Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Causation and the Flow of Energy' and 'Against the Logicians (two books)'

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8 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Ordinary speech is not exact about what is true; we say we are digging a well before the well exists [Sext.Empiricus]
     Full Idea: We must allow ordinary speech to use inexact terms, as it does not seek after what is really true but what is supposed to be true. We speak of digging a well or weaving a cloak, but there is no well or cloak when they are being dug or woven.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Logicians (two books) [c.180], II.129)
     A reaction: Nice examples. The imprecision is reduced if I say I am creating a well, because that implies something that is not yet complete. If I say I intend to dig a well, is that imprecise because the well does not exist?
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
Some properties are inseparable from a thing, such as the length, breadth and depth of a body [Sext.Empiricus]
     Full Idea: Some properties are inseparable from the things to which they belong - as are length, breadth and depth from bodies, for without their presence it is impossible to perceive Body.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Logicians (two books) [c.180], I.270)
     A reaction: For the opposite case he suggests a man running, talking or sleeping. He doesn't mention essential natures, but this is clearly correct. We might say that they are properties which need to be mentioned in a full definition.
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
Fools, infants and madmen may speak truly, but do not know [Sext.Empiricus]
     Full Idea: The fool and the infant and the madman at times say something true, but they do not possess knowledge of the true.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Logicians (two books) [c.180], I.042)
     A reaction: This may be correct of someone who is insane, but seems unfair to the fool and the infant. At what age do children begin to know things? If speech was just random nonsense, an accidental truth seems impossible.
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
Madmen are reliable reporters of what appears to them [Sext.Empiricus]
     Full Idea: The madman is a trustworthy criterion of the appearances which occur in madness.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Logicians (two books) [c.180], I.062)
     A reaction: It is hard to conceive of an genuinely insane person deliberately misreporting their hallucinations. They are, of course, the sole witness.
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / b. Empirical concepts
We can only dream of a winged man if we have experienced men and some winged thing [Sext.Empiricus]
     Full Idea: He who in his sleep dreams of a winged man does not dream so without having seen some winged thing and a man. And in general it is impossible to find in conception anything which one does not possess as known by experience.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Logicians (two books) [c.180], II.058)
     A reaction: This precisely David Hume's empiricist account of the formation of concepts. Hume's example is a golden mountain, which he got from Aquinas. How do we dream of faces we have never encountered, or shapes we have never seen?
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.]
     Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice.
     From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where?
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
Science has shown that causal relations are just transfers of energy or momentum [Fair, by Sosa/Tooley]
     Full Idea: Basic causal relations can, as a consequence of our scientific knowledge, be identified with certain physicalistic [sic] relations between objects that can be characterized in terms of transference of either energy or momentum between objects.
     From: report of David Fair (Causation and the Flow of Energy [1979]) by E Sosa / M Tooley - Introduction to 'Causation' §1
     A reaction: Presumably a transfer of momentum is a transfer of energy. If only anyone had the foggiest idea what energy actually is, we'd be doing well. What is energy made of? 'No identity without substance', I say. I like Fair's idea.
Fair shifted his view to talk of counterfactuals about energy flow [Fair, by Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: Fair, who originated the energy flow view of causation, moved to a view that understands connection in terms of counterfactuals about energy flow.
     From: report of David Fair (Causation and the Flow of Energy [1979]) by Jonathan Schaffer - The Metaphysics of Causation 2.1.2
     A reaction: David Fair was a pupil of David Lewis, the king of the counterfactual view. To me that sounds like a disappointing move, but it is hard to think that a mere flow of energy through space would amount to causation. Cause must work back from an effect.