Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Ethical consistency' and 'Intro to I: Classical Logic'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

4 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
9463 Classical logic is bivalent, has excluded middle, and only quantifies over existent objects [Jacquette]
     Full Idea: Classical logic (of Whitehead, Russell, Gödel, Church) is a two-valued system of propositional and predicate logic, in which all propositions are exclusively true or false, and quantification and predication are over existent objects only.
     From: Dale Jacquette (Intro to I: Classical Logic [2002], p.9)
     A reaction: All of these get challenged at some point, though the existence requirement is the one I find dubious.
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / a. Dilemmas
22455 Many ethical theories neglect the power of regretting the ought not acted upon [Williams,B]
     Full Idea: It is a fundamental criticism of many ethical theories that their accounts of moral conflict and its resolution do not do justice to the facts of regret...: basically because they eliminate from the scene the ought that is not acted upon.
     From: Bernard Williams (Ethical consistency [1965], p.175), quoted by Philippa Foot - Moral Realism and Moral Dilemma p.39
     A reaction: [p.175 in Problems of the Self] Williams seems to have initiated this idea. It doesn't matter much for Kantians and Utilitarians (any more than a wrong answer in maths), but it matters if character is the focus. The virtuous have regrets.
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
468 Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.]
     Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice.
     From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where?
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / f. Ethical non-cognitivism
22453 Moral conflicts have a different feeling and structure from belief conflicts [Williams,B, by Foot]
     Full Idea: Williams insisted that the feelings we have in situations of moral conflict show that the 'structure' of moral judgements is unlike that of assertions expressing beliefs.
     From: report of Bernard Williams (Ethical consistency [1965]) by Philippa Foot - Moral Realism and Moral Dilemma p.36
     A reaction: Foot presents this as a key reason for the non-cognitivist view of ethics, and her paper attacks it. I don't usually react to moral disagreement with the same vigour I have when I think a belief is untrue. It may just be uncertainty, though.