13857
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Truth-functional possibilities include the irrelevant, which is a mistake [Edgington]
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Full Idea:
How likely is a fair die landing on an even number to land six? My approach is, assume an even number, so three possibilities, one a six, so 'one third'; the truth-functional approach is it's true if it is not-even or six, so 'two-thirds'.
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From:
Dorothy Edgington (Do Conditionals Have Truth Conditions? [1986], 3)
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A reaction:
The point is that in the truth-functional approach, if the die lands not-even, then the conditional comes out as true, when she says it should be irrelevant. She seems to be right about this.
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13853
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It is a mistake to think that conditionals are statements about how the world is [Edgington]
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Full Idea:
The mistake philosophers have made, in trying to understand the conditional, is to assume that its function is to make a statement about how the world is (or how other possible worlds are related to it), true or false, as the case may be.
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From:
Dorothy Edgington (Do Conditionals Have Truth Conditions? [1986], 1)
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A reaction:
'If pigs could fly we would never catch them' may not be about the world, but 'if you press this switch the light comes on' seems to be. Actually even the first one is about the world. I've an inkling that Edgington is wrong about this. Powers!
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13854
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Conditionals express what would be the outcome, given some supposition [Edgington]
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Full Idea:
It is often necessary to suppose (or assume) that some epistemic possibility is true, and to consider what else would be the case, or would be likely to be the case, given this supposition. The conditional expresses the outcome of such thought processes.
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From:
Dorothy Edgington (Do Conditionals Have Truth Conditions? [1986], 1)
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A reaction:
This is the basic Edgington view. It seems to involve an active thought process, and imagination, rather than being the static semantic relations offered by possible worlds analyses. True conditionals state relationships in the world.
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7322
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Constitutive scepticism is about facts, and epistemological scepticism about our ability to know them [Miller,A]
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Full Idea:
We should distinguish 'constitutive scepticism' (about the existence of certain sorts of facts) from the traditional 'epistemological scepticism' (which concedes that the sort of fact in question exists, but questions our right to claim knowledge of it).
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From:
Alexander Miller (Philosophy of Language [1998], 4.7)
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A reaction:
I would be inclined to call the first type 'ontological scepticism'. Miller is discussing Quine's scepticism about meaning. Atheists fall into the first group, and agnostics into the second. An important, and nicely simple, distinction.
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7325
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Dispositions say what we will do, not what we ought to do, so can't explain normativity [Miller,A]
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Full Idea:
Dispositional facts are facts about what we will do, not about what we ought to do, and as such cannot capture the normativity of meaning.
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From:
Alexander Miller (Philosophy of Language [1998], 6.2)
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A reaction:
Miller is discussing language, but this raises a nice question for all behaviourist accounts of mental events. Perhaps there is a disposition to behave in a guilty way if you do something you think you shouldn't do. (Er, isn't 'guilt' a mental event?)
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7324
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Explain meaning by propositional attitudes, or vice versa, or together? [Miller,A]
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Full Idea:
Grice wants to explain linguistic meaning in terms of the content of propositional attitudes, Dummett has championed the view that propositional attitudes must be explained by linguistic meaning, while Davidson says they must be explained together.
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From:
Alexander Miller (Philosophy of Language [1998], 6.1)
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A reaction:
A useful map. My intuition says propositional attitudes come first, for evolutionary reasons. We are animals first, and speakers second. Thought precedes language. A highly social animal flourishes if it can communicate.
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7328
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The principle of charity is holistic, saying we must hold most of someone's system of beliefs to be true [Miller,A]
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Full Idea:
Properly construed, the principle of charity is a holistic constraint applying, not to individual beliefs, but rather to systems of belief: we must interpret a speaker so that most of the beliefs in his system are, by our lights, true.
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From:
Alexander Miller (Philosophy of Language [1998], 8.7)
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A reaction:
This is a lot more plausible than applying the principle to individual sentences, particularly if you are in the company of habitual ironists or constitutional liars.
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