70 ideas
4171 | Philosophy considers only the universal, in nature as everywhere else [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: Philosophy considers only the universal, in nature as everywhere else. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], II 027) | |
A reaction: I think what draws people to philosophy is an interest in whatever is timeless. Contingent reality is so frustrating and exhausting. Hence I agree. |
4186 | Everyone is conscious of all philosophical truths, but philosophers bring them to conceptual awareness [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: Every person is conscious of all philosophical truths, but to bring them to conceptual awareness, to reflection, is the business of the philosopher. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.68) | |
A reaction: I like this. All human beings are philosophical. It seems unlikely, though, that we are all pre-conceptually conscious of the higher levels of philosophical logic. |
12171 | Absurdity is incongruity between correct and false points of view [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: The more correct the subsumption of objects from one point of view, and the greater and more glaring the incongruity from another point of view, the greater is the ludicrous effect which is produced by this contrast. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 013), quoted by Roger Scruton - Laughter §5 | |
A reaction: This accounts for ludicrous humour, but there seem to be plenty of other types. Exceptional stupidity is usually amusing without necessarily being incongruous. Though it is a departure from the sensible norm. |
21366 | Metaphysics must understand the world thoroughly, as a principal source of knowledge [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: The task of metaphysics is not to pass over experience in which the world exists, but to understand it thoroughly, since inner and outer experience are certainly the principal source of all knowledge. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 428), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 3 'Will' | |
A reaction: I wonder to what extent he meant ordinary experience, and to what extent he was advocating the study if science? |
22216 | Phenomenology studies different types of correlation between consciousness and its objects [Husserl, by Bernet] |
Full Idea: Husserl's phenomenology is the science of the intentional correlation of acts of consciousness with their objects and it studies the ways in which different kinds of objects involve different kinds of correlation with different kinds of acts. | |
From: report of Edmund Husserl (Ideas: intro to pure phenomenology [1913]) by Rudolf Bernet - Husserl p.198 | |
A reaction: I notice he uncritically accepts Husserl's description of it as a 'science'. My naive question is how you would distinguish one kind of 'correlation' from another. |
22218 | There can only be a science of fluctuating consciousness if it focuses on stable essences [Husserl, by Bernet] |
Full Idea: How can there be a science of a Heraclitean flux of acts of consciousness? Husserl answers that this is possible only if these acts are described in respect of their invariant or essential structure. This is an 'eidetic' scence of 'pure' psychology. | |
From: report of Edmund Husserl (Ideas: intro to pure phenomenology [1913]) by Rudolf Bernet - Husserl p.199 | |
A reaction: This is his phenomenology in 1913, which Bernet describes as 'static'. Husserl later introduced time with his 'genetic' version of phenomenology, looking at the sources of experience (and then at history). Essentialism seems to be intuitive. |
21217 | Phenomenology needs absolute reflection, without presuppositions [Husserl] |
Full Idea: Phenomenology demands the most perfect freedom from presuppositions and, concerning itself, an absolute reflective insight. | |
From: Edmund Husserl (Ideas: intro to pure phenomenology [1913], III.1.063), quoted by Victor Velarde-Mayol - On Husserl 3.1 | |
A reaction: As an outsider, I would have thought that the whole weight of modern continental philosophy is entirely opposed to the aspiration to think without presuppositions. |
22217 | Phenomenology aims to validate objects, on the basis of intentional intuitive experience [Husserl, by Bernet] |
Full Idea: Husserl's goal is to account for the validity, the 'being-true', of objects on the basis of the way in which they are given or constituted. ...Experiences more suitable for guaranteeing objects are those which both intend and intuitively apprehend them. | |
From: report of Edmund Husserl (Ideas: intro to pure phenomenology [1913]) by Rudolf Bernet - Husserl p.199 | |
A reaction: [compressed] In the light of previous scepticism and idealism, the project sounds a bit optimistic. If there is a gulf between mind and world it can only be bridged by 'reaching out' from both sides. This is a mind-sided attempt. |
22219 | Husserl saw transcendental phenomenology as idealist, in its construction of objects [Husserl, by Bernet] |
