15 ideas
| 15086 | Absolute necessity might be achievable either logically or metaphysically [Hale] |
| Full Idea: Maybe peaceful co-existence between absolute logical necessity and absolute metaphysical necessity can be secured, ..and absolute necessity is their union. ...However, a truth would then qualify as absolutely necessary in two quite different ways. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Absolute Necessities [1996], 4) | |
| A reaction: Hale is addressing a really big question for metaphysic (absolute necessity) which others avoid. In the end he votes for rejecting 'metaphysical' necessity. I am tempted to vote for rejecting logical necessity (as being relative). 'Absolute' is an ideal. |
| 8261 | Maybe not-p is logically possible, but p is metaphysically necessary, so the latter is not absolute [Hale] |
| Full Idea: It might be metaphysically necessary that p but logically possible that not-p, so that metaphysical necessity is not, after all, absolute. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Absolute Necessities [1996]), quoted by E.J. Lowe - The Possibility of Metaphysics 1.5 | |
| A reaction: Lowe presents this as dilemma, but it sounds fine to me. Flying pigs etc. have no apparent logical problems, but I can't conceive of a possible world where pigs like ours fly in a world like ours. Earthbound pigs may be metaphysically necessary. |
| 15081 | A strong necessity entails a weaker one, but not conversely; possibilities go the other way [Hale] |
| Full Idea: One type of necessity may be said to be 'stronger' than another when the first always entails the second, but not conversely. This will obtain only if the possibility of the first is weaker than the possibility of the second. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Absolute Necessities [1996], 1) | |
| A reaction: Thus we would normally say that if something is logically necessary (a very strong claim) then it will have to be naturally necessary. If something is naturally possible, then clearly it will have to be logically possible. Sounds OK. |
| 15080 | 'Relative' necessity is just a logical consequence of some statements ('strong' if they are all true) [Hale] |
| Full Idea: Necessity is 'relative' if a claim of φ-necessary that p just claims that it is a logical consequence of some statements Φ that p. We have a 'strong' version if we add that the statements in Φ are all true, and a 'weak' version if not. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Absolute Necessities [1996], 1) | |
| A reaction: I'm not sure about 'logical' consequence here. It may be necessary that a thing be a certain way in order to qualify for some category (which would be 'relative'), but that seems like 'sortal' necessity rather than logical. |
| 15082 | Metaphysical necessity says there is no possibility of falsehood [Hale] |
| Full Idea: Friends of metaphysical necessity would want to hold that when it is metaphysically necessary that p, there is no good sense of 'possible' (except, perhaps, an epistemic one) in which it is possible that not-p. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Absolute Necessities [1996], 2) | |
| A reaction: We might want to say which possible worlds this refers to (and presumably it won't just be in the actual world). The normal claim would refer to all possible worlds. Adding a '...provided that' clause moves it from absolute to relative necessity. |
| 15085 | 'Broadly' logical necessities are derived (in a structure) entirely from the concepts [Hale] |
| Full Idea: 'Broadly' logical necessities are propositions whose truth derives entirely from the concepts involved in them (together, of course, with relevant structure). | |
| From: Bob Hale (Absolute Necessities [1996], 3) | |
| A reaction: Is the 'logical' part of this necessity bestowed by the concepts, or by the 'structure' (which I take to be a logical structure)? |
| 15088 | Logical necessities are true in virtue of the nature of all logical concepts [Hale] |
| Full Idea: The logical necessities can be taken to be the propositions which are true in virtue of the nature of all logical concepts. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Absolute Necessities [1996], p.10) | |
| A reaction: This is part of his story of essences giving rise to necessities. His proposal sounds narrow, but logical concepts may have the highest degree of generality which it is possible to have. It must be how the concepts connect that causes the necessities. |
| 15087 | Conceptual necessities are made true by all concepts [Hale] |
| Full Idea: Conceptual necessities can be taken to be propositions which are true in virtue of the nature of all concepts. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Absolute Necessities [1996], p.9) | |
| A reaction: Fine endorse essences for these concepts. Could we then come up with a new concept which contradicted all the others, and destroyed the necessity? Yes, presumably. Presumably witchcraft and astrology are full of 'conceptual necessities'. |
| 22687 | Maybe literary assessment is evaluating the artist as a suitable friend [Gaut] |
| Full Idea: An approach in Hume (elaborated by Wayne Booth) holds that literary assessment is akin to an act of befriending, for one assesses the author of a work as a suitable friend. | |
| From: Berys Gaut (The Ethical Criticism of Art [1998], 'Some') | |
| A reaction: I like the idea that art exploits our normal range of social emotions and attitudes, so I think this has some truth, but some of the best artists are so out of my league as to not even be candidates for friendship. Dostoevsky? Webster? Caravaggio? |
| 22686 | Formalists say aesthetics concerns types of beauty, or unity, complexity and intensity [Gaut] |
| Full Idea: The formal objects which individuate the aesthetic attitude may be narrowly aesthetic, as beauty, and its subspecies, such as grace and elegance, or more broadly by other formalist criteria, such as Beardley's unity, complexity and intensity. | |
| From: Berys Gaut (The Ethical Criticism of Art [1998], 'Objections 1') | |
| A reaction: I'm not sure about unity or complexity, but intensity was endorsed by Henry James. Intensity doesn't sound very 'formal'. 'Beauty' doesn't seem the right word for the wonderful 'King Lear', or even for Jane Austen novels. |
| 22690 | 'Moralism' says all aesthetic merits are moral merits [Gaut] |
| Full Idea: The view that the only aesthetic merit of works are ethical ones is known as 'moralism'. | |
| From: Berys Gaut (The Ethical Criticism of Art [1998], n 1) | |
| A reaction: [He says this view was demolished by R.W.Beardsmore in 1971] Gaut contrasts this with his own carefully modulated 'ethicism'. Moralism predominated in the eighteenth century, but now looks clearly wrong (or naïve). |
| 468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |
| Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice. | |
| From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where? |
| 22684 | Good ethics counts towards aesthetic merit, and bad ethics counts against it [Gaut] |
| Full Idea: I defend 'ethicism', which says that ethically admirable attitudes count toward the the aesthetic merit of a work, and ethically reprehensible attitudes count against its aesthetic merit. | |
| From: Berys Gaut (The Ethical Criticism of Art [1998], 'Ethicism') | |
| A reaction: He recognises that morally admirable works can explore unethical behaviour, and also that identifying the 'attitude' of a work is not simple. The ethics are not necessary. 'Triumph of the Will' is a classic test case. I disagree with Gaut. |
| 22689 | If we don't respond ethically in the way a work prescribes, that is an aesthetic failure [Gaut] |
| Full Idea: Our having reason not to respond in the way prescribed (because it is unethical) is a failure of the work …so that is an aesthetic failure, which is an aesthetic defect. | |
| From: Berys Gaut (The Ethical Criticism of Art [1998], 'Merited') | |
| A reaction: A key argument for Gaut's theory of 'ethicism' about literature. If 'Triumph of the Will' gets the right response from Nazi sympathisers, that is probably all aesthetic success. Jane Austen hasn't failed if she is rejected as bourgeois. |
| 22685 | Good art does not necessarily improve people (any more than good advice does) [Gaut] |
| Full Idea: Ethicism does not entail the causal thesis that good art ethically improves people, …any more than it follows that earnest ethical advice improves people. | |
| From: Berys Gaut (The Ethical Criticism of Art [1998], 'Ethicism') | |
| A reaction: How successful were sermons, in the great days of Christianity? It seems hard to disagree with Gaut's point. |