73 ideas
| 1887 | You cannot divide anything into many parts, because after the first division you are no longer dividing the original [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: You cannot divide anything (such as the decad) into many parts, because as soon as you separate the first part, you are no longer dividing the original. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], II.215) |
| 17663 | If you know what it is, investigation is pointless. If you don't, investigation is impossible [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: Paradox of Analysis:if we ask what sort of thing an X is, then either we know what an X is or we do not. If we know then there is no need to ask the question. If we do not know then there is no way to begin the investigation. It's pointless or impossible | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 01.2) | |
| A reaction: [G.E. Moore is the source of this, somewhere] Plato worried that to get to know something you must already know it. Solving this requires the concept of a 'benign' circularity. |
| 1885 | Proof moves from agreed premises to a non-evident inference [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: Dogmatists define proof as "an argument which, by means of agreed premises, reveals by way of deduction a nonevident inference". | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], II.135) |
| 12196 | A valid hypothetical syllogism is 'that which does not begin with a truth and end with a falsehood' [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: Philo (of Megara) says that a valid hypothetical syllogism is 'that which does not begin with a truth and end with a falsehood,' as for instance the syllogism 'If it is day, I converse,' when in fact it is day and I am conversing. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], II.110) | |
| A reaction: Russell endorses this, and Rumfitt quotes it as the classic case of denying that there is any modal aspect (such as 'logical necessity') involved in logical consequence. He labels it 'material or Philonian consequence'. |
| 1902 | Since Socrates either died when he was alive (a contradiction) or died when he was dead (meaningless), he didn't die [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: If Socrates died, he died either when he lived or when he died; so he was either dead when he was alive, or he was twice dead when he was dead. So he didn't die. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.111) | |
| A reaction: One of my favourites. Of all the mysteries facing us, the one that boggles me most is how anything can happen in the 'present' moment, if the present is just the overlap point between past and future. |
| 17688 | Negative facts are supervenient on positive facts, suggesting they are positive facts [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: Negative facts appear to be supervenient upon the positive facts, which suggests that they are nothing more than the positive facts. | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 10.3) |
| 17691 | Nothing is genuinely related to itself [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: I believe that nothing is genuinely related to itself. | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 10.7) |
| 17679 | All instances of some property are strictly identical [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: A property ...is something which is strictly identical, strictly the same, in all its different instances. | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 06.2) | |
| A reaction: Some is gravitation one property, or an infinity of properties, for each of its values? What is the same between objects of different mass. I sort of believe in all the masses, but I'm not sure what 'mass' is. Abstraction, say I. |
| 12677 | Armstrong holds that all basic properties are categorical [Armstrong, by Ellis] |
| Full Idea: I am against Armstrong's strong categoricalism, that is, the thesis that all basic properties are categorical. | |
| From: report of David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983]) by Brian Ellis - The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism 3 | |
| A reaction: I certainly agree with this, as I cannot see where the power would come from to get the whole thing off the ground. Armstrong depends on universals to necessitate what happens, which I find very peculiar. |
| 17666 | Actualism means that ontology cannot contain what is merely physically possible [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: Actualism ...debars us from admitting into our ontology the merely possible, not only the merely logically possible, but also the merely physically possible. | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 01.3) | |
| A reaction: This is the big metaphysical question for fans (like myself) of 'powers' in nature. Armstrong declares himself an Actualist. I take it as obvious that the actual world contains powers, but how are we to characterise them? |
| 17667 | Dispositions exist, but their truth-makers are actual or categorical properties [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: It is not denied that statements attributing dispositions and/or powers to objects are often true. But the truth-makers or ontological ground for such statements must always be found in the actual, or categorical, properties of the objects involved. | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 01.3) | |
| A reaction: This is the big debate in the topic of powers. I love powers, but you always think there must be 'something' which has the power. Could reality entirely consist of powers? See Fetzer. |
| 17687 | If everything is powers there is a vicious regress, as powers are defined by more powers [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: I believe reducing all universals to powers is involved in vicious regress. The power is what it is by the sort of actualisations it gives rise to in suitable sorts of circumstances. But they themselves can be nothing but powers... | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 08.3) | |
| A reaction: [compressed wording] I don't see this problem. Anything postulated as fundamental is going to be baffling. Why are categorical properties superior to powers? Postulate basic powers (or basic empowered stuff), then build up. |
| 17678 | Universals are just the repeatable features of a world [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: Universals can be brought into the spatio-temporal world, becoming simply the repeatable features of that world. | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 06.2) | |
| A reaction: I wish Armstrong wouldn't use the word 'universal', which has so much historical baggage. The world obviously has repeatable features, but does that mean that our ontology must include things called 'features'? Hm. |
| 17669 | Realist regularity theories of laws need universals, to pick out the same phenomena [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: A Realistic version of a Regularity theory of laws will have to postulate universals. How else will it be possible to say that the different instances of a certain uniformity are all instances of objectively the same phenomenon? | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 02.4) | |
| A reaction: I disagree. We may (or may not) need properties, but they can be have a range. We just need stable language. We use one word 'red', even when the shade of redness varies. Non-realists presumably refer to sense-data. |
| 17677 | Past, present and future must be equally real if universals are instantiated [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: Past, present and future I take to be all and equally real. A universal need not be instantiated now. | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 06.2) | |
