8 ideas
| 13795 | Properties only have identity in the context of their contraries [Elder] |
| Full Idea: The very being, the identity, of any property consists at least in part in its contrasting as it does with its own proper contraries. | |
| From: Crawford L. Elder (Real Natures and Familiar Objects [2004], 2.4) | |
| A reaction: See Elder for the details of this, but the idea that properties can only be individuated contextually sounds promising. |
| 13798 | Maybe we should give up the statue [Elder] |
| Full Idea: Some contemporary metaphysicians infer that one of the objects must go, namely, the statue. | |
| From: Crawford L. Elder (Real Natures and Familiar Objects [2004], 7.2) | |
| A reaction: [He cites Zimmerman 1995] This looks like a recipe for creating a vast gulf between philosophers and the rest of the population. If it is right, it makes the true ontology completely useless in understanding our daily lives. |
| 13797 | The loss of an essential property means the end of an existence [Elder] |
| Full Idea: The loss of any essential property must amount to the end of an existence. | |
| From: Crawford L. Elder (Real Natures and Familiar Objects [2004], 3) | |
| A reaction: This is orthodoxy for essentialists, and I presume that Aristotle would agree, but I have a problem with the essence of a great athlete, who then grows old. Must we say that they lose their identity-as-an-athlete? |
| 13794 | Essential properties by nature occur in clusters or packages [Elder] |
| Full Idea: Essential properties by nature occur in clusters or packages. | |
| From: Crawford L. Elder (Real Natures and Familiar Objects [2004], 2.2) | |
| A reaction: Elder proposes this as his test for the essentialness of a property - his Test of Flanking Uniformities. A nice idea. |
| 13796 | Essential properties are bound together, and would be lost together [Elder] |
| Full Idea: The properties of any essential nature are bound together....[122] so any case in which one of our envisioned familiar objects loses one of its essential properties will be a case in which it loses several. | |
| From: Crawford L. Elder (Real Natures and Familiar Objects [2004], 3) | |
| A reaction: This sounds like a fairly good generalisation rather than a necessary truth. Is there a natural selection for properties, so that only the properties which are able to bind to others to form teams are able to survive and flourish? |
| 9100 | Our intellect only assents to what we believe to be true [William of Ockham] |
| Full Idea: Our intellect does not assent to anything unless we believe it to be true. | |
| From: William of Ockham (Prologue to Ordinatio [1320], Q 1 N sqq) | |
| A reaction: This strikes me as being a much more accurate and commonsense view of belief than that of Hume, who simply views it phenomenologically. ...But then the remark appears to be circular. Belief requires a belief that it is true. Hm. |
| 9101 | Abstractive cognition knows universals abstracted from many singulars [William of Ockham] |
| Full Idea: Abstractive cognition (in one sense) relates to something abstracted from many singulars; and in this sense abstractive cognition is nothing else but cognition of a universal which can be abstracted from many things. | |
| From: William of Ockham (Prologue to Ordinatio [1320], Q 1 N sqq) | |
| A reaction: This strikes me as being correct common sense, even though it has become deeply unfashionable since Frege. We may not be able to see quite how the mind manages to see universals in a bunch of objects, but there is no better story. |
| 468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |
| Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice. | |
| From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where? |