13417
|
If a mathematical structure is rejected from a physical theory, it retains its mathematical status [Parsons,C]
|
|
Full Idea:
If experience shows that some aspect of the physical world fails to instantiate a certain mathematical structure, one will modify the theory by sustituting a different structure, while the original structure doesn't lose its status as part of mathematics.
|
|
From:
Charles Parsons (Review of Tait 'Provenance of Pure Reason' [2009], §2)
|
|
A reaction:
This seems to be a beautifully simple and powerful objection to the Quinean idea that mathematics somehow only gets its authority from physics. It looked like a daft view to begin with, of course.
|
20713
|
God must be fit for worship, but worship abandons morally autonomy, but there is no God [Rachels, by Davies,B]
|
|
Full Idea:
Rachels argues 1) If any being is God, he must be a fitting object of worship, 2) No being could be a fitting object of worship, since worship requires the abandonment of one's role as an autonomous moral agent, so 3) There cannot be a being who is God.
|
|
From:
report of James Rachels (God and Human Attributes [1971], 7 p.334) by Brian Davies - Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion 9 'd morality'
|
|
A reaction:
Presumably Lionel Messi can be a fitting object of worship without being God. Since the problem is with being worshipful, rather than with being God, should I infer that Messi doesn't exist?
|