Full Idea: Phenomeonology is 'transcendental' in describing the correlation between phenomena and intentional objects, to show how their meaning and validity are constructed. Husserl gave this process an idealist interpretation (which Heidegger criticised). | |
From: report of Edmund Husserl (Ideas: intro to pure phenomenology [1913]) by Rudolf Bernet - Husserl p.200 | |
A reaction: [compressed] If the actions which produce our concepts of objects all take place 'behind' phenomenal consciousness, then it is hard to avoid sliding into some sort of idealism. It encourages direct realism about perception. |
22204 | Start philosophising with no preconceptions, from the intuitively non-theoretical self-given [Husserl] |
Full Idea: Where other philosophers ...start from unclarified, ungrounded preconceptions, we start out from that which antedates all standpoints: from the totality of the intuitively self-given which is prior to any theorising reflexion. | |
From: Edmund Husserl (Ideas: intro to pure phenomenology [1913], I.2.020) | |
A reaction: This is the great aim of Phenomenology, which is obviously inspired by Hegel's similar desire to start from nothing. Hegel starts from a concept ('nothing'), but Husserl starts from raw experience. I suspect both approaches are idle dreams. |
22207 | Epoché or 'bracketing' is refraining from judgement, even when some truths are certain [Husserl] |
Full Idea: In relation to every thesis we can use this peculiar epoché (the phenomenon of 'bracketing' or 'disconnecting'), a certain refraining from judgment which is compatible with the unshaken and unshakable because self-evidencing conviction of Truth. | |
From: Edmund Husserl (Ideas: intro to pure phenomenology [1913], II.1.031) | |
A reaction: This is the crucial first step of Phenomenology. It seems to me that it is best described as 'methodological scepticism'. People actually practise it all the time, while they focus on some experience, while trying to forget preconceptions. |
22208 | 'Bracketing' means no judgements at all about spatio-temporal existence [Husserl] |
Full Idea: I use the 'phenomenological' epoché, which completely bars me from using any judgment that concerns spatio-temporal existence. | |
From: Edmund Husserl (Ideas: intro to pure phenomenology [1913], II.1.032) | |
A reaction: This makes bracketing (or epoché) into a sort of voluntary idealism. Put like that, it is hard to see what benefits it could bring. I am, you will notice, a pretty thorough sceptic about the project of phenomenology. What has it taught us? |
22210 | After everything is bracketed, consciousness still has a unique being of its own [Husserl] |
Full Idea: We fix our eyes steadily upon the sphere of Consciousness and study what it is that we find immanent in it. ...Consciousness in itself has a being of its own which in its absolute uniqueness of nature remains unaffected by disconnection. | |
From: Edmund Husserl (Ideas: intro to pure phenomenology [1913], II.2.033) | |
A reaction: 'Disconnection' is his 'bracketing'. He makes it sound obvious, but Schopenhauer entirely disagrees with him, and I have no idea how to arbitrate. I struggle to grasp consciousness once nature has been bracketed, but have little luck. Is it Da-sein? |
22215 | Phenomenology describes consciousness, in the light of pure experiences [Husserl] |
Full Idea: Phenomenology is a pure descriptive discipline which studies the whole field of pure transcendental consciousness in the light of pure intuition. | |
From: Edmund Husserl (Ideas: intro to pure phenomenology [1913], II.4.059) | |
A reaction: When he uses the word 'pure' three times in a sentence, each applied to a different thing, you begin to wonder precisely what it means. Strictly speaking, I would probably only apply 'pure' to abstracta, and never to experiences or reality.115 |
22201 | The use of mathematical-style definitions in philosophy is fruitless and harmful [Husserl] |
Full Idea: Definition cannot take the same form in philosophy as it does in mathematics; the imitation of mathematical procedure is invariably in this respect not only unfruitful, but perverse and most harmful in its consequences. | |
From: Edmund Husserl (Ideas: intro to pure phenomenology [1913], Intro) | |
A reaction: A hundred years of analytic philosophy has entirely ignored this warning. My heart has always sunk when I read '=def...' in a philosophy article (which is usually American). The illusion of rigour. |
4168 | Matter and intellect are inseparable correlatives which only exist relatively, and for each other [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: In my system matter and intellect are inseparable correlatives which exist only for each other, and so exist only relatively. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I.Supp) | |
A reaction: A plausible picture, but built from dualist presuppositions. Personally I think intellect is built out of matter, so I am not going down Schopenhauer's road. |
22209 | Our goal is to reveal a new hidden region of Being [Husserl] |
Full Idea: We could refer to our goal as the winning of a new region of Being, the distinctive character of which has not yet been defined. | |
