Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Daniel Dennett on himself' and 'Universals and Particulars'

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7 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / c. Self-predication
Most thinkers now reject self-predication (whiteness is NOT white) so there is no Third Man problem [Armstrong]
     Full Idea: Modern upholders of universals generally reject self-predication; humanity is not a man, whiteness is not a white thing. This means that the Third Man argument does not constitute a difficulty.
     From: David M. Armstrong (Universals and Particulars [1995], p.506)
     A reaction: This certainly seems right, and is relevant to the modern problem of the content of thought. The idea of a tree does not need to be tree-like.
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 3. Intentional Stance
The 'intentional stance' is a way of interpreting an entity by assuming it is rational and self-aware [Dennett]
     Full Idea: The 'intentional stance' is the tactic of interpreting an entity by adopting the presupposition that it is an approximation of the ideal of an optimally designed (i.e. rational) self-regarding agent.
     From: Daniel C. Dennett (Daniel Dennett on himself [1994], p.239)
     A reaction: This is Dennett's 'instrumentalism', a descendant of behaviourism, which strikes me as a pragmatist's evasion of the ontological problems of mind which should interest philosophers
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
Like the 'centre of gravity', desires and beliefs are abstract concepts with no actual existence [Dennett]
     Full Idea: Like such abstracta as centres of gravity and parallelograms of force, the beliefs and desires posited by the highest intentional stance have no independent and concrete existence.
     From: Daniel C. Dennett (Daniel Dennett on himself [1994], p.239)
     A reaction: I don't see why we shouldn't one day have a physical account of the distinctive brain events involved in a belief or a desire
18. Thought / C. Content / 9. Conceptual Role Semantics
The nature of content is entirely based on its functional role [Dennett]
     Full Idea: All attributions of content are founded on an appreciation of the functional roles of the items in question.
     From: Daniel C. Dennett (Daniel Dennett on himself [1994], p.239)
     A reaction: This seems wrong to me. How can anything's nature be its function? It must have intrinsic characteristics in order to have the function. This is an evasion.
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.]
     Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice.
     From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where?
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
Learning is evolution in the brain [Dennett]
     Full Idea: Learning is evolution in the brain.
     From: Daniel C. Dennett (Daniel Dennett on himself [1994], p.238)
     A reaction: This is a rather non-conscious, associationist view, connected to Dawkins' idea of 'memes'. It seems at least partially correct.
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 1. Biology
Biology is a type of engineering, not a search for laws of nature [Dennett]
     Full Idea: Biology is not a science like physics, in which one should strive to find 'laws of nature', but a species of engineering.
     From: Daniel C. Dennett (Daniel Dennett on himself [1994], p.239)
     A reaction: Yes. This is also true of chemistry, which has always struck me as minitiarised car mechanics.