4 ideas
8406 | Not all explanations are causal, but if a thing can be explained at all, it can be explained causally [Sanford] |
Full Idea: Although not all explanations are causal, anything which can be explained in any way can be explained causally. | |
From: David H. Sanford (Causation [1995], p.79) | |
A reaction: A nice bold claim with which I am in sympathy, but he would have a struggle proving it. Does this imply that causal explanations are basic, or in some way superior? Note that functional explanations would thus have underlying causal explanations. |
468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |
Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice. | |
From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where? |
8407 | A totality of conditions necessary for an occurrence is usually held to be jointly sufficient for it [Sanford] |
Full Idea: A totality of conditions necessary for an occurrence is jointly sufficient for it. This is a widely held but controversial view, and it is not a logical truth. | |
From: David H. Sanford (Causation [1995], p.82) | |
A reaction: This wouldn't work for an impossible occurrence. What are the necessary conditions to produce a large planet made of uranium? One of them would have to be a naturally impossible necessity. |
8338 | A phenomenalist about objects has to be a regularity theorist about causation [Strawson,G] |
Full Idea: If you are a phenomenalist about objects, then there is an important sense in which you ought to be a Regularity theorist about what causation is, in such objects. | |
From: Galen Strawson (The Secret Connexion [1989], App C) | |
A reaction: Strawson is denying that Hume is a phenomenalist. One might go a little further, and say that a phenomenalist should abandon the idea of causation (as Russell did). |