49 ideas
| 1887 | You cannot divide anything into many parts, because after the first division you are no longer dividing the original [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: You cannot divide anything (such as the decad) into many parts, because as soon as you separate the first part, you are no longer dividing the original. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], II.215) |
| 1885 | Proof moves from agreed premises to a non-evident inference [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: Dogmatists define proof as "an argument which, by means of agreed premises, reveals by way of deduction a nonevident inference". | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], II.135) |
| 12196 | A valid hypothetical syllogism is 'that which does not begin with a truth and end with a falsehood' [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: Philo (of Megara) says that a valid hypothetical syllogism is 'that which does not begin with a truth and end with a falsehood,' as for instance the syllogism 'If it is day, I converse,' when in fact it is day and I am conversing. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], II.110) | |
| A reaction: Russell endorses this, and Rumfitt quotes it as the classic case of denying that there is any modal aspect (such as 'logical necessity') involved in logical consequence. He labels it 'material or Philonian consequence'. |
| 1902 | Since Socrates either died when he was alive (a contradiction) or died when he was dead (meaningless), he didn't die [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: If Socrates died, he died either when he lived or when he died; so he was either dead when he was alive, or he was twice dead when he was dead. So he didn't die. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.111) | |
| A reaction: One of my favourites. Of all the mysteries facing us, the one that boggles me most is how anything can happen in the 'present' moment, if the present is just the overlap point between past and future. |
| 16435 | Plantinga proposes necessary existent essences as surrogates for the nonexistent things [Plantinga, by Stalnaker] |
| Full Idea: Plantinga proposes surrogates for nonexistent things - individual essences that are themselves necessary existents and that correspond one-to-one with all the 'things' that might exist. | |
| From: report of Alvin Plantinga (World and Essence [1970]) by Robert C. Stalnaker - Mere Possibilities 1 | |
| A reaction: There are an awful lot of competing concepts of essence flying around these days. This one seems to require some abstract 'third realm' (or worse) in which these essences can exist, awaiting the arrival of thinkers. Not for me. |
| 14655 | The 'identity criteria' of a name are a group of essential and established facts [Plantinga] |
| Full Idea: What we might call 'identity criteria' associated with a name such as 'Aristotle' are what the users of the name regard as essential and established facts about him. | |
| From: Alvin Plantinga (World and Essence [1970], I) | |
| A reaction: The problem here is that identifying something is superficial, whereas essences run deep. Plantinga is, in fact, talking about Lockean 'nominal essence' (and seems unaware of the fact, and never mentions the Lockean real/nominal distinction). |
| 14658 | 'Being Socrates' and 'being identical with Socrates' characterise Socrates, so they are among his properties [Plantinga] |
| Full Idea: Surely it is true of Socrates that he is Socrates and he is identical with Socrates. If these are true of him, then 'being Socrates' and 'being identical with Socrates' characterize him; they are among his properties or attributes. | |
| From: Alvin Plantinga (World and Essence [1970], II) | |
| A reaction: As far as I can see (if you insist on accepting self-identity as meaningful) the most you get here is that these are predicates that can attach to Socrates. If you identify predicates with properties you are in deep metaphysical trouble. |
| 14656 | Does Socrates have essential properties, plus a unique essence (or 'haecceity') which entails them? [Plantinga] |
| Full Idea: Does Socrates have, in addition to his essential properties, an 'essence' or 'haecceity' - a property essential to him that entails each of his essential properties and that nothing distinct from him has in the world? | |
| From: Alvin Plantinga (World and Essence [1970], II) | |
| A reaction: Plantinga says yes, and offers 'Socrateity' (borrowed from Boethius) as his candidate. This is a very odd use of the word 'essence'. I take an essence to be a complex set of fundamental properties. I am also puzzled by his use of the word 'entails'. |
| 14653 | X is essentially P if it is P in every world, or in every X-world, or in the actual world (and not ¬P elsewhere) [Plantinga] |
| Full Idea: Socrates has P essentially if he has P in every world, or has it in every world in which he exists, or - most plausible of all - has P in the actual world and has its complement [non-P] in no world. | |
| From: Alvin Plantinga (World and Essence [1970], Intro) | |
| A reaction: These strike me as mere necessary properties, which are not the same thing at all. Essences give rise to the other properties, but Plantinga offers nothing to do the job (and especially not 'Socrateity'!). Essences must explain, say I! |
| 14654 | Properties are 'trivially essential' if they are instantiated by every object in every possible world [Plantinga] |
| Full Idea: Let us call properties that enjoy the distinction of being instantiated by every object in every possible world 'trivially essential properties'. | |
| From: Alvin Plantinga (World and Essence [1970], I) | |
| A reaction: These would appear to be trivially 'necessary' rather than 'essential'. This continual need for the qualifier 'trivial' shows that they are not talking about proper essences. |
| 14660 | If a property is ever essential, can it only ever be an essential property? [Plantinga] |
| Full Idea: Is it the case that any property had essentially by anything is had essentially by everything that has it? | |
| From: Alvin Plantinga (World and Essence [1970], III) | |
| A reaction: Plantinga says it is not true, but the only example he can give is Socrates having the property of 'being Socrates or Greek'. I take it to be universally false. There are not two types of property here. Properties sometimes play an essential role. |
| 14661 | Essences are instantiated, and are what entails a thing's properties and lack of properties [Plantinga] |
| Full Idea: E is an essence if and only if (a) 'has E essentially' is instantiated in some world or other, and (b) for any world W and property P, E entails 'has P in W' or 'does not have P in W'. | |
| From: Alvin Plantinga (World and Essence [1970], IV) | |
| A reaction: 'Entail' strikes me as a very odd word when you are talking about the structure of the physical world (or are we??). Why would a unique self-identity (his candidate for essence) do the necessary entailing? |
