Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Substitutional Classes and Relations' and 'Two treatises'

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7 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 7. Contextual Definition
Any linguistic expression may lack meaning when taken out of context [Russell]
     Full Idea: Any sentence, a single word, or a single component phrase, may often be quite devoid of meaning when separated from its context.
     From: Bertrand Russell (Substitutional Classes and Relations [1906], p.165)
     A reaction: Contextualism is now extremely fashionable, in philosophy of language and in epistemology. Here Russell is looking for a contextual way to define classes [so says Lackey, the editor].
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 8. Category Mistake / a. Category mistakes
'The number one is bald' or 'the number one is fond of cream cheese' are meaningless [Russell]
     Full Idea: 'The number one is bald' or 'the number one is fond of cream cheese' are, I maintain, not merely silly remarks, but totally devoid of meaning.
     From: Bertrand Russell (Substitutional Classes and Relations [1906], p.166)
     A reaction: He connects this to paradoxes in set theory, such as the assertion that 'the class of human beings is a human being' (which is the fallacy of composition).
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / p. Axiom of Reducibility
Axiom of Reducibility: there is always a function of the lowest possible order in a given level [Russell, by Bostock]
     Full Idea: Russell's Axiom of Reducibility states that to any propositional function of any order in a given level, there corresponds another which is of the lowest possible order in the level. There corresponds what he calls a 'predicative' function of that level.
     From: report of Bertrand Russell (Substitutional Classes and Relations [1906]) by David Bostock - Philosophy of Mathematics 8.2
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
There is no complexity without relations, so no propositions, and no truth [Russell]
     Full Idea: Relations in intension are of the utmost importance to philosophy and philosophical logic, since they are essential to complexity, and thence to propositions, and thence to the possibility of truth and falsehood.
     From: Bertrand Russell (Substitutional Classes and Relations [1906], p.174)
     A reaction: Should we able to specify the whole of reality, if we have available to us objects, properties and relations? There remains indeterminate 'stuff', when it does not compose objects. There are relations between pure ideas.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 4. Quantity of an Object
Quantity is the capacity to be divided [Digby]
     Full Idea: Quantity …is divisibility, or a capacity to be divided into parts.
     From: Kenelm Digby (Two treatises [1644], I.2.8), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 04.1
     A reaction: 'Quantity' is scholastic philosophy is a concept we no longer possess. Without quantity, a thing might potentially exist at a spaceless point. Quantity is what spreads things out. See Pasnau Ch. 4.
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.]
     Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice.
     From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where?
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / b. Corpuscles
Colours arise from the rarity, density and mixture of matter [Digby]
     Full Idea: The origin of all colours in bodies is plainly deduced out of the various degrees of rarity and density, variously mixed and compounded.
     From: Kenelm Digby (Two treatises [1644], I.29.4), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 22.5
     A reaction: We are still struggling with this question, though I think the picture is gradually become clear, once you get the hang of the brain. Easy! See Idea 17396.