16 ideas
15842 | An ad hominem refutation is reasonable, if it uses the opponent's assumptions [Harte,V] |
Full Idea: Judicious use of an opponent's assumptions is quite capable of producing a perfectly reasonable ad hominem refutation of the opponent's thesis. | |
From: Verity Harte (Plato on Parts and Wholes [2002], 1.6) |
15841 | Mereology began as a nominalist revolt against the commitments of set theory [Harte,V] |
Full Idea: Historically, the evolution of mereology was associated with the desire to find alternatives to set theory for those with nomimalist qualms about the commitment to abstract objects like sets. | |
From: Verity Harte (Plato on Parts and Wholes [2002], 1.2) | |
A reaction: Goodman, for example. It is interesting to note that the hardline nominalist Quine, pal of Goodman, eventually accepted set theory. It is difficult to account for things by merely naming their parts. |
10061 | The If-thenist view only seems to work for the axiomatised portions of mathematics [Musgrave] |
Full Idea: The If-thenist view seems to apply straightforwardly only to the axiomatised portions of mathematics. | |
From: Alan Musgrave (Logicism Revisited [1977], §5) | |
A reaction: He cites Lakatos to show that cutting-edge mathematics is never axiomatised. One might reply that if the new mathematics is any good then it ought to be axiomatis-able (barring Gödelian problems). |
10065 | Perhaps If-thenism survives in mathematics if we stick to first-order logic [Musgrave] |
Full Idea: If we identify logic with first-order logic, and mathematics with the collection of first-order theories, then maybe we can continue to maintain the If-thenist position. | |
From: Alan Musgrave (Logicism Revisited [1977], §5) | |
A reaction: The problem is that If-thenism must rely on rules of inference. That seems to mean that what is needed is Soundness, rather than Completeness. That is, inference by the rules must work properly. |
10049 | Logical truths may contain non-logical notions, as in 'all men are men' [Musgrave] |
Full Idea: Containing only logical notions is not a necessary condition for being a logical truth, since a logical truth such as 'all men are men' may contain non-logical notions such as 'men'. | |
From: Alan Musgrave (Logicism Revisited [1977], §3) | |
A reaction: [He attributes this point to Russell] Maybe it is only a logical truth in its general form, as ∀x(x=x). Of course not all 'banks' are banks. |
10050 | A statement is logically true if it comes out true in all interpretations in all (non-empty) domains [Musgrave] |
Full Idea: The standard modern view of logical truth is that a statement is logically true if it comes out true in all interpretations in all (non-empty) domains. | |
From: Alan Musgrave (Logicism Revisited [1977], §3) |
10058 | No two numbers having the same successor relies on the Axiom of Infinity [Musgrave] |
Full Idea: The axiom of Peano which states that no two numbers have the same successor requires the Axiom of Infinity for its proof. | |
From: Alan Musgrave (Logicism Revisited [1977], §4 n) | |
A reaction: [He refers to Russell 1919:131-2] The Axiom of Infinity is controversial and non-logical. |
10063 | Formalism is a bulwark of logical positivism [Musgrave] |
Full Idea: Formalism is a bulwark of logical positivist philosophy. | |
From: Alan Musgrave (Logicism Revisited [1977], §5) | |
A reaction: Presumably if you drain all the empirical content out of arithmetic and geometry, you are only left with the bare formal syntax, of symbols and rules. That seems to be as analytic as you can get. |
10062 | Formalism seems to exclude all creative, growing mathematics [Musgrave] |
Full Idea: Formalism seems to exclude from consideration all creative, growing mathematics. | |
From: Alan Musgrave (Logicism Revisited [1977], §5) | |
A reaction: [He cites Lakatos in support] I am not immediately clear why spotting the remote implications of a formal system should be uncreative. The greatest chess players are considered to be highly creative and imaginative. |
15858 | Traditionally, the four elements are just what persists through change [Harte,V] |
Full Idea: Earth, air, fire and water, viewed as elements, are, by tradition, the leading candidates for being the things that persist through change. | |
From: Verity Harte (Plato on Parts and Wholes [2002], 4.4) | |
A reaction: Physics still offers us things that persist through change, as conservation laws. |
15848 | Mereology treats constitution as a criterion of identity, as shown in the axiom of extensionality [Harte,V] |
Full Idea: Mereologists do suppose that constitution is a criterion of identity. This view is enshrined in the Mereological axiom of extensionality; that objects with the same parts are identical. | |
From: Verity Harte (Plato on Parts and Wholes [2002], 3.1) | |
A reaction: A helpful explanation of why classical mereology is a very confused view of the world. It is at least obvious that a long wall and a house are different things, even if built of identical bricks. |
15837 | What exactly is a 'sum', and what exactly is 'composition'? [Harte,V] |
Full Idea: The difficulty with the claim that a whole is (just) the sum of its parts is what are we to understand by 'the sum'? ...If we say wholes are 'composites' of parts, how are we to understand the relation of composition? | |
From: Verity Harte (Plato on Parts and Wholes [2002], 1.1) |
15839 | If something is 'more than' the sum of its parts, is the extra thing another part, or not? [Harte,V] |
Full Idea: Holism inherits all the difficulties associated with the term 'sum' and adds one of its own, when it says a whole is 'more than' the sum of its parts. This seems to say it has something extra? Is this something extra a part? | |
From: Verity Harte (Plato on Parts and Wholes [2002], 1.1) | |
A reaction: [compressed] Most people take the claim that a thing is more than the sum of its parts as metaphorical, I would think (except perhaps emergentists about the mind, and they are wrong). |
15838 | The problem with the term 'sum' is that it is singular [Harte,V] |
Full Idea: For my money, the real problem with the term 'sum' is that it is singular. | |
From: Verity Harte (Plato on Parts and Wholes [2002], 1.1) | |
A reaction: Her point is that the surface grammar makes you accept a unity here, with no account of what unifies it, or even whether there is a unity. Does classical mereology have a concept (as the rest of us do) of 'disunity'? |
10060 | Logical positivists adopted an If-thenist version of logicism about numbers [Musgrave] |
Full Idea: Logical positivists did not adopt old-style logicism, but rather logicism spiced with varying doses of If-thenism. | |
From: Alan Musgrave (Logicism Revisited [1977], §4) | |
A reaction: This refers to their account of mathematics as a set of purely logical truths, rather than being either empirical, or a priori synthetic. |
468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |
Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice. | |
From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where? |