| 14657 | Does 'being identical with Socrates' name a property? I can think of no objections to it [Plantinga] |
| Full Idea: Is there any reason to suppose that 'being identical with Socrates' names a property? Well, is there any reason to suppose that it does not? I cannot think of any, nor have I heard any that are at all impressive. | |
| From: Alvin Plantinga (World and Essence [1970], II) | |
| A reaction: Is there any reason to think that a planet somewhere is entirely under the control of white mice? Extraordinary. No wonder Plantinga believes in God and the Ontological Argument, as well as the existence of 'Socrateity' etc. |
| 14652 | 'De re' modality is as clear as 'de dicto' modality, because they are logically equivalent [Plantinga] |
| Full Idea: The idea of modality 'de re' is no more (although no less) obscure that the idea of modality 'de dicto'; for I think we can see that any statement of the former type is logically equivalent to some statement of the latter. | |
| From: Alvin Plantinga (World and Essence [1970], Intro) | |
| A reaction: If two things are logically equivalent, that doesn't ensure that they are equally clear! Personally I am on the side of de re modality. |
| 14659 | We can imagine being beetles or alligators, so it is possible we might have such bodies [Plantinga] |
| Full Idea: We easily understand Kafka's story about the man who wakes up to discover that he now has the body of a beetle; and in fact the state of affairs depicted is entirely possible. I can imagine being an alligator, so Socrates could have had an alligator body. | |
| From: Alvin Plantinga (World and Essence [1970], III) | |
| A reaction: This really is going the whole hog with accepting whatever is conceivable as being possible. I take this to be shocking nonsense, and it greatly reduces Plantinga in my esteem, despite his displays of intelligence and erudition. |
| 1889 | If an argument has an absurd conclusion, we should not assent to the absurdity, but avoid the absurd argument [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: If an argument leads to confessedly absurd conclusions, we should not assent to the absurdity just because of the argument, but avoid the argument because of the absurdity. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], II.252) | |
| A reaction: cf. G.E.Moore. Denying that you have a hand seems to be an absurdity, but I'm not sure if I can give a criterion for absurdity in such a case. One person's modus ponens is another person's modus tollens. |
| 1871 | Whether honey is essentially sweet may be doubted, as it is a matter of judgement rather than appearance [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: Honey appears to sceptics to be sweet, but whether it is also sweet in its essence is for us a matter of doubt, since this is not an appearance but a judgement. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.20) |
| 1883 | How can the intellect know if sensation is reliable if it doesn't directly see external objects? [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: Just as you can't know if a portrait of Socrates is good without seeing the man, so when the intellect gazes on sensations but not the external objects it cannot know whether they are similar. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], II.75) |
| 1890 | We distinguish ambiguities by seeing what is useful [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: It is the experience of what is useful in each affair that brings about the distinguishing of ambiguities. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], II.258) |
| 1870 | The basis of scepticism is the claim that every proposition has an equal opposing proposition [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: The main basic principle of the sceptic system is that of opposing to every proposition an equal proposition. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.12) |
| 1881 | The same oar seems bent in water and straight when out of it [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: The same oar seems bent when in the water but straight when out of the water. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.119) |
| 1882 | The necks of doves appear different in colour depending on the angle of viewing [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: The necks of doves appear different in hue according to the differences in the angle of inclination. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.120) |
| 1872 | The same tower appears round from a distance, but square close at hand [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: The same tower appears round from a distance, but square close at hand. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.32) |
| 1873 | If we press the side of an eyeball, objects appear a different shape [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: When we press the eyeball at one side the forms, figures and sizes of the objects appear oblong and narrow. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.47) |
| 1874 | How can we judge between our impressions and those of other animals, when we ourselves are involved? [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: We cannot judge between our own impressions and those of other animals, because we ourselves are involved in the dispute. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.59) |
| 1879 | Sickness is perfectly natural to the sick, so their natural perceptions should carry some weight [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: Health is natural for the healthy but unnatural for the sick, and sickness is unnatural for the healthy but natural for the sick, so we must give credence to the natural perceptions of the sick. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.103) |
| 1877 | If we had no hearing or sight, we would assume no sound or sight exists, so there may be unsensed qualities [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: A man with touch, taste and smell, but no hearing or sight, will assume nothing audible or visible exists, so maybe an apple has qualities which we have no senses to perceive. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.96) |
| 1880 | Some actions seem shameful when sober but not when drunk [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: Actions which seem shameful to us when sober do not seem shameful when drunk. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.109) |
| 1878 | Water that seems lukewarm can seem very hot on inflamed skin [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: The same water which seems very hot when poured on inflamed spots seems lukewarm to us. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.101) |
| 1876 | If we enjoy different things, presumably we receive different impressions [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: The enjoyment of different things is an indication that we get varying impressions from the underlying objects. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.80) |