From: Edmund Husserl (Ideas: intro to pure phenomenology [1913], II.2.033) | |
A reaction: The obvious fruit of this idea, I would think, is Heidegger's concept of Da-sein, which claims to be a distinctively human region of Being. I'm not sure I can cope with the claim that Being itself (a very broad-brush term) has hidden regions. |
22211 | As a thing and its perception are separated, two modes of Being emerge [Husserl] |
Full Idea: We are left with the transcendence of the thing over against the perception of it, ...and thus a basic and essential difference arises between Being as Experience and Being as Thing. | |
From: Edmund Husserl (Ideas: intro to pure phenomenology [1913], II.2.042) | |
A reaction: I'm thinking that this is not just the germ of Heidegger's concept of Da-sein, but it actually IS his concept, without the label. Husserl had said that he hoped to reveal a new region of Being. |
21926 | Schopenhauer, unlike other idealists, says reality is irrational [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB] |
Full Idea: Schopenhauer radically departs from his fellow idealists in his assertion of the irrational character of reality. | |
From: report of Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819]) by Peter B. Lewis - Schopenhauer 4 | |
A reaction: This is the rejection of the original confidence about rationality of the stoics. And yet Schopenauer saw the principle of sufficient reason as axiomatic. Not sure how to reconcile those. Lewis identifies this idea as 'Romantic'. |
22202 | The World is all experiencable objects [Husserl] |
Full Idea: The World is the totality of objects that can be known through experience. | |
From: Edmund Husserl (Ideas: intro to pure phenomenology [1913], I.1.001) | |
A reaction: I think this is the 'Nature' which has to be 'bracketed', when pursuing Phenomenology. It sounds like anti-realist empiricism, which has no place for unobservables. |
22213 | Absolute reality is an absurdity [Husserl] |
Full Idea: An absolute reality is just as valid as a round square. | |
From: Edmund Husserl (Ideas: intro to pure phenomenology [1913], II.3.055) | |
A reaction: Husserl distances himself from 'Berkeleyian' idealism, but his discussion keeps flirting with, perhaps in some sort of have-your-cake-and-eat-it Hegelian way. Perhaps it is close to Dummett's Anti-Realism. |
4167 | The knowing subject and the crude matter of the world are both in themselves unknowable [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: The world has two poles - the knowing subject and crude matter, which are both completely unknowable, the former because it is the knower, the latter because without form and quality it cannot be perceived. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I Supp) | |
A reaction: A nice concept, that all of reality comes from their relationship, but the two components are intrinsically unknowable. Does God the Knower know his own mind? |
21218 | The sense of anything contingent has a purely apprehensible essence or Eidos [Husserl] |
Full Idea: It belongs to the sense of anything contingent to have an essence and therefore an Eidos which can be apprehended purely. | |
From: Edmund Husserl (Ideas: intro to pure phenomenology [1913], I.1.002), quoted by Victor Velarde-Mayol - On Husserl 3.2.2 | |
A reaction: This is the quirky idea that we can know necessary categorial essences a priori, even if the category is currently empty. Crops us in Lowe. Husserl says grasping the corresponding individuals must be possible. Third Man question. |
19263 | Imagine an object's properties varying; the ones that won't vary are the essential ones [Husserl, by Vaidya] |
Full Idea: Husserl's 'eidetic variation' implies that we can judge the essential properties of an object by varying the properties of the object in imagination, and seeing which vary and which do not. | |
From: report of Edmund Husserl (Ideas: intro to pure phenomenology [1913]) by Anand Vaidya - Understanding and Essence 'Knowledge' | |
A reaction: The problem with this is that there are trivial or highly general necessary properties which are obviously not essential to the thing. Vaidya says [822] you can't perform the experiment without prior knowledge of the essence. |
4165 | Descartes found the true beginning of philosophy with the Cogito, in the consciousness of the individual [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: By taking Cogito Ergo Sum as the only certainty, and by his provisionally regarding the existence of the world as problematical, the essential starting point of all philosophy was found, and its true focus in the subjective, the individual consciousness. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I Supp) | |
A reaction: Some people think this was a disaster, not a triumph. Descartes could have doubted himself and accepted the world as his starting point. |
21220 | The physical given, unlike the mental given, could be non-existing [Husserl] |
Full Idea: Anything physical which is given in person can be non-existing, no mental process which is given in person can be non-existing. | |
