14712
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A sentence is a priori if no possible way the world might actually be could make it false [Chalmers]
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Full Idea:
The Core Thesis for rationalist 2D semantics is that for any sentence S, S is apriori iff S has a necessary 1-intension. (That is, there is no possible way the world might be that, if it actually obtained, would make S false).
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From:
David J.Chalmers (Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics [2004], p.165), quoted by Laura Schroeter - Two-Dimensional Semantics 2.3.2
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A reaction:
[The parenthesis is by Schroeter] A '1-intension' is defined by a diagonal on a 2D semantic matrix. Chalmers defends conceivability as the guide to possibility. This is a very traditional view of the a priori, expressed in modern terms.
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3272
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Moral luck can arise in character, preconditions, actual circumstances, and outcome [Nagel]
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Full Idea:
Moral luck involves one's character, the antecedent circumstances of the act, the actual circumstances of the act, and the outcome of the act.
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From:
Thomas Nagel (Moral Luck [1976], p.28)
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A reaction:
Meaning, I take it, that there can be luck in any one of those four. A neat slicing up that doesn't quite fit the real world, where things flow. Helpful, though.
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