11 ideas
| 17266 | Using modal logic, philosophers tried to handle all metaphysics in modal terms [Correia/Schnieder] |
| Full Idea: In the heyday of modal logic, philosophers typically tried to account for any metaphysical notions in modal terms. | |
| From: Correia,F/Schnieder,B (Grounding: an opinionated introduction [2012], 2.4) | |
| A reaction: Lewisian realism about possible worlds actually gets rid of purely 'modal' terms, but I suppose they include possible worlds in their remark. Annoying for modal logicians to be told they had a 'heyday' - a nice example of the rhetoric of philosophy. |
| 17263 | Why do rationalists accept Sufficient Reason, when it denies the existence of fundamental facts? [Correia/Schnieder] |
| Full Idea: What is most puzzling about the rationalist tradition is the steadfast certainty with which the Principle of Sufficient Reason was often accepted, since it in effect denies that there are fundamental facts. | |
| From: Correia,F/Schnieder,B (Grounding: an opinionated introduction [2012], 2.2) | |
| A reaction: A very simple and interesting observation. The principle implies either a circle of reasons, or an infinite regress of reasons. Nothing can be labelled as 'primitive' or 'foundational' or 'given'. The principle is irrational! |
| 17270 | Is existential dependence by grounding, or do grounding claims arise from existential dependence? [Correia/Schnieder] |
| Full Idea: We may take existential dependence to be a relation induced by certain cases of grounding, but one may also think that facts about existential dependence are prior to corresponding ground claims, and in fact ground those claims. | |
| From: Correia,F/Schnieder,B (Grounding: an opinionated introduction [2012], 4.3) | |
| A reaction: I would vote for grounding, since dependence seems more abstract, and seems to demand explanation, whereas grounding seems more like a feature of reality, and to resist further intrinsic explanation (on the whole). |
| 17268 | Grounding is metaphysical and explanation epistemic, so keep them apart [Correia/Schnieder] |
| Full Idea: To us it seems advisable to separate the objective notion of grounding, which belongs to the field of metaphysics, from the epistemically loaded notion of explanation. | |
| From: Correia,F/Schnieder,B (Grounding: an opinionated introduction [2012], 4.2) | |
| A reaction: Paul Audi is the defender of the opposite view. I'm with Audi. The 'epistemically loaded' pragmatic aspect is just contextual - that we have different interests in different aspects of the grounding on different occasions. |
| 17267 | The identity of two facts may depend on how 'fine-grained' we think facts are [Correia/Schnieder] |
| Full Idea: There is a disagreement on the issue of factual identity, concerning the 'granularity' of facts, the question of how fine-grained they are. | |
| From: Correia,F/Schnieder,B (Grounding: an opinionated introduction [2012], 3.3) | |
| A reaction: If they are very fine-grained, then no two descriptions of a supposed fact will capture the same details. If we go broadbrush, facts become fuzzy and less helpful. 'Fact' was never going to be a clear term. |
| 468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |
| Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice. | |
| From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where? |
| 23831 | The essence of power is illusory prestige [Weil] |
| Full Idea: Prestige, which is an illusion, is the very essence of power. | |
| From: Simone Weil (The Power of Words [1934], p.255) | |
| A reaction: It is hard to maintain illusory prestige if there is no actual power behind it. |
| 23830 | A group is only dangerous if it endorses an abstract entity [Weil] |
| Full Idea: Any group which has not secreted an abstract entity will probably not be dangerous. | |
| From: Simone Weil (The Power of Words [1934], p.255) | |
| A reaction: Written in the 1930s, the era of many political -isms. No group can be united if it lacks a clear label, and a few simple slogans. |
| 23829 | National leaders want to preserve necessary order - but always the existing order [Weil] |
| Full Idea: Those in command see their duty as defending order, without which no social life can survive; and the only order they conceive is the existing one. | |
| From: Simone Weil (The Power of Words [1934], p.249) | |
| A reaction: She sympathises with them, because a new order is such an unknown. But it always struck me as weird that traditions are preserved because they are traditions, and not because they are good. (My old school, for example!). |
| 23828 | National prestige consists of behaving as if you could beat the others in a war [Weil] |
| Full Idea: What is called national prestige consists in behaving always in such a way as to demoralise other nations by giving them the impression that, if it comes to war, one would certainly defeat them. | |
| From: Simone Weil (The Power of Words [1934], p.244) | |
| A reaction: It's true. No nation gains prestige because of the happy lives of its citizens, or the creativity of its culture. |
| 23827 | Modern wars are fought in the name of empty words which are given capital letters [Weil] |
| Full Idea: For our contemporaries the role of Helen in the Trojan War is is played by words with capital letters. …When empty words are given capital letters, then, on the slightest pretext, men will begin shedding blood for them and piling up ruin in their name. | |
| From: Simone Weil (The Power of Words [1934], p.241) | |
| A reaction: This seems particularly true of the 1930s, where specific dogmatic ideologies seemed to grip and divide people. Simple aggressive nationalism seems to be the cause of current wars, now the fear of Communism has diminished. |