8 ideas
| 15395 | Give up objects necessitating truths, and say their natures cause the truths? [Cameron] |
| Full Idea: We could abandon the view that truthmakers necessitate the truth of that which makes them true, and say that an object makes a truth when its intrinsic nature suffices for that truth. The object would have a different intrinsic nature if the truth failed. | |
| From: Ross P. Cameron (Intrinsic and Extrinsic Properties [2009], 'Truthmakers') | |
| A reaction: [He cites Josh Parsons 1999, 2005 for this] This approach seems closely related to Kit Fine's proposal that necessities arise from the natures of things. It sounds to me as if an object with that intrinsic nature would necessitate that truth. |
| 15394 | Truthmaker requires a commitment to tropes or states of affairs, for contingent truths [Cameron] |
| Full Idea: The most popular view is that an object is a truthmaker if the object couldn't exist and the truth be false. But contingent predications are also held to need truthmakers. Socrates is not necessarily snub-nosed, so a trope or state of affairs is needed. | |
| From: Ross P. Cameron (Intrinsic and Extrinsic Properties [2009], 'Truthmakers') | |
| A reaction: Cameron calls this 'some heavy ontological commitments'. If snub-nosedness is necessitated by the trope of 'being snub-nosed', what is the truthmaker for Socrates having that trope? |
| 15401 | Essentialists say intrinsic properties arise from what the thing is, irrespective of surroundings [Cameron] |
| Full Idea: The essentialist approach would be to say that an intrinsic property is one such that it is no part of what it is to instantiate that property that the bearer stands in some relation to its surroundings. | |
| From: Ross P. Cameron (Intrinsic and Extrinsic Properties [2009], 'Analysis') | |
| A reaction: This is offered as an alternative to the David Lewis account in terms of duplicates across possible worlds. You will have gathered by now, if you have spent days poring over my stuff, that I favour the essentialist approach. |
| 15393 | An object's intrinsic properties are had in virtue of how it is, independently [Cameron] |
| Full Idea: Intrinsic properties are those that an object has solely in virtue of how it is, independently of its surroundings. | |
| From: Ross P. Cameron (Intrinsic and Extrinsic Properties [2009], 'Intro') | |
| A reaction: Better not mention quantum mechanics and fields if you want to talk of objects being independent of their surroundings. Am I 'independent' of gravity, or is gravity 'independent' of me? |
| 21710 | We know a universal in 'yellow differs from blue' or 'yellow resembles blue less than green does' [Russell] |
| Full Idea: We are aware of the universal 'yellow'; this universal is the subject in such judgements as 'yellow differs from blue' or 'yellow resembles blue less than green does'. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Knowledge by Acquaintance and Description-1 [1911], 154), quoted by Bernard Linsky - Russell's Metaphysical Logic 2.3 | |
| A reaction: This still seems one of the strongest examples in support of universals. You could hardly be talking about yellow tropes in such instances (even if the world does contain yellow tropes). |
| 15396 | Most criteria for identity over time seem to leave two later objects identical to the earlier one [Cameron] |
| Full Idea: Criteria for identity across times have proven hard to give. Whatever criteria we lay down, it seems that there are possible situations in which two later objects bear the relevant relation to one earlier object, though only one of them can be identical. | |
| From: Ross P. Cameron (Intrinsic and Extrinsic Properties [2009], 'Personal') | |
| A reaction: We only have to think of twins, amoebae that fission, and the Ship of Theseus. We seem to end up inventing a dubious criterion in order to break the tie. |
| 8854 | My 'acquaintance' with sense-data is nothing like my knowing New York [Williams,M on Russell] |
| Full Idea: My 'acquaintance' with sense-data is nothing like my knowing New York. | |
| From: comment on Bertrand Russell (Knowledge by Acquaintance and Description-1 [1911]) by Michael Williams - Without Immediate Justification §4 | |
| A reaction: This pinpoints a nice difficulty for Russell. Williams may misrepresent Russell's account of acquaintance, but that is probably because Russell is unclear, or uncertain. The problem is when Russell claims that his acquaintance gives knowledge. |
| 468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |
| Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice. | |
| From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where? |