34 ideas
16477 | Asserting not-p is saying p is false [Russell] |
Full Idea: When you do what a logician would call 'asserting not-p', you are saying 'p is false'. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth [1940], 5) | |
A reaction: This is presumably classical logic. If we could label p as 'undetermined' (a third truth value), then 'not-p' might equally mean 'undetermined'. |
16484 | There are four experiences that lead us to talk of 'some' things [Russell] |
Full Idea: Propositions about 'some' arise, in practice, in four ways: as generalisations of disjunctions; when an instance suggests compatibility of terms we thought incompatible; as steps to a generalisation; and in cases of imperfect memory. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth [1940], 5) | |
A reaction: Modern logicians seem to have no interest in the question Russell is investigating here, but I love his attempt, however vague the result, to connect logic to real experience and thought. |
16486 | The physical world doesn't need logic, but the mental world does [Russell] |
Full Idea: The non-mental world can be completely described without the use of any logical word, …but when it comes to the mental world, there are facts which cannot be mentioned without the use of logical words. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth [1940], 5) | |
A reaction: He adds that logical words are not needed for physics, but are needed for psychology. I love Russell's interest in the psychology of logic (in defiance of the anti-psychologism of Frege). See also the ideas of Robert Hanna. |
2947 | Questions wouldn't lead anywhere without the law of excluded middle [Russell] |
Full Idea: Without the law of excluded middle, we could not ask the questions that give rise to discoveries. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth [1940], c.p.88) |
16480 | A disjunction expresses indecision [Russell] |
Full Idea: A disjunction is the verbal expression of indecision, or, if a question, of the desire to reach a decision. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth [1940], 5) | |
A reaction: Russell is fishing here for Grice's conversational implicature. If you want to assert a simple proposition, you don't introduce it into an irrelevant disjunction, because that would have a particular expressive purpose. |
16479 | 'Or' expresses hesitation, in a dog at a crossroads, or birds risking grabbing crumbs [Russell] |
Full Idea: Psychologically, 'or' corresponds to a state of hesitation. A dog waits at a fork in the road, to see which way you are going. For crumbs on a windowsill, birds behave in a manner we would express by 'shall I be brave, or go hungry?'. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth [1940], 5) | |
A reaction: I love two facts here - first, that Russell wants to link the connective to the psychology of experience, and second, that a great logician wants to connect his logic to the minds of animals. |
16481 | 'Or' expresses a mental state, not something about the world [Russell] |
Full Idea: When we assert 'p or q' we are in a state which is derivative from two previous states, and we express this state, not something about the world. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth [1940], 5) | |
A reaction: His example: at a junction this road or that road goes to Oxford, but the world only contains the roads, not some state of 'this or that road'. He doesn't deny that in one sense 'p or q' tells you something about the world. |
16487 | Maybe the 'or' used to describe mental states is not the 'or' of logic [Russell] |
Full Idea: It might be contended that, in describing what happens when a man believes 'p or q', the 'or' that we must use is not the same as the 'or' of logic. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth [1940], 5) | |
A reaction: This seems to be the general verdict on Russell's enquiries in this chapter, but I love any attempt, however lacking in rigour etc., to connect formal logic to how we think, and thence to the world. |
16483 | Disjunction may also arise in practice if there is imperfect memory. [Russell] |
Full Idea: Another situation in which a disjunction may arise is practice is imperfect memory. 'Either Brown or Jones told me that'. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth [1940], 5) |
16475 | A 'heterological' predicate can't be predicated of itself; so is 'heterological' heterological? Yes=no! [Russell] |
Full Idea: A predicate is 'heterological' when it cannot be predicated of itself; thus 'long' is heterological because it is not a long word, but 'short' is homological. So is 'heterological' heterological? Either answer leads to a contradiction. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth [1940], 5) | |
A reaction: [Grelling's Paradox] Yes: 'heterological' is heterological because it isn't heterological; No: it isn't, because it is. Russell says we therefore need a hierarchy of languages (types), and the word 'word' is outside the system. |
16482 | All our knowledge (if verbal) is general, because all sentences contain general words [Russell] |
Full Idea: All our knowledge about the world, in so far as it is expressed in words, is more or less general, because every sentence contains at least one word that is not a proper name, and all such words are general. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth [1940], 5) | |
A reaction: I really like this, especially because it addresses the excessive reliance of some essentialists on sortals, categories and natural kinds, instead of focusing on the actual physical essences of individual objects. |