From: Edmund Husserl (Ideas: intro to pure phenomenology [1913], II.2.046), quoted by Victor Velarde-Mayol - On Husserl 3.3.5 | |
A reaction: This endorsement of Descartes shows how strong the influence of the Cogito remained in later continental philosophy. Phenomenology is a footnote to Descartes. |
21923 | Schopenhauer can't use force/energy instead of 'will', because he is not a materialist [Lewis,PB on Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: Some say Schopenhauer would be less misunderstood if he had used 'force' or 'energy' rather than 'will' to characterise inner natures. But this would have steered his idealism towards materialism, of which he was an avowed opponent. | |
From: comment on Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819]) by Peter B. Lewis - Schopenhauer 4 | |
A reaction: I presume therefore that Nietzsche's will to power is a commitment to materialism, since it occurs in material objects as well as minds. |
4162 | The world only exists in relation to something else, as an idea of the one who conceives it [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: The world which surrounds man exists only as idea - that is, only in relation to something else, the one who conceives the idea, which is himself. If any truth can be enunciated a priori, it is this. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 001) | |
A reaction: Yes, but the idea we have is of a real world. It is definitely not part of the idea that it is an idea (unlike my idea for a Christmas present). |
21922 | We know reality because we know our own bodies and actions [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: The double knowledge of the nature and action of our own body is the key to the inner being of every phenomenon in nature. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 105), quoted by Peter B. Lewis - Schopenhauer 4 | |
A reaction: Lewis calls this 'the heart of his philosophy'. Bodily awareness comes from acts of willing. So Lewis says 'the thing-in-itself is revealed to us in willing'. We experience Being and causation. Is he trying to combine idealism with the thing-in-itself? |
21913 | Kant rightly separates appearance and thing-in-itself [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: Kant's greatest merit is the distinction of the phenomenon from the thing-in-itself. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 417 App), quoted by Peter B. Lewis - Schopenhauer 3 | |
A reaction: This is Schopenhauer firmly opposing the Absolute Idealism of Kant's successors, who dismissed the 'thing-in-itsef'. |
22205 | Feelings of self-evidence (and necessity) are just the inventions of theory [Husserl] |
Full Idea: So-called feelings of self-evidence, of intellectual necessity, and however they may otherwise be called, are just theoretically invented feelings. | |
From: Edmund Husserl (Ideas: intro to pure phenomenology [1913], I.2.021) | |
A reaction: This seems to be a dismissal of the a priori necessary on the grounds that it is 'theory-laden' - which is why it has to be bracketed in order to do phenomenology. |
4164 | Direct feeling of the senses are merely data; perception of the world comes with understanding causes [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: What the eye, the ear, or the hand feels, is not perception, it is merely data. Only when the understanding passes from the effect to the cause does the world lie before us as perception extended in space. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 004) | |
A reaction: These certainly seems to be a sense-data theory. Philosophers are much more ready to separate the data from the understanding than neuroscientists are. |
4163 | All perception is intellectual [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: All perception is intellectual. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 004) | |
A reaction: Even in slugs? I suspect that this is a tautology. Schopenhauer will only allow my vision or hearing to become 'perception' when an intellectual element enters into it. |
21221 | Direct 'seeing' by consciousness is the ultimate rational legitimation [Husserl] |
Full Idea: Immediate 'seeing', not merely sensuous, experiential seeing, but seeing in the universal sense as an originally presenting consciousness of any kind whatsoever, is the ultimate legitimising source of all rational assertions. | |
From: Edmund Husserl (Ideas: intro to pure phenomenology [1913], I.2.019), quoted by Victor Velarde-Mayol - On Husserl 3.3.5 | |
A reaction: Husserl is (I gather from this) a classic rationalist. Just like Descartes' judgement of the molten wax. |
22220 | The phenomena of memory are given in the present, but as being past [Husserl, by Bernet] |
Full Idea: In Husserl's phenomenology, the intentional object of a memory is the object of a past experience, which is intuitively given to me in the present, not, however, as being present but as being past. | |
From: report of Edmund Husserl (Ideas: intro to pure phenomenology [1913]) by Rudolf Bernet - Husserl p.203 | |