| 1910 | With us it is shameful for men to wear earrings, but among Syrians it is considered noble [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: It is a shameful thing with us for men to wear earrings, but among some of the barbarians, such as the Syrians, it is a token of nobility. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.203) |
| 1911 | Even if all known nations agree on a practice, there may be unknown nations which disagree [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: Even among practices on which all known cultures are agreed, disagreement about them may possibly exist amongst some of the nations which are unknown to us. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.234) |
| 1886 | If you don't view every particular, you may miss the one which disproves your universal induction [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: Induction cannot establish the universal by means of the particular, since limited particulars may omit crucial examples which disprove the universal, and infinite particulars are impossible to know. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], II.204) |
| 1884 | If we utter three steps of a logical argument, they never exist together [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: If we say "If day exists, lights exists", and then "day exists", and then "light exists", then parts of the judgement never exist together, and so the whole judgement will have no real existence. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], II.109) |
| 468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |
| Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice. | |
| From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where? |
| 1894 | Some say that causes are physical, some say not [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: Some affirm cause to be corporeal, some incorporeal. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.14) |
| 1897 | Knowing an effect results from a cause means knowing that the cause belongs with the effect, which is circular [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: To know an effect belongs to a cause, we must also know that that cause belongs to that effect, and this is circular. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.21) |
| 1898 | Cause can't exist before effect, or exist at the same time, so it doesn't exist [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: If cause neither subsists before its effect, nor subsists along with it, nor does the effect precede the cause, it would seem that it has no substantial existence at all. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.27) |
| 1896 | If there were no causes then everything would have been randomly produced by everything [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: If causes were non-existent everything would have been produced by everything, and at random. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.18) |
| 1895 | Causes are either equal to the effect, or they link equally with other causes, or they contribute slightly [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: The majority say causes are immediate (when they are directly proportional to effects), or associate (making an equal contribution to effects), or cooperant (making a slight contribution). | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.15) |
| 1900 | If time and place are infinitely divided, it becomes impossible for movement ever to begin [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: If bodies, and the places and times when they are said to move, are divided into infinity, motion will not occur, it being impossible to find anything which will initiate the first movement. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.76) |
| 1901 | If all atoms, times and places are the same, everything should move with equal velocity [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: If objects are reducible to atoms, and each thing passes in an atomic time with its own first atom into an atomic point of space, then all moving things are of equal velocity. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.77) |
| 1899 | Does the original self-mover push itself from behind, or pull itself from in front? [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: Self-movement must move in some particular direction, but if it pushes it will be behind itself, and if it pulls it will be in front of itself. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.68) | |
| A reaction: This is the same as Aquinas's First Way of proving God's existence. |
| 1903 | If motion and rest are abolished, so is time [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: Since time does not seem to subsist without motion or even rest, if motion is abolished, and likewise rest, time is abolished. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.141) |
| 1904 | Time must be unlimited, but past and present can't be non-existent, and can't be now, so time does not exist [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: There can't be a time when there was no time, so time is not limited; but unlimited time means past and present are non-existent (so time is limited to the present), or they exist (which means they are present). Time does not exist. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.142) |
| 1905 | How can time be divisible if we can't compare one length of time with another? [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: Time is clearly divisible (into past, present and future), but it can't be, because a divisible thing is measured by some part of itself (divisions of length), but the two parts must coincide to make the measurement (e.g. present must coincide with past). | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.143) |
| 1891 | How can we agree on the concept of God, unless we agree on his substance or form or place? [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: How shall we be able to reach a conception of God when we have no agreement about his substance or his form or his place of abode? | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.3) |
| 1892 | The existence of God can't be self-evident or everyone would have agreed on it, so it needs demonstration [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: The existence of God is not pre-evident, for if it was the dogmatists would have agreed about it, whereas their disagreements show it is non-evident, and in need of demonstration. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.6) |
| 1893 | If God foresaw evil he would presumably prevent it, and if he only foresees some things, why those things? [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: If God had forethought for all, there would be no evil in the world, yet they say the world is full of evil. And if he forethinks some things, why those and not others? | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.9) |