4758 | Naïve realism leads to physics, but physics then shows that naïve realism is false [Russell] |
Full Idea: Naïve realism leads to physics, and physics, if true, shows that naïve realism is false. Therefore naïve realism, if true, is false, therefore it is false. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth [1940], p.13) | |
A reaction: I'm inclined to agree with this, though once you have gone off and explored representation and sense data you may be driven back to naïve realism again. |
16476 | For simple words, a single experience can show that they are true [Russell] |
Full Idea: So long as a man avoids words which are condensed inductions (such as 'dog'), and confines himself to words that can describe a single experience, it is possible for a single experience to show that his words are true. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth [1940], 5) | |
A reaction: One might question whether a line can be drawn between the inductive and the non-inductive in this way. I'm inclined just to say that the simpler the proposition the less room there is for error in confirming it. |
16485 | Perception can't prove universal generalisations, so abandon them, or abandon empiricism? [Russell] |
Full Idea: Propositions about 'some' may be proved empirically, but propositions about 'all' are difficult to know, and can't be proved unless such propositions are in the premisses. These aren't in perception, so forgo general propositions, or abandon empiricism? | |
From: Bertrand Russell (An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth [1940], 5) | |
A reaction: This is obviously related to the difficulty empiricists have with induction. You could hardly persuade logicians to give up the universal quantifier, because it is needed in mathematics. Do we actually know any universal empirical truths? |
16478 | A mother cat is paralysed if equidistant between two needy kittens [Russell] |
Full Idea: I once, to test the story of Buridan's Ass, put a cat exactly half-way between her two kittens, both too young to move: for a time she found the disjunction paralysing. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth [1940], 5) | |
A reaction: Buridan's Ass is said to have starved between two equal piles of hay. Reason can't be the tie-breaker; reason obviously says 'choose one!', but intellectualism demands a reason for the one you choose. |
468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |
Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice. | |
From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where? |
20624 | Work degrades into heat, but not vice versa [Close] |
Full Idea: William Thomson, Lord Kelvin, declared (in 1865) the second law of thermodynamics: mechanical work inevitably tends to degrade into heat, but not vice versa. | |
From: Frank Close (Theories of Everything [2017], 3 'Perpetual') | |
A reaction: The basis of entropy, which makes time an essential part of physics. Might this be the single most important fact about the physical world? |
20623 | First Law: energy can change form, but is conserved overall [Close] |
Full Idea: The first law of thermodynamics : energy can be changed from one form to another, but is always conserved overall. | |
From: Frank Close (Theories of Everything [2017], 3 'Perpetual') | |
A reaction: So we have no idea what energy is, but we know it's conserved. (Daniel Bernoulli showed the greater the mean energy, the higher the temperature. James Joule showed the quantitative equivalence of heat and work p.26-7) |
20625 | Third Law: total order and minimum entropy only occurs at absolute zero [Close] |
Full Idea: The third law of thermodynamics says that a hypothetical state of total order and minimum entropy can be attained only at the absolute zero temperature, minus 273 degrees Celsius. | |
From: Frank Close (Theories of Everything [2017], 3 'Arrow') | |
A reaction: If temperature is energetic movement of atoms (or whatever), then obviously zero movement is the coldest it can get. So is absolute zero an energy state, or an absence of energy? I have no idea what 'total order' means. |
20622 | All motions are relative and ambiguous, but acceleration is the same in all inertial frames [Close] |
Full Idea: There is no absolute state of rest; only relative motions are unambiguous. Contrast this with acceleration, however, which has the same magnitude in all inertial frames. | |
From: Frank Close (Theories of Everything [2017], 3 'Newton's') | |
A reaction: It seems important to remember this, before we start trumpeting about the whole of physics being relative. ....But see Idea 20634! |
20628 | The electric and magnetic are tightly linked, and viewed according to your own motion [Close] |
Full Idea: Electric and magnetic phenomena are profoundly intertwined; what you interpret as electric or magnetic thus depends on your own motion. | |
From: Frank Close (Theories of Everything [2017], 3 'Light!') | |
A reaction: This sounds like an earlier version of special relativity. |
20635 | The general relativity equations relate curvature in space-time to density of energy-momentum [Close] |
Full Idea: The essence of general relativity relates 'curvature in space-time' on one side of the equation to the 'density of momentum and energy' on the other. ...In full, Einstein required ten equations of this type. | |
From: Frank Close (Theories of Everything [2017], 5 'Gravity') | |
A reaction: Momentum involves mass, and energy is equivalent to mass (e=mc^2). |
20642 | Photon exchange drives the electro-magnetic force [Close] |
Full Idea: The exchange of photons drives the electro-magnetic force. | |
