11 ideas
14782 | Philosophy is an experimental science, resting on common experience [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Philosophy, although it uses no microscopes or other apparatus of special observation, is really an experimental science, resting on that experience which is common to us all. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Nature of Mathematics [1898], I) | |
A reaction: The 'experimental' either implies that thought-experiments are central to the subject, or that philosophers are discussing the findings of scientists, but at a high level of theory and abstraction. Peirce probably means the latter. I can't disagree. |
14787 | Self-contradiction doesn't reveal impossibility; it is inductive impossibility which reveals self-contradiction [Peirce] |
Full Idea: It is an anacoluthon to say that a proposition is impossible because it is self-contradictory. It rather is thought so to appear self-contradictory because the ideal induction has shown it to be impossible. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Nature of Mathematics [1898], III) |
14783 | Logic, unlike mathematics, is not hypothetical; it asserts categorical ends from hypothetical means [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Mathematics is purely hypothetical: it produces nothing but conditional propositions. Logic, on the contrary, is categorical in its assertions. True, it is a normative science, and not a mere discovery of what really is. It discovers ends from means. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Nature of Mathematics [1898], II) |
14788 | Mathematics is close to logic, but is even more abstract [Peirce] |
Full Idea: The whole of the theory of numbers belongs to logic; or rather, it would do so, were it not, as pure mathematics, pre-logical, that is, even more abstract than logic. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Nature of Mathematics [1898], IV) | |
A reaction: Peirce seems to flirt with logicism, but rejects in favour of some subtler relationship. I just don't believe that numbers are purely logical entities. |
14786 | Some logical possibility concerns single propositions, but there is also compatibility between propositions [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Many say everything is logically possible which involves no contradiction. In this sense two contradictory propositions may be severally possible. In the substantive sense, the contradictory of a possible proposition is impossible (if we were omniscient). | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Nature of Mathematics [1898], III) |
14789 | Experience is indeed our only source of knowledge, provided we include inner experience [Peirce] |
Full Idea: If Mill says that experience is the only source of any kind of knowledge, I grant it at once, provided only that by experience he means personal history, life. But if he wants me to admit that inner experience is nothing, he asks what cannot be granted. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Nature of Mathematics [1898]) | |
A reaction: Notice from Idea 14785 that Peirce has ideas in mind, and not just inner experiences like hunger. Empiricism certainly begins to look more plausible if we expand the notion of experience. It must include what we learned from prior experience. |
14785 | The world is one of experience, but experiences are always located among our ideas [Peirce] |
Full Idea: The real world is the world of sensible experience, and it is part of the process of sensible experience to locate its facts in the world of ideas. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Nature of Mathematics [1898], III) | |
A reaction: This is the neatest demolition of the sharp dividing line between empiricism and rationalism that I have ever encountered. |
12890 | That standards vary with context doesn't imply different truth-conditions for judgements [Conee] |
Full Idea: The fact that different standards are routinely applied in making an evaluative judgement does not imply the correctness of semantic contextualism about the contents of judgements. ..We can't infer different truth conditions from differing standards. | |
From: Earl Conee (Contextualism Contested [2005], p.51) | |
A reaction: This is the basic objection to contextualism from the 'invariantist' camp, which says there are facts about good judgement and justification, despite contextual shifts. My sympathies are with the contextualists (on this one). |
12892 | Maybe there is only one context (the 'really and truly' one) for serious discussions of knowledge [Conee] |
Full Idea: Maybe every issue about knowledge (Gettier problem, scientific knowledge, justification, scepticism) has been discussed solely in the single 'really and truly' context. | |
From: Earl Conee (Contextualism Contested [2005], p.53) | |
A reaction: This seems not to be true, if we contrast Descartes' desire for total certainty with Peirce's fallibilism. It seems to me that modern philosophy has deliberately relaxed the standard, in order to make some sort of knowledge possible. Cf. Idea 12894. |
468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |
Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice. | |
From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where? |
14784 | Ethics is the science of aims [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Ethics is the science of aims. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Nature of Mathematics [1898], II) | |
A reaction: Intriguing slogan. He is discussing the aims of logic. I think what he means is that ethics is the science of value. 'Science' may be optimistic, but I would sort of agree with his basic idea. |