| A reaction: This is the price you must pay for saying that you only believe in universals which are instantiated. |
| 15442 | Universals are abstractions from their particular instances [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
| Full Idea: Armstrong takes universals generally, and structural universals along with the rest, to be abstractions from their particular instances. | |
| From: report of David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], p.83-4) by David Lewis - Against Structural Universals 'The pictorial' | |
| A reaction: To me, 'abstracted' implies a process of human psychology, a way of thinking about the instances. I don't see how there can be an 'abstracted' relation which is a part of the external world. That makes his laws of nature human creations. |
| 17686 | Universals are abstractions from states of affairs [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: Universals are abstractions from states of affairs. | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 7) | |
| A reaction: I'm getting confused about Armstrong's commitments. He bases his whole theory on the existence of universals (repeatable features), but now says those are 'abstracted' from something else. Abstracted by us? |
| 17668 | It is likely that particulars can be individuated by unique conjunctions of properties [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: For each particular it is likely that there exists at least one individuating conjunction of properties, that is, a conjunction of properties such that the particular instantiates this conjunction and nothing else does. | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 02.3) | |
| A reaction: Armstrong commits to a famous Leibniz view, but I don't see his grounds for it. There is nothing incoherent about nature churning out perfect replicas of things, such as quarks and electrons. Would we care if two pens were perfectly identical? |
| 17680 | The identity of a thing with itself can be ruled out as a pseudo-property [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: There is reason to rule out as pseudo-properties such things as the identity of a thing with itself. | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 06.2) | |
| A reaction: Good on you, David. |
| 17693 | The necessary/contingent distinction may need to recognise possibilities as real [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: It may be that the necessary/contingent distinction is tied to a metaphysics which recognises possibility as a real something wider than actuality. | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 11.2) | |
| A reaction: Armstrong responds by trying to give an account of possibility in terms of 'combinations' from actuality. I think powers offer a much better strategy. |
| 1889 | If an argument has an absurd conclusion, we should not assent to the absurdity, but avoid the absurd argument [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: If an argument leads to confessedly absurd conclusions, we should not assent to the absurdity just because of the argument, but avoid the argument because of the absurdity. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], II.252) | |
| A reaction: cf. G.E.Moore. Denying that you have a hand seems to be an absurdity, but I'm not sure if I can give a criterion for absurdity in such a case. One person's modus ponens is another person's modus tollens. |
| 1871 | Whether honey is essentially sweet may be doubted, as it is a matter of judgement rather than appearance [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: Honey appears to sceptics to be sweet, but whether it is also sweet in its essence is for us a matter of doubt, since this is not an appearance but a judgement. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.20) |
| 1883 | How can the intellect know if sensation is reliable if it doesn't directly see external objects? [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: Just as you can't know if a portrait of Socrates is good without seeing the man, so when the intellect gazes on sensations but not the external objects it cannot know whether they are similar. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], II.75) |
| 1890 | We distinguish ambiguities by seeing what is useful [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: It is the experience of what is useful in each affair that brings about the distinguishing of ambiguities. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], II.258) |
| 1870 | The basis of scepticism is the claim that every proposition has an equal opposing proposition [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: The main basic principle of the sceptic system is that of opposing to every proposition an equal proposition. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.12) |
| 1882 | The necks of doves appear different in colour depending on the angle of viewing [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: The necks of doves appear different in hue according to the differences in the angle of inclination. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.120) |
| 1881 | The same oar seems bent in water and straight when out of it [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: The same oar seems bent when in the water but straight when out of the water. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.119) |
| 1872 | The same tower appears round from a distance, but square close at hand [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: The same tower appears round from a distance, but square close at hand. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.32) |
| 1873 | If we press the side of an eyeball, objects appear a different shape [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: When we press the eyeball at one side the forms, figures and sizes of the objects appear oblong and narrow. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.47) |
| 1874 | How can we judge between our impressions and those of other animals, when we ourselves are involved? [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: We cannot judge between our own impressions and those of other animals, because we ourselves are involved in the dispute. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.59) |
| 1878 | Water that seems lukewarm can seem very hot on inflamed skin [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: The same water which seems very hot when poured on inflamed spots seems lukewarm to us. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.101) |
| 1880 | Some actions seem shameful when sober but not when drunk [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: Actions which seem shameful to us when sober do not seem shameful when drunk. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.109) |
| 1877 | If we had no hearing or sight, we would assume no sound or sight exists, so there may be unsensed qualities [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: A man with touch, taste and smell, but no hearing or sight, will assume nothing audible or visible exists, so maybe an apple has qualities which we have no senses to perceive. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.96) |
| 1879 | Sickness is perfectly natural to the sick, so their natural perceptions should carry some weight [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: Health is natural for the healthy but unnatural for the sick, and sickness is unnatural for the healthy but natural for the sick, so we must give credence to the natural perceptions of the sick. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.103) |