From: Frank Close (Theories of Everything [2017], 6 'Superstrings') | |
A reaction: So light, which we just think of as what is visible, is a mere side-effect of the engine room of nature - the core mechanism of the whole electro-magnetic field. |
20627 | Electric fields have four basic laws (two by Gauss, one by Ampère, one by Faraday) [Close] |
Full Idea: Four basic laws of electric and magnetic fields: Gauss's Law (about the flux produced by a field), Gauss's law of magnets (there can be no monopoles), Ampère's Law (fields on surfaces), and Farday's Law (accelerated magnets produce fields). | |
From: Frank Close (Theories of Everything [2017], 3 'Light!') | |
A reaction: [Highly compressed, for an overview. Close explains them] |
20630 | Light isn't just emitted in quanta called photons - light is photons [Close] |
Full Idea: Planck had assumed that light is emitted in quanta called photons. Einstein went further - light is photons. | |
From: Frank Close (Theories of Everything [2017], 3 'Light!') | |
A reaction: The point is that light travels as entities which are photons, rather than the emissions being quantized packets of some other stuff. |
20637 | In general relativity the energy and momentum of photons subjects them to gravity [Close] |
Full Idea: In Einstein's general theory, gravity acts also on energy and momentum, not simply on mass. For example, massless photons of light feel the gravitational attraction of the Sun and can be deflected. | |
From: Frank Close (Theories of Everything [2017], 5 'Planck') | |
A reaction: Ah, a puzzle solved. How come massless photons are bent by gravity? |
20629 | Electro-magnetic waves travel at light speed - so light is electromagnetism! [Close] |
Full Idea: Faradays' measurements predicted the speed of electro-magnetic waves, which happened to be the speed of light, so Maxwell made an inspired leap: light is an electromagnetic wave! | |
From: Frank Close (Theories of Everything [2017], 3 'Light!') | |
A reaction: Put that way, it doesn't sound like an 'inspired' leap, because travelling at exactly the same speed seems a pretty good indication that they are the same sort of thing. (But I'm not denying that Maxwell was a special guy!) |
20632 | In QED, electro-magnetism exists in quantum states, emitting and absorbing electrons [Close] |
Full Idea: Dirac created quantum electrodynamics (QED): the universal electro-magnetic field can exist in discreet states of energy (with photons appearing and disappearing by energy excitations. This combined classical ideas, quantum theory and special relativity. | |
From: Frank Close (Theories of Everything [2017], 3 'Light!') | |
A reaction: Close says this is the theory of everything in atomic structure, but not in nuclei (which needs QCD and QFD). So if there are lots of other 'fields' (e.g. gravitational, weak, strong, Higgs), how do they all fit together? Do they talk to one another? |
20639 | Quantum fields contain continual rapid creation and disappearance [Close] |
Full Idea: Quantum field theory implies that the vacuum of space is filled with particles and antiparticles which bubble in and out of existence on faster and faster timescales over shorter and shorter distances. | |
From: Frank Close (Theories of Everything [2017], 6 'Intro') | |
A reaction: Ponder this sentence until you head aches. Existence, but not as we know it, Jim. Close says calculations in QED about the electron confirm this. |
20641 | Electrons get their mass by interaction with the Higgs field [Close] |
Full Idea: The electron gets its mass by interaction with the ubiquitous Higgs field. | |
From: Frank Close (Theories of Everything [2017], 6 'Hierarchy') | |
A reaction: I thought I understood mass until I read this. Is it just wrong to say the mass of a table is the 'amount of stuff' in it? |
20631 | Dirac showed how electrons conform to special relativity [Close] |
Full Idea: In 1928 Paul Dirac discovered the quantum equation that describes the electron and conforms to the requirements special relativity theory. | |
From: Frank Close (Theories of Everything [2017], 3 'Light!') | |
A reaction: This sounds like a major step in the unification of physics. Quantum theory and General relativity remain irreconcilable. |
20626 | Modern theories of matter are grounded in heat, work and energy [Close] |
Full Idea: The link between temperature, heat, work and energy is at the root of our historical ability to construct theories of matter, such as Newton's dynamics, while ignoring, and indeed being ignorant of - atomic dimensions. | |
From: Frank Close (Theories of Everything [2017], 3 'Arrow') | |
A reaction: That is, presumably, that even when you fill in the atoms, and the standard model of physics, these aspects of matter do the main explaiining (of the behaviour, rather than of the structure). |
20633 | The Higgs field is an electroweak plasma - but we don't know what stuff it consists of [Close] |
Full Idea: In 2012 it was confirmed that we are immersed in an electroweak plasma - the Higgs field. We curently have no knowledge of what this stuff might consist of. | |
From: Frank Close (Theories of Everything [2017], 4 'Higgs') | |
A reaction: The second sentence has my full attention. So we don't understand a field properly until we understand the 'stuff' it is made of? So what are all the familiar fields made of? Tell me more! |
20640 | Space-time is indeterminate foam over short distances [Close] |
Full Idea: At very short distances, space-time itself becomes some indeterminate foam. | |
From: Frank Close (Theories of Everything [2017], 6 'Intro') | |
A reaction: [see Close for a bit more detail of this weird idea] |