction to 'Properties' [1997], §9)
     A reaction: This presumably follows from an assumption that all beliefs need reasons, but is that the case? The Principle of Sufficient Reason precedes Ockham's Razor.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
4027 Properties are respects in which particular objects may be alike or differ [Mellor/Oliver]
     Full Idea: Properties are respects in which particular objects may be alike or differ.
     From: DH Mellor / A Oliver (Introduction to 'Properties' [1997], §1)
     A reaction: Note that this definition does not mention a causal role for properties.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
4029 Nominalists ask why we should postulate properties at all [Mellor/Oliver]
     Full Idea: Nominalists ask why we should postulate properties at all.
     From: DH Mellor / A Oliver (Introduction to 'Properties' [1997], §3)
     A reaction: Objects might be grasped without language, but events cannot be understood, and explanations of events seem inconceivable without properties (implying that they are essentially causal).
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
9382 Subjects may be unaware of their epistemic 'entitlements', unlike their 'justifications' [Burge]
     Full Idea: I call 'entitlement' (as opposed to justification) the epistemic rights or warrants that need not be understood by or even be accessible to the subject.
     From: Tyler Burge (Content Preservation [1993]), quoted by Paul Boghossian - Analyticity Reconsidered §III
     A reaction: I espouse a coherentism that has both internal and external components, and is mediated socially. In Burge's sense, animals will sometimes have 'entitlement'. I prefer, though, not to call this 'knowledge'. 'Entitled true belief' is good.
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 5. Abstracta by Negation
4039 Abstractions lack causes, effects and spatio-temporal locations [Mellor/Oliver]
     Full Idea: Abstract entities (such as sets) are usually understood as lacking causes, effects, and spatio-temporal location.
     From: DH Mellor / A Oliver (Introduction to 'Properties' [1997], §10)
     A reaction: This seems to beg some questions. Has the ideal of 'honour' never caused anything? Young men dream of pure velocity.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / a. Preconditions for ethics
168 To understand morality requires a soul [Plato]
     Full Idea: Good and evil are meaningless to things that have no soul.
     From: Plato (Letter Seven [c.352 BCE], 334)
     A reaction: That is presumably psuché, and hence includes plants. Soulless things can still function well, but obviously that is not 'meaningful' to them.