8 ideas
21563 | The 'no classes' theory says the propositions just refer to the members [Russell] |
Full Idea: The contention of the 'no classes' theory is that all significant propositions concerning classes can be regarded as propositions about all or some of their members. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (On 'Insolubilia' and their solution [1906], p.200) | |
A reaction: Apparently this theory has not found favour with later generations of theorists. I see it in terms of Russell trying to get ontology down to the minimum, in the spirit of Goodman and Quine. |
5637 | Nowadays logic is seen as the science of extensions, not intensions [Scruton] |
Full Idea: Logicians have come increasingly to realise that logic is the science not of the intension, but of the extension of terms. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Short History of Modern Philosophy [1981], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: I take this to be because the notion of a 'set' is basic, which is defined strictly in terms of its members. This move is probably because we can be clear about extensions, but not intensions. Tidiness is no substitute for complex truth. |
21565 | Richard's puzzle uses the notion of 'definition' - but that cannot be defined [Russell] |
Full Idea: In Richard's puzzle, we use the notion of 'definition', and this, oddly enough, is not definable, and is indeed not a definite notion at all. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (On 'Insolubilia' and their solution [1906], p.209) | |
A reaction: The background for this claim is his type theory, which renders certain forms of circular reference meaningless. |
21564 | Vicious Circle: what involves ALL must not be one of those ALL [Russell] |
Full Idea: The 'vicious-circle principle' says 'whatever involves an apparent variable must not be among the possible values of that variable', or (less exactly) 'whatever involves ALL must not be one of ALL which it involves. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (On 'Insolubilia' and their solution [1906], p.204) | |
A reaction: He offers this as a parallel to his 'no classes' principle. That referred to classes, but this refers to propositions, and specifically the Liar Paradox (which he calls the 'Epimenedes'). |
5636 | Cartesian 'ideas' confuse concepts and propositions [Scruton] |
Full Idea: Cartesian 'ideas' seem to be both concepts and propositions at once. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Short History of Modern Philosophy [1981], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: This seems to be the simple reason why modern philosophers don't like this seventeenth century notion. There is something slightly too tidy about the modern notion of propositions built out of concepts. Animals see propositions in a flash. |
468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |
Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice. | |
From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where? |
5660 | Allegiance is prior to the recognition of individual rights [Scruton] |
Full Idea: Personally I regard allegiance, in the manner of Hegel, as prior to the recognition of individual rights. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Short History of Modern Philosophy [1981], Bibliog) | |
A reaction: Scruton notoriously generates rather right-wing views from this basis, but it is also the basis of communitarianism, which can take a softer form. It seems to me self-evident that rights cannot be the prime concept in a society. What society? |
5653 | A right is a power which is enforced in the name of justice [Scruton] |
Full Idea: Rights are enforced in the name of justice, whereas power is enforced come what may. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Short History of Modern Philosophy [1981], Ch.14) | |
A reaction: Presumably rights can be claimed as well as enforced, and the notion of a natural right is at least a discussable concept, as in the 'right' of self-defence. Scruton offers us a very right-wing definition of rights. |