A reaction: I certainly don't have to assess my mental events, and judge which are past, which are now, and which are future imaginings. I suppose Fodor would say they are memories because we find them in the memory-box. How else could it work? |
22206 | Natural science has become great by just ignoring ancient scepticism [Husserl] |
Full Idea: Natural science has grown to greatness by pushing ruthlessly aside the rank growth of ancient skepticism and renouncing the attempt to conquer it. | |
From: Edmund Husserl (Ideas: intro to pure phenomenology [1913], I.2.026) | |
A reaction: This may be because scepticism is boring, or it may be because science 'brackets' scepticism, leaving philosophers to worry about it. |
22221 | We know another's mind via bodily expression, while also knowing it is inaccessible [Husserl, by Bernet] |
Full Idea: Another person's consciousness is given to me through the expressive stratum of her body, which gives me access to her experience while making me realise that it is inaccessible to me. Empathy is a presentation of what is absent. | |
From: report of Edmund Husserl (Ideas: intro to pure phenomenology [1913]) by Rudolf Bernet - Husserl p.203 | |
A reaction: This is the phenomenological approach to the problem of other minds, by examining the raw experience of encountering another person. It is true that we seem to both know and not know another person's mind when we encounter them. |
4166 | A consciousness without an object is no consciousness [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: A consciousness without an object is no consciousness. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I Supp) | |
A reaction: This hints at Hume's observations about the self. Certainly totally vacant consciousness seems inconceivable, but is that a necessary or a contingent truth? |
22212 | Pure consciousness is a sealed off system of actual Being [Husserl] |
Full Idea: Consciousness, considered in its 'purity', must be reckoned as a self-contained system of Being, a system of actual Being, into which nothing can penetrate, and from which nothing can escape. | |
From: Edmund Husserl (Ideas: intro to pure phenomenology [1913], II.3.049) | |
A reaction: Recorded without comment, to show that among phenomenologists there is a way of thinking about consciousness which is a long way from analytic discussions of the topic. |
21369 | We have hidden and unadmitted desires and fears, suppressed because of vanity [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: We often do not know what we desire or fear. For years we can have a desire without admitting it to ourselves ....because the intellect is not to know anything about it, since the good opinion we have of ourselves would inevitably suffer thereby. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], II 210), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 5 'Will' | |
A reaction: The idea of unconscious thought crept up well before Freud. It is in La Rochefoucauld, and important in Nietzsche. Neuroscience seems to give it a strong priority over the conscious mind, which is a revolutionary idea. |
21367 | I know both aspects of my body, as representation, and as will [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: My body is the only object of which I know not merely the one side, that of the representation, but also the other, that is called 'will'. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 125), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 3 'Will' | |
A reaction: I'm not convinced that knowledge of the body through the will (and action, presumably) constitutes a different sort of knowledge. Philosophers are always trying to split the world in two (but not Nietzsche!). |
22214 | We never meet the Ego, as part of experience, or as left over from experience [Husserl] |
Full Idea: We never stumble across the pure Ego as an experience within the flux of manifold experiences which survives as transcendental residuum; nor do we meet it as a constitutive bit of experience appearing with the experience of which it is an integral part. | |
From: Edmund Husserl (Ideas: intro to pure phenomenology [1913], II.4.057) | |
A reaction: It seems that he agrees with David Hume. Sartre's 'Transcendence of the Ego' follows up this idea. However, Husserl goes on to assert the 'necessity' of the permanent Ego, which sounds like Kant's view. |
4175 | It is as perverse to resent our individuality being replaced by others, as to resent the body renewing itself [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: It is as perverse to desire the continuity of one's individuality which is being replaced by other individuals, as to desire the permanence of the body's substance which is always being replaced by new substance. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.54) | |
A reaction: If I let that go, what am I supposed to hang on to? Nothing? Non-existence is not an attractive condition to aspire to. |
