22 ideas
| 13560 | A wise man is not subservient to anything [Seneca] |
| Full Idea: I do not call any man wise who is subservient to anything. | |
| From: Seneca the Younger (On the Happy Life [c.60], §11) | |
| A reaction: At the very least, a wise man should be subservient to a wiser man. |
| 11223 | Definitions usually have a term, a 'definiendum' containing the term, and a defining 'definiens' [Gupta] |
| Full Idea: Many definitions have three elements: the term that is defined, an expression containing the defined term (the 'definiendum'), and another expression (the 'definiens') that is equated by the definition with this expression. | |
| From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 2) | |
| A reaction: He notes that the definiendum and the definiens are assumed to be in the 'same logical category', which is a right can of worms. |
| 11215 | Notable definitions have been of piety (Plato), God (Anselm), number (Frege), and truth (Tarski) [Gupta] |
| Full Idea: Notable examples of definitions in philosophy have been Plato's (e.g. of piety, in 'Euthyphro'), Anselm's definition of God, the Frege-Russell definition of number, and Tarski's definition of truth. | |
| From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], Intro) | |
| A reaction: All of these are notable for the extensive metaphysical conclusions which then flow from what seems like a fairly neutral definition. We would expect that if we were defining essences, but not if we were just defining word usage. |
| 11225 | A definition needs to apply to the same object across possible worlds [Gupta] |
| Full Idea: In a modal logic in which names are non-vacuous and rigid, not only must existence and uniqueness in a definition be shown to hold necessarily, it must be shown that the definiens is satisfied by the same object across possible worlds. | |
| From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 2.4) |
| 11227 | The 'revision theory' says that definitions are rules for improving output [Gupta] |
| Full Idea: The 'revision theory' of definitions says definitions impart a hypothetical character, giving a rule of revision rather than a rule of application. ...The output interpretation is better than the input one. | |
| From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 2.7) | |
| A reaction: Gupta mentions the question of whether such definitions can extend into the trans-finite. |
| 11221 | A definition can be 'extensionally', 'intensionally' or 'sense' adequate [Gupta] |
| Full Idea: A definition is 'extensionally adequate' iff there are no actual counterexamples to it. It is 'intensionally adequate' iff there are no possible counterexamples to it. It is 'sense adequate' (or 'analytic') iff it endows the term with the right sense. | |
| From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 1.4) |
| 11224 | Traditional definitions are general identities, which are sentential and reductive [Gupta] |
| Full Idea: Traditional definitions are generalized identities (so definiendum and definiens can replace each other), in which the sentential is primary (for use in argument), and they involve reduction (and hence eliminability in a ground language). | |
| From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 2.2) |
| 11226 | Traditional definitions need: same category, mention of the term, and conservativeness and eliminability [Gupta] |
| Full Idea: A traditional definition requires that the definiendum contains the defined term, that definiendum and definiens are of the same logical category, and the definition is conservative (adding nothing new), and makes elimination possible. | |
| From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 2.4) |
| 11217 | Chemists aim at real definition of things; lexicographers aim at nominal definition of usage [Gupta] |
| Full Idea: The chemist aims at real definition, whereas the lexicographer aims at nominal definition. ...Perhaps real definitions investigate the thing denoted, and nominal definitions investigate meaning and use. | |
| From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 1.1) | |
| A reaction: Very helpful. I really think we should talk much more about the neglected chemists when we discuss science. Theirs is the single most successful branch of science, the paradigm case of what the whole enterprise aims at. |
| 11216 | If definitions aim at different ideals, then defining essence is not a unitary activity [Gupta] |
| Full Idea: Some definitions aim at precision, others at fairness, or at accuracy, or at clarity, or at fecundity. But if definitions 'give the essence of things' (the Aristotelian formula), then it may not be a unitary kind of activity. | |
| From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 1) | |
| A reaction: We don't have to accept this conclusion so quickly. Human interests may shift the emphasis, but there may be a single ideal definition of which these various examples are mere parts. |
