23655
|
An ad hominem argument is good, if it is shown that the man's principles are inconsistent [Reid]
|
|
Full Idea:
It is a good argument ad hominem, if it can be shewn that a first principle which a man rejects, stands upon the same footing with others which he admits, …for he must then be guilty of an inconsistency.
|
|
From:
Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 6: Judgement [1785], 4)
|
|
A reaction:
Good point. You can't divorce 'pure' reason from the reasoners, because the inconsistency of two propositions only matters when they are both asserted together. …But attacking the ideas isn't quite the same as attacking the person.
|
14212
|
A consistent theory just needs one model; isomorphic versions will do too, and large domains provide those [Lewis]
|
|
Full Idea:
A consistent theory is, by definition, one satisfied by some model; an isomorphic image of a model satisfies the same theories as the original model; to provide the making of an isomorphic image of any given model, a domain need only be large enough.
|
|
From:
David Lewis (Putnam's Paradox [1984], 'Why Model')
|
|
A reaction:
This is laying out the ground for Putnam's model theory argument in favour of anti-realism. If you are chasing the one true model of reality, then formal model theory doesn't seem to offer much encouragement.
|
14213
|
Anti-realists see the world as imaginary, or lacking joints, or beyond reference, or beyond truth [Lewis]
|
|
Full Idea:
Anti-realists say the only world is imaginary, or only has the parts or classes or relations we divide it into, or doubt that reference to the world is possible, or doubt that our interpretations can achieve truth.
|
|
From:
David Lewis (Putnam's Paradox [1984], 'Why Anti-R')
|
|
A reaction:
[compression of a paragraph on anti-realism] Lewis is a thoroughgoing realist. A nice example of the rhetorical device of ridiculing an opponent by suggesting that they don't even know what they themselves believe.
|
14210
|
A gerrymandered mereological sum can be a mess, but still have natural joints [Lewis]
|
|
Full Idea:
The mereological sum of the coffee in my cup, the ink in this sentence, a nearby sparrow, and my left shoe is a miscellaneous mess of an object, yet its boundaries are by no means unrelated to the joints of nature.
|
|
From:
David Lewis (Putnam's Paradox [1984], 'What Might')
|
|
A reaction:
In that case they do, but if there are no atoms at the root of physics then presumably their could also be thoroughly jointless assemblages, involving probability distributions etc. Even random scattered atoms seem rather short of joints.
|
23659
|
If someone denies that he is thinking when he is conscious of it, we can only laugh [Reid]
|
|
Full Idea:
If any man could be found so frantic as to deny that he thinks, while he is conscious of it, I may wonder, I may laugh, or I may pity him, but I cannot reason the matter with him.
|
|
From:
Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 6: Judgement [1785], 5)
|
|
A reaction:
An example of the influence of Descartes' Cogito running through all subsequent European philosophy. There remain the usual questions about personal identity which then arise, but Reid addresses those.
|
23654
|
In obscure matters the few must lead the many, but the many usually lead in common sense [Reid]
|
|
Full Idea:
In matters beyond the reach of common understanding, the many are led by the few, and willingly yield to their authority. But, in matters of common sense, the few must yield to the many, when local and temporary prejudices are removed.
|
|
From:
Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 6: Judgement [1785], 4)
|
|
A reaction:
Wishful thinking in the 21st century, when the many routinely deny the authority of the expert few, and the expert few occasionally prove that the collective common sense of the many is delusional. I still sort of agree with Reid.
|
23653
|
If you can't distinguish the features of a complex object, your notion of it would be a muddle [Reid]
|
|
Full Idea:
If you perceive an object, white, round, and a foot in diameter, if you had not been able to distinguish the colour from the figure, and both from the magnitude, your senses would only give you one complex and confused notion of all these mingled together
|
|
From:
Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 6: Judgement [1785], 1)
|
|
A reaction:
His point is that if you reject the 'abstraction' of these qualities, you still cannot deny that distinguishing them is an essential aspect of perceiving complex things. Does this mean that animals distinguish such things?
|
14209
|
Descriptive theories remain part of the theory of reference (with seven mild modifications) [Lewis]
|
|
Full Idea:
Description theories of reference are supposed to have been well and truly refuted. I think not: ..it is still tenable with my seven points, and part of the truth of reference [7: rigidity, egocentric, tokens, causal, imperfect, indeterminate, families].
|
|
From:
David Lewis (Putnam's Paradox [1984], 'Glob Desc')
|
|
A reaction:
(The bit at the end refers to his seven points, on p.59). He calls his basic proposal 'causal descriptivism', incorporating his seven slight modifications of traditional descriptivism about reference.
|