8 ideas
| 4037 | Ockham's Razor is the principle that we need reasons to believe in entities [Mellor/Oliver] |
| Full Idea: Ockham's Razor is the principle that we need reasons to believe in entities. | |
| From: DH Mellor / A Oliver (Introduction to 'Properties' [1997], §9) | |
| A reaction: This presumably follows from an assumption that all beliefs need reasons, but is that the case? The Principle of Sufficient Reason precedes Ockham's Razor. |
| 21697 | The Struthionic Fallacy is that of burying one's head in the sand [Quine] |
| Full Idea: The Struthionic Fallacy is that of burying one's head in the sand [which I name from the Greek for 'ostrich'] | |
| From: Willard Quine (Lecture on Nominalism [1946], §4) | |
| A reaction: David Armstrong said this is the the fallacy involved in a denial of universals. Quine is accusing Carnap and co. of the fallacy. |
| 21698 | All relations, apart from ancestrals, can be reduced to simpler logic [Quine] |
| Full Idea: Much of the theory of relations can be developed as a virtual theory, in which we seem to talk of relations, but can explain our notation in terms {finally] of just the logic of truth-functions, quantification and identity. The exception is ancestrals. | |
| From: Willard Quine (Lecture on Nominalism [1946], §8) | |
| A reaction: The irreducibility of ancestrals is offered as a reason for treating sets as universals. |
| 21696 | Nominalism rejects both attributes and classes (where extensionalism accepts the classes) [Quine] |
| Full Idea: 'Nominalism' is distinct from 'extensionalism'. The main point of the latter doctrine is rejection of properties or attributes in favour of classes. But class are universals equally with attributes, and nominalism in the defined sense rejects both. | |
| From: Willard Quine (Lecture on Nominalism [1946], §3) | |
| A reaction: Hence Quine soon settled on labelling himself as an 'extensionalist', leaving proper nominalism to Nelson Goodman. It is commonly observed that science massively refers to attributes, so they can't just be eliminated. |
| 4027 | Properties are respects in which particular objects may be alike or differ [Mellor/Oliver] |
| Full Idea: Properties are respects in which particular objects may be alike or differ. | |
| From: DH Mellor / A Oliver (Introduction to 'Properties' [1997], §1) | |
| A reaction: Note that this definition does not mention a causal role for properties. |
| 4029 | Nominalists ask why we should postulate properties at all [Mellor/Oliver] |
| Full Idea: Nominalists ask why we should postulate properties at all. | |
| From: DH Mellor / A Oliver (Introduction to 'Properties' [1997], §3) | |
| A reaction: Objects might be grasped without language, but events cannot be understood, and explanations of events seem inconceivable without properties (implying that they are essentially causal). |
| 12750 | The question is whether force is self-sufficient in bodies, and essential, or dependent on something [Lenfant] |
| Full Idea: The whole question is to know if the force to act in bodies is in matter something distinct and independent of everything else that one conceives there. Without that, this force cannot be its essence, and will remain the result of some primitive quality. | |
| From: Jacques Lenfant (Letters to Leibniz [1693], 1693.11.07), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 8 | |
| A reaction: This challenge to Leibniz highlights the drama of trying to simultaneously arrive at explanations of things, and to decide the nature of essence. Leibniz replied that force is primitive, because it is the 'principle' of behaviour and dispositions. |
| 4039 | Abstractions lack causes, effects and spatio-temporal locations [Mellor/Oliver] |
| Full Idea: Abstract entities (such as sets) are usually understood as lacking causes, effects, and spatio-temporal location. | |
| From: DH Mellor / A Oliver (Introduction to 'Properties' [1997], §10) | |
| A reaction: This seems to beg some questions. Has the ideal of 'honour' never caused anything? Young men dream of pure velocity. |