4176 | We all regard ourselves a priori as free, but see from experience that character and motive compel us [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: Everyone regards himself a priori as free in his individual actions, and only a posteriori sees that necessarily his actions follow from the coincidence of character with motives. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.55) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure what experience shows. Necessity seems more obvious when observing other people. Samuel Johnson said experience showed freedom, not necessity. |
4170 | Man's actions are not free, because they follow strictly from impact of motive on character [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: Man's action have been interpreted as free, which they are not, for every individual action follows with strict necessity from the impact of motive on character. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], II 023) | |
A reaction: If 'character is fate' (Heraclitus) then presumably motive must also be fate to complete the determinist picture. I shall spend the next year redesigning my motivation. |
4169 | Every true act of will is also at once and without exception a movement of the body [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: Every true act of will is also at once and without exception a movement of the body. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], II 018) | |
A reaction: The word 'act' seems to beg the question (as does 'true'!). I am no longer sure that I know what an act of will is. Hobbes says there is no such thing. |
7187 | Schopenhauer was caught in Christian ideals, because he didn't deify his 'will' [Nietzsche on Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: Schopenhauer's interpretation of the in-itself as will was an essential step: but he didn't know how to deify the will, and remained caught in the moral, Christian ideal | |
From: comment on Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819]) by Friedrich Nietzsche - Writings from Late Notebooks 9[42] | |
A reaction: Intriguingly, this seems to suggest that Nietzsche consciously sought to replace the absence of God with the human will, which strikes me as an odd, and very nineteenth century, idea. Loss of religion bothered them a lot. |
21365 | Only the will is thing-in-itself, seen both in blind nature and in human action [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: Only the will is thing-in-itself. ...It appears in every blindly acting force of nature, and also in the deliberate conduct of man, and the great difference between the two concerns only the degree of the manifestation. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 110), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 3 'Will' | |
A reaction: If will acts 'blindly' in forces of nature, then these seems to be the same concept as Nietzsche's 'will to power'. This seems to be heading towards Heidegger's Dasein, as a central and distinctive mode of being. |
4173 | If we were essentially intellect rather than will, our moral worth would depend on imagined motives [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: If, as all philosophers imagine, the intellect is our actual nature and the will is arrived at through knowledge, then only the motive from which we imagined we were acting would decide our moral worth. Imagined and true motive would be indistinguishable. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], II Supp) | |
A reaction: A nice argument. If motive is morally decisive, it is certainly crucial to decide between real and imagined motive (especially since Freud). But uncontrollable motive seems morally irrelevant. |
21370 | Schopenhauer is a chief proponent of aesthetic experience as 'disinterested' [Schopenhauer, by Janaway] |
Full Idea: Schopenhauer belongs to a tradition which equates aesthetic experience with a 'disinterested' attitude towards its object, and is often cited as one of the chief proponents of such a view. | |
From: report of Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819]) by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 6 'Aesthetic' | |
A reaction: 'Disinterested' is quite a nice word for one's attitude to art, though you then have to capture why you are also involved in it. |
4182 | A principal pleasure of the beautiful is that it momentarily silences the will [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: The momentary silencing of all volition …is one of the principal elements in our pleasure in the beautiful. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.65) | |
A reaction: Iris Murdoch sees moral value in beauty, because it overrides selfishness. The perception of beauty is certainly something deeper than just another nice feeling. There is a cognitive element to it. |
21928 | The Sublime fights for will-less knowing, when faced with a beautiful threat to humanity [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB] |
Full Idea: Exaltation of the Sublime is the struggle to maintain will-less knowing in the face of a threat to the human will. The Sublime contains an awful beauty and a delightful terror because it includes a threat to human existence. | |
