3 ideas
15540 | You can't deny temporary intrinsic properties by saying the properties are relations (to times) [Lewis] |
Full Idea: To say that properties are really relations to times is to treat temporary intrinsics (such as my changing shape) as a matter of relations, but then 'intrinsic properties' would not deserve the name, and it is untenable if it denies temporary intrinsics. | |
From: David Lewis (Rearrangement of Particles [1988], 1) | |
A reaction: [I have compressed a paragraph; he refers to his 1986:204] If a property is meant to be a 'relation to a time', I am not sure what the relata are meant to be, and I agree with Lewis that this seems a long way from properties. |
16792 | If parts change, the whole changes [William of Ockham] |
Full Idea: That is not the same whole that does not have the same parts. | |
From: William of Ockham (Commentary on the Sentences [1320], IV.13), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 29.2 | |
A reaction: In isolation, this is mereological essentialism (as Pasnau confirms), which is incredibly implausible, if I cease to be the same person when I cut one of my fingernails. |
468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |
Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice. | |
From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where? |