6 ideas
| 21597 | Logical connectives have the highest precision, yet are infected by the vagueness of true and false [Russell, by Williamson] |
| Full Idea: Russell says the best chance of avoiding vagueness are the logical connectives. ...But the vagueness of 'true' and 'false' infects the logical connectives too. All words are vague. Russell concludes that all language is vague. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (Vagueness [1923]) by Timothy Williamson - Vagueness 2.4 | |
| A reaction: This relies on the logical connectives being defined semantically, in terms of T and F, but that is standard. Presumably the formal uninterpreted syntax is not vague. |
| 9051 | Since natural language is not precise it cannot be in the province of logic [Russell, by Keefe/Smith] |
| Full Idea: Russell takes it that logic assumes precision, and since natural language is not precise it cannot be in the province of logic at all. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (Vagueness [1923]) by R Keefe / P Smith - Intro: Theories of Vagueness §1 | |
| A reaction: I find this view congenial. It seems to me that the necessary prelude to logic is to do everything you can to eliminate ambiguity and vagueness from the sentences at issue. We want the proposition, or logical form. If there isn't one, forget it? |
| 9054 | Vagueness is only a characteristic of representations, such as language [Russell] |
| Full Idea: Vagueness and precision alike are characteristics which can only belong to a representation, of which language is an example. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Vagueness [1923], p.62) | |
| A reaction: Russell was the first to tackle the question of vagueness, and he may have got it right. If we are unable to decide which set an object belongs in (red or orange) that is a problem for our conceptual/linguistic scheme. The object still has a colour! |
| 4760 | Belief aims at knowledge (rather than truth), and mere believing is a kind of botched knowing [Williamson] |
| Full Idea: Knowing is the best kind of believing. Mere believing is a kind of botched knowing. In short, belief aims at knowledge (not just truth). | |
| From: Timothy Williamson (Knowledge and its Limits [2000], §1.5) | |
| A reaction: The difference between aiming at truth and aiming at knowledge has to be in the justificiation, so beliefs aim to be justified. Believers always aim at truth, but they can be strikingly relaxed about justification. |
| 19512 | Don't analyse knowledge; use knowledge to analyse other concepts in epistemology [Williamson, by DeRose] |
| Full Idea: Williamson says that instead of being viewed as a concept to be analysed, knowledge should be seen as something useful in the analysis of all sorts of other concepts to epistemology - and to philosophy of mind as well. | |
| From: report of Timothy Williamson (Knowledge and its Limits [2000]) by Keith DeRose - The Case for Contextualism 1.8 | |
| A reaction: I just don't believe this, because knowledge is obviously a complex state of mind, which invites breaking it down into ingredients. How could knowledge possibly be prior to truth? |
| 468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |
| Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice. | |
| From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where? |