From: report of Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 201-7) by Peter B. Lewis - Schopenhauer 5 | |
A reaction: Can you experience the Sublime when looking down a microscope? Can a mere theory in cosmology be sublime? Can a supposed perception of the Sublime ever be incorrect? We no longer worry about these questions, it seems. |
21927 | Schopenhauer emphasises Ideas in art, unlike most romantics [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB] |
Full Idea: The emphasis on the presentation of Platonic Ideas distinguishes Schopenhauer's theory of art from standard Romantic theories, which emphasize the expression of emotion and feeling. | |
From: report of Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], II) by Peter B. Lewis - Schopenhauer 5 | |
A reaction: Theories of art that neglect ideas, even if subliminally expressed, have gone badly wrong. |
8116 | The will-less contemplation of art brings a liberation from selfhood [Schopenhauer, by Gardner] |
Full Idea: For Schopenhauer, the point of art lies in the metaphysical liberation from selfhood that will-less aesthetic contemplation induces. | |
From: report of Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819]) by Sebastian Gardner - Aesthetics 3.6.3 | |
A reaction: I've never understood why anyone (Buddhists included) would want 'liberation from selfhood'. Certainly art can make us forget ourselves in a more objective view of things, but science can do that too. |
4174 | Man is more beautiful than anything else, and the loftiest purpose of art is to reveal his nature [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: Man is more beautiful than anything else, and the loftiest purpose of art is to reveal his nature. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], III 41) | |
A reaction: A bit of a shock, because it implies human vanity, but it fits the best works of art rather well. What else reveals humanity's beauty? Beautiful deeds must be recorded. |
468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |
Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice. | |
From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where? |
21380 | The only aim of our existence is to grasp that non-existence would be better [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: Nothing else can be stated as the aim of our existence except the knowledge that it would be better for us not to exist. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], II 605), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 8 'Denial' | |
A reaction: Nonsense on stilts. Nietzsche rebelled against this. If there is such 'knowledge' then it obviously has nothing to do with the aim of our existence. It is just a rejection of aims. The aim is making the best of existence, not spurning it. |
21374 | We should no more expect ethical theory to produce good people than aesthetics to produce artists [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: We should be just as foolish to expect that our moral systems and ethics would create virtuous, noble and hold men, as that our aesthetics would produce poets, painterd and musicians. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 271), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 7 'Against' | |
A reaction: Presumably the aim of ethical theory is to understand the truths about ethics. That can't do any harm, can it? In every other area of life we think that understanding leads to improvement. Unless, of course, there are no truths of ethics.... |
22203 | Only facts follow from facts [Husserl] |
Full Idea: From facts follow always nothing but facts. | |
From: Edmund Husserl (Ideas: intro to pure phenomenology [1913], I.1.008) | |
A reaction: I presume objective possibilities follow from facts, so this doesn't sound strictly correct. I sounds like a nice slogan for those desiring to keep facts separate from values. [on p.53 he comments on fact/value] |
4181 | Every good is essentially relative, for it has its essential nature only in its relation to a desiring will [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: Every good is essentially relative, for it has its essential nature only in its relation to a desiring will. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.65) | |
A reaction: A nice way of stating the core of moral relativism. To me, though, it just seems a rejection of morality. Conflicting wills bring moral paralysis. Might is right. |
5649 | Will casts aside each of its temporary fulfilments, so human life has no ultimate aim [Schopenhauer, by Scruton] |
Full Idea: Since for Schopenhauer will has no intrinsic end, but breaks through all its temporary fulfilments and casts them aside as irrelevant once attained, it becomes impossible to assert that there is any ultimate aim to human activity. | |
From: report of Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819]) by Roger Scruton - Short History of Modern Philosophy Ch.13 | |
