9284
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Reasons are 'internal' if they give a person a motive to act, but 'external' otherwise [Williams,B]
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Full Idea:
Someone has 'internal reasons' to act when the person has some motive which will be served or furthered by the action; if this turns out not to be so, the reason is false. Reasons are 'external' when there is no such condition.
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From:
Bernard Williams (Internal and External Reasons [1980], p.101)
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A reaction:
[compressed] An external example given is a family tradition of joining the army, if the person doesn't want to. Williams says (p.111) external reason statements are actually false, and a misapplication of the concept of a 'reason to act'. See Idea 8815.
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8408
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Probabilistic causation says C is a cause of E if it increases the chances of E occurring [Mellor, by Tooley]
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Full Idea:
The basic idea of probabilistic causation is that a sufficient condition of C's being a cause of E is that C and E are actual, individual events, and the objective chance of E's occurring is greater given the occurrence of C than it would be without C.
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From:
report of D.H. Mellor (The Facts of Causation [1995]) by Michael Tooley - Causation and Supervenience 5.3
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A reaction:
Mellor has to include objective 'chances' in his ontology to support his theory. As it stands this looks like a weak theory, since the event might not occur despite C happening, and some less likely event might turn out to be the actual cause.
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