Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Ethics and Language' and 'Why Propositions Aren't Truth-Supporting Circumstance'

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4 ideas

19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
Semantics as theory of meaning and semantics as truth-based logical consequence are very different [Soames]
     Full Idea: There are two senses of 'semantic' - as theory of meaning or as truth-based theory of logical consequence, and they are very different.
     From: Scott Soames (Why Propositions Aren't Truth-Supporting Circumstance [2008], p.78)
     A reaction: This subtle point is significant in considering the role of logic in philosophy. The logicians' semantics (based on logical consequence) is in danger of ousting the broader and more elusive notion of meaning in natural language.
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
Semantic content is a proposition made of sentence constituents (not some set of circumstances) [Soames]
     Full Idea: The semantic content of a sentence is not the set of circumstances supporting its truth. It is rather the semantic content of a structured proposition the constituents of which are the semantic contents of the constituents of the sentence.
     From: Scott Soames (Why Propositions Aren't Truth-Supporting Circumstance [2008], p.74)
     A reaction: I'm not sure I get this, but while I like the truth-conditions view, I am suspicious of any proposal that the semantic content of something is some actual physical ingredients of the world. Meanings aren't sticks and stones.
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.]
     Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice.
     From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where?
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
Moral words have an inherited power from expressing attitudes in emotional situations [Stevenson,CL]
     Full Idea: A term is moral because of the power that the word acquires, on account of its history in emotional situations, to evoke or directly express attitudes, as distinct from describing or designating them.
     From: Charles Leslie Stevenson (Ethics and Language [1944], p.33), quoted by John Hacker-Wright - Philippa Foot's Moral Thought 1 'Ayer'
     A reaction: Invites the question of what the words meant before they acquired this patina of historical usage. If 'good' orginally meant 'hurray!', its repeated usage doesn't seem to change that. If it was descriptive, why would that change with time?