A reaction: This sums up part of the modern anti-teleological view of life, with its notion of purposes which can only arise out of consciousnesses. Such a view leaves untouched the key question, which is "What should I will?" |
4177 | Most people would probably choose non-existence at the end of their life, rather than relive the whole thing [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: Perhaps no one at the end of his life, if he gives the matter sober consideration and is, at the same time, frank, ever wishes to live it over again; he more readily chooses non-existence. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.59) | |
A reaction: Hence Nietzsche's doctrine of 'eternal return' (Gay Science §341, idea 2936). From Schopenhauer it is just bleak pessimism, but from Nietzsche it is a wonderful challenge to live, perhaps the best ever. |
4185 | Altruistic people make less distinction than usual between themselves and others [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: If we observe an altruistic action the simplest explanation and the essential character of the person's conduct is that they make less distinction than is usually made between themselves and others. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.66) | |
A reaction: Obvious, really, but Schopenhauer is talking about the will. Is the effacement of the Self desirable, apart from the benefit it might bring to other people. I don't find it appealing. |
4183 | Only self-love can motivate morality, but that also makes it worthless [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: A theory of morals which motivates can only do so by working on self-love, but what springs from this latter has no moral worth. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.66) | |
A reaction: I just don't believe this pessimism. Schopenhauer was an incipient social darwinist who needed a course in modern game theory. Or he just needed to be a nicer man. |
4172 | Happiness is the swift movement from desire to satisfaction, and then again on to desire [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: We are fortunate if we keep up the game whereby desire passes into satisfaction, and satisfaction into new desire - if the pace of this is swift, it is called happiness, and if it is slow, sorrow. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], II 029) | |
A reaction: This seems to be the dream of the addict, as Socrates points out with his example of the leaky jar in 'Gorgias'. Should we want more desires? |
21371 | We can never attain happiness while our will is pursuing desires [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: So long as our consciousness is filled by our will, so long as we are given up to the throng of desires with its constant hopes and fears, so long as we are the subject of willing, we never attain lasting happiness or peace. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 196), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 6 'Aesthetic' | |
A reaction: I hate this idea. It obviously leads to his Buddhism, and the eastern idea that life is generally a bad idea and to be avoided. I think Nietzsche rebelled strongly against this attitude of Schopenhauer's. |
4184 | Virtue must spring from an intuitive recognition that other people are essentially like us [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: Virtue must spring from that intuitive knowledge which recognises in the individuality of others the same essence as in our own. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.66) | |
A reaction: After all his pessimism, he arrives at a view similar to Hume's, that morality is built on natural empathy. But why built a moral theory on one base. Everything points us towards morality! Moral actions are more beautiful. |
4179 | The essence of nature is the will to life itself [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: The essence of nature is the will to life itself. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.60) | |
A reaction: How would he have responded to Darwin? The will to life is the product, there, of a different and more remote force, such as the 'energy' of the physicist (whatever that is!). |
4178 | Christianity is a pessimistic religion, in which the world is equated with evil [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: Let no one think that Christianity is conducive to optimism; on the contrary, in the Gospels 'world' and 'evil' are used almost synonymously. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.59) | |
A reaction: The source of Nietzsche's 'Beyond Good and Evil'. Do any religions throw you vigorously back into the middle of life, with its conflict and creativity? |
4180 | Religion is the mythical clothing of the truth which is inaccessible to the crude human intellect [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: All systems of religion are the mythical clothing of the truth which is inaccessible to the crude human intellect. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.63) | |
A reaction: Is this a compliment? It seems to be, because at least the mysteries are identified and given an outward form. A nice thought. |