6 ideas
14804 | Is chance just unknown laws? But the laws operate the same, whatever chance occurs [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Chance is the name for some law that is unknown to us? If you say 'each die moves under the influence of precise mechanical laws', it seems to me it is not these laws which made the tie turn up sixes, for the laws act the same when other throws come up. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Doctrine of Necessity Examined [1892], p.333) |
6172 | The Inverted Earth example shows that phenomenal properties are not representational [Block, by Rowlands] |
Full Idea: Block's Inverted Earth example (with matching inversion of both colours and colour-language) tries to show a variation of representational properties without a variation of phenomenal properties, so that the latter are not constituted by the former. | |
From: report of Ned Block (Inverted Earth [1990]) by Mark Rowlands - Externalism Ch.7 | |
A reaction: (The example is actually quite complex). This type of argument - a thought experiment in which qualia are held steady while everything else varies, or vice versa - seems to be the only way that we can possibly get at an assessment of the role of qualia. |
468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |
Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice. | |
From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where? |
14805 | Is there any such thing as death among the lower organisms? [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Among some of the lower organisms, it is a moot point with biologists whether there be anything which ought to be called death. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Doctrine of Necessity Examined [1892], p.334) | |
A reaction: The point, presumably, is that one phase of an organisms moves into another, and the 'individuals' are not distinct enough for their 'death' to be a significant transition. A nicely mind-expanding thought. |
14806 | If the world is just mechanical, its whole specification has no more explanation than mere chance [Peirce] |
Full Idea: The mechanical philosopher leaves the whole specification of the world utterly unaccounted for, which is pretty nearly as bad as to baldly attribute it to chance. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Doctrine of Necessity Examined [1892], p.337) | |
A reaction: If now complete is even remotely available, then that doesn't seem to matter too much, but if there is one message modern physics teaches philosophy, it is that we should not give up on trying to answer the deeper questions. |
14803 | The more precise the observations, the less reliable appear to be the laws of nature [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Try to verify any law of nature, and you will find that the more precise your observations, the more certain they will be to show irregular departures from the law. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Doctrine of Necessity Examined [1892], p.331) | |
A reaction: This nicely encapsulates modern doubts about whether the so-called 'laws' of nature actually capture what is going on in the real world. |