| 11218 | Stipulative definition assigns meaning to a term, ignoring prior meanings [Gupta] |
| Full Idea: Stipulative definition imparts a meaning to the defined term, and involves no commitment that the assigned meaning agrees with prior uses (if any) of the term | |
| From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 1.3) | |
| A reaction: A nice question is how far one can go in stretching received usage. If I define 'democracy' as 'everyone is involved in decisions', that is sort of right, but pushing the boundaries (children, criminals etc). |
| 11220 | Ostensive definitions look simple, but are complex and barely explicable [Gupta] |
| Full Idea: Ostensive definitions look simple (say 'this stick is one meter long', while showing a stick), but they are effective only because a complex linguistic and conceptual capacity is operative in the background, of which it is hard to give an account. | |
| From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 1.2) | |
| A reaction: The full horror of the situation is brought out in Quine's 'gavagai' example (Idea 6312) |
| 11222 | The ordered pair <x,y> is defined as the set {{x},{x,y}}, capturing function, not meaning [Gupta] |
| Full Idea: The ordered pair <x,y> is defined as the set {{x},{x,y}}. This does captures its essential uses. Pairs <x,y> <u,v> are identical iff x=u and y=v, and the definition satisfies this. Function matters here, not meaning. | |
| From: Anil Gupta (Definitions [2008], 1.5) | |
| A reaction: This is offered as an example of Carnap's 'explications', rather than pure definitions. Quine extols it as a philosophical paradigm (1960:§53). |
| 468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |
| Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice. | |
| From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where? |
| 13558 | The supreme good is harmony of spirit [Seneca] |
| Full Idea: The highest good is harmony of spirit. | |
| From: Seneca the Younger (On the Happy Life [c.60], §08) | |
| A reaction: This idea is straight from Plato's Republic. |
| 13559 | I seek virtue, because it is its own reward [Seneca] |
| Full Idea: You ask what I seek from virtue? Virtue herself. For she has nothing better, she is herself her own reward. | |
| From: Seneca the Younger (On the Happy Life [c.60], §09) | |
| A reaction: Presumably this is the source of the popular saying that 'virtue is its own reward'. The trouble is that this doesn't seem a very persuasive thing to say to a sceptic who doubts whether being virtuous is worth the trouble. |
| 13561 | Virtue is always moderate, so excess need not be feared [Seneca] |
| Full Idea: In the case of virtue excess should not be feared, since in virtue resides moderation. | |
| From: Seneca the Younger (On the Happy Life [c.60], §13) | |
| A reaction: This seems to imply that all of the virtues are unified in the one achievement of the virtuous state. It leaves the notion of 'virtue' a bit thin in content, though. |
| 13562 | It is shameful to not even recognise your own slaves [Seneca] |
| Full Idea: Why, to your shame, are you so careless that you do not know your handful of slaves by sight? | |
| From: Seneca the Younger (On the Happy Life [c.60], §17) |
| 13563 | Why does your wife wear in her ears the income of a wealthy house? [Seneca] |
| Full Idea: Why does your wife wear in her ears the income of a wealthy house? | |
| From: Seneca the Younger (On the Happy Life [c.60], §17) |
| 13565 | If wealth was a good, it would make men good [Seneca] |
| Full Idea: Wealth is not a good; for it it was, it would make men good. | |
| From: Seneca the Younger (On the Happy Life [c.60], §24) | |
| A reaction: An immediately attractive argument, but should we assume that anything which is good will enhance our personal goodness? If goodness is a habit, then continual pursuit of wealth is the test case to examine. Seneca is right! |
| 13564 | There is far more scope for virtue if you are wealthy; poverty only allows endurance [Seneca] |
| Full Idea: What doubt can there be that the wise man has greater scope for displaying his powers if he is rich than if he is poor, since in the case of poverty only one kind of virtue exists - refusal to be bowed down and crushed. | |
| From: Seneca the Younger (On the Happy Life [c.60], §22) | |
| A reaction: It is against this view that I see Jesus proposing poverty as central to virtue. But then he has the surprising view (to Seneca) that humility is a virtue. What Nietzsche calls the slaves' inversion of values. |
| 13557 | Unfortunately the majority do not tend to favour what is best [Seneca] |
| Full Idea: Human concerns are not so happily arranged that the majority favours the better things. | |
| From: Seneca the Younger (On the Happy Life [c.60], §02) | |
| A reaction: On the whole Seneca is unimpressed by democracy, as people are rushed into decisions by the crowd, and live to regret them. |