16 ideas
22701 | Jokes can sometimes be funny because they are offensive [Jacobson,D] |
Full Idea: Sometimes it is exactly what is offensive about a joke that makes it funny. | |
From: Daniel Jacobson (Ethical Criticism and the Vice of Moderation [2006], 'emotional') | |
A reaction: Jacobson offers this in support of his immoralist view, that immoral literature can be aesthetically successful. It is uncomfortable to find yourself laughing at a joke of which you disapprove. |
22462 | We should speak the truth, but also preserve and pursue it [Foot] |
Full Idea: There belongs to truthfulness not only the avoidance of lying but also that other kind of attachment to truth which has to do with its preservation and pursuit. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Utilitarianism and the Virtues [1985], p.74) | |
A reaction: This is truth as a value, rather than as a mere phenomenon of accurate thought and speech. The importance of 'preserving' the truth is the less common part of this idea. |
22703 | We don't often respond to events in art as if they were real events [Jacobson,D] |
Full Idea: We routinely do not respond to art as if we were as if we were real-life spectators of its events. | |
From: Daniel Jacobson (Ethical Criticism and the Vice of Moderation [2006], 'rejection') | |
A reaction: This strikes me as one of the basic facts about aesthetics, and especially of narrative art. People sometimes encounter terrible events on the street, only to find someone is making a film. |
22702 | Audiences can be too moral [Jacobson,D] |
Full Idea: An audience can be overly moralistic. | |
From: Daniel Jacobson (Ethical Criticism and the Vice of Moderation [2006], 'emotional') | |
A reaction: People can be too moral in real life as well. Goody Two Shoes. |
468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |
Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice. | |
From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where? |
22696 | 'Autonomism' says the morality is irrelevant to the aesthetics [Jacobson,D] |
Full Idea: 'Autonomism' is the theory that the intrinsic moral merits and defects of an artwork are irrelevant to its aesthetic value. | |
From: Daniel Jacobson (Ethical Criticism and the Vice of Moderation [2006], Intro) | |
A reaction: This contrasts with 'moralism', which says the ethics is part of the aesthetics. Autonomism seems to be the modern academic label for art for art's sake. In nineteenth century novels the ethics are central; in modernist novels they seem to be irrelevant. |
22697 | Moral defects of art can be among its aesthetic virtues [Jacobson,D] |
Full Idea: To put my claim most provocatively: the moral defects in a work of art can be among its aesthetic virtues. This claim has been called 'immoralism'. | |
From: Daniel Jacobson (Ethical Criticism and the Vice of Moderation [2006], Intro) | |
A reaction: To describe sympathetic descriptions of vile moral behaviour as 'defects' may be a misunderstanding. If a work sets out to promote wickedness, then its wickedness isn't a defect in the work. It could be a masterpiece of corruption. |
22700 | Immoral art encourages immoral emotions [Jacobson,D] |
Full Idea: Humean moralism includes the view that immoral art prescribes unethical emotional responses. | |
From: Daniel Jacobson (Ethical Criticism and the Vice of Moderation [2006], 'emotional') | |
A reaction: [He cites Hume's 'On the Standard of Taste'] 'Prescribes' is tricky. Is a vivid description of wicked events, given without comment, a prescription? What if the commentary condemns, but the description entices? Trust the work itself, said Lawrence. |
22699 | Moderate moralism says moral qualities can sometimes also be aesthetic qualities [Jacobson,D] |
Full Idea: Noël Carroll's moderate moralism maintains that some moral defects in artworks are aesthetic defects, and some moral virtues are aesthetic merits. | |
From: Daniel Jacobson (Ethical Criticism and the Vice of Moderation [2006], 'How moderate') | |
A reaction: I'm beginning to think that moralist critics are confusing morality and wisdom. We don't admire novels for hammering on about goodness. We admire their insight into characters and actions, of which the most interesting aspects happen to be moral. |
22698 | We can judge art ethically, or rate its ethical influence, or assess its quality via its ethics [Jacobson,D] |
Full Idea: Ethical criticism includes 1) ethical judgements of art works, 2) assessment of an art work's role in moral education, or 3) bringing moral praise or censure to bear on the aesthetic evaluation. | |
From: Daniel Jacobson (Ethical Criticism and the Vice of Moderation [2006], 'What is') | |
A reaction: [a compressed summary of Jacobson. He cites Levinson 1998 and Carroll 2000 as examples of ethical criticism] |
22458 | Consequentialists can hurt the innocent in order to prevent further wickedness [Foot] |
Full Idea: For consequentialists there will be nothing that it will not be right to do to a perfectly innocent individual, if that is the only way of preventing another agent from doing more things of the same kind. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Utilitarianism and the Virtues [1985], p.61) | |
A reaction: This is her generalised version that Williams dramatised as Jim and the Indians. Roughly, if you achieve a good outcome, it matters little how it is achieved. Foot sees consequentialism as the main problem with utilitarianism. |
22460 | Why might we think that a state of affairs can be morally good or bad? [Foot] |
Full Idea: We should ask why we think that it makes sense to talk about morally good and bad states of affairs. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Utilitarianism and the Virtues [1985], p.68) | |
A reaction: This is the key question in her attack on consequentialism. There is nothing 'morally' good about my football team winning a great victory. |
22461 | Good outcomes are not external guides to morality, but a part of virtuous actions [Foot] |
Full Idea: It is not that maximum welfare or 'the best outcome' stands outside morality as it foundation and arbiter, but rather that it appears within morality as the end of one of the virtues. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Utilitarianism and the Virtues [1985], p.73) | |
A reaction: She cites justice and benevolence as aiming at different (and even conflicting) outcomes. I'm not sure about her distinction between 'outside' and 'within' morality. I suppose a virtuously created end is a moral end, unlike mere good states of affairs. |
22464 | The idea of a good state of affairs has no role in the thought of Aristotle, Rawls or Scanlon [Foot] |
Full Idea: The idea of the goodness of total states of affairs played no part in Aristotle's moral philosophy, and in modern times plays not part either in Rawls's account of justice or in the theories of more thoroughgoing contractualists such as Scanlon. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Utilitarianism and the Virtues [1985], p.76) | |
A reaction: We can add Kant to that. But if the supremely good state of affairs were permanently achieved, would that make morality irrelevant? A community of the exceptionally virtuous would not need the veil of ignorance, or contracts. |
22463 | Morality is seen as tacit legislation by the community [Foot] |
Full Idea: Morality is thought of as a kind of tacit legislation by the community. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Utilitarianism and the Virtues [1985], p.75) | |
A reaction: Foot presents this as a utilitarian doctrine, because the tacit legislation is felt to produce the best outcomes. This is Nietzsche's good and evil, beyond which he wished to go (presumably following other values). |
22459 | For consequentialism, it is irrational to follow a rule which in this instance ends badly [Foot] |
Full Idea: It would be irrational to obey even the most useful rule if in a particular instance we clearly see that such obedience will not have the best results. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Utilitarianism and the Virtues [1985], p.62) | |
A reaction: This is the simple reason why attempts at rule utilitarianism always lead back to act utilitarianism. Another way of putting it is that a good rule can only be assessed by the outcomes of individual acts that follow it. |