| 1876 | If we enjoy different things, presumably we receive different impressions [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: The enjoyment of different things is an indication that we get varying impressions from the underlying objects. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.80) |
| 1910 | With us it is shameful for men to wear earrings, but among Syrians it is considered noble [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: It is a shameful thing with us for men to wear earrings, but among some of the barbarians, such as the Syrians, it is a token of nobility. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.203) |
| 1911 | Even if all known nations agree on a practice, there may be unknown nations which disagree [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: Even among practices on which all known cultures are agreed, disagreement about them may possibly exist amongst some of the nations which are unknown to us. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.234) |
| 1886 | If you don't view every particular, you may miss the one which disproves your universal induction [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: Induction cannot establish the universal by means of the particular, since limited particulars may omit crucial examples which disprove the universal, and infinite particulars are impossible to know. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], II.204) |
| 17685 | Induction aims at 'all Fs', but abduction aims at hidden or theoretical entities [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: Many philosophers of science have distinguished between 'simple induction' - the argument from observed Fs to all Fs - and the argument to hidden or theoretical entities (Peirce's 'abduction'). | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 06.7) | |
| A reaction: 'Abduction' is (roughly) the same is inference to the best explanation, of which I am a great fan. |
| 17683 | Science suggests that the predicate 'grue' is not a genuine single universal [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: It is plausible to say, on the basis of total science, that 'grue' is a predicate to which no genuine, that is, unitary, universal corresponds. | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 06.7) |
| 17675 | Unlike 'green', the 'grue' predicate involves a time and a change [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: The predicate 'grue' involves essential reference to a particular time, which 'green' does not. Also on the 'grue' hypothesis a change occurs in emeralds in a way that change does not occur on the 'green' hypothesis. | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 04.5) | |
| A reaction: I'm inclined to think that comparing 'grue' with 'green' is a category mistake. 'Grue' is a behaviour. Armstrong says this is no objection, because Goodman's argument is purely formal. |
| 17674 | The raven paradox has three disjuncts, confirmed by confirming any one of them [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: We could rewrite the generalisation as For all x, ((x is a raven and x is black) v (x is not a raven and x is black) v (x is not a raven and x is not black)). Instances of any one of the three disjuncts will do as confirmation. | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 04.3) | |
| A reaction: A nice clarification. |
| 17672 | A good reason for something (the smoke) is not an explanation of it (the fire) [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: A good reason for P is not necessarily an explanation of P. The presence of smoke is a good reason for thinking that fire is present. But it is not an explanation of the presence of fire. | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 04.2) | |
| A reaction: This may be an equivocation on 'the reason for'. Smoke is a reason for thinking there is a fire, but no one would propose it as a reason for the fire. If the reason for the fire was arson, that would seem to explain it as well. |
| 17684 | To explain observations by a regular law is to explain the observations by the observations [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: Given the Regularity theory, the explanatory element seems to vanish. For to say that all the observed Fs are Gs because all the Fs are Gs involves explaining the observations in terms of themselves. | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 06.7) | |
| A reaction: This point cries out, it is so obvious (once spotted). Tigers are ferocious because all tigers are ferocious (see?). |
| 17676 | Best explanations explain the most by means of the least [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: The best explanation explains the most by means of the least. Explanation unifies. | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 05.4) | |
| A reaction: To get unification, you need to cite the diversity of what is explained, and not the mere quantity. The force of gravity unifies because it applies to such a diversity of things. |
| 1884 | If we utter three steps of a logical argument, they never exist together [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: If we say "If day exists, lights exists", and then "day exists", and then "light exists", then parts of the judgement never exist together, and so the whole judgement will have no real existence. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], II.109) |
| 17664 | Each subject has an appropriate level of abstraction [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: To every subject, its appropriate level of abstraction. | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 01.2) | |
| A reaction: Mathematics rises through many levels of abstraction. Economics can be very concrete or very abstract. It think it is clearer to talk of being 'general', rather than 'abstract'. |
| 468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |
| Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice. | |
| From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where? |
| 17692 | We can't deduce the phenomena from the One [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: No serious and principled deduction of the phenomena from the One has ever been given, or looks likely to be given. | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 11) | |
| A reaction: This seems to pick out the best reason why hardly anybody (apart from Jonathan Schaffer) takes the One seriously. |
| 17689 | Absences might be effects, but surely not causes? [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: Lacks and absences could perhaps by thought of as effects, but we ought to be deeply reluctant to think of them as causes. | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 10.4) | |
| A reaction: Odd. So we allow that they exist (as effects), but then deny that they have any causal powers? |
| 1894 | Some say that causes are physical, some say not [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: Some affirm cause to be corporeal, some incorporeal. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.14) |
| 1897 | Knowing an effect results from a cause means knowing that the cause belongs with the effect, which is circular [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: To know an effect belongs to a cause, we must also know that that cause belongs to that effect, and this is circular. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.21) |
| 1898 | Cause can't exist before effect, or exist at the same time, so it doesn't exist [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: If cause neither subsists before its effect, nor subsists along with it, nor does the effect precede the cause, it would seem that it has no substantial existence at all. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.27) |
| 1896 | If there were no causes then everything would have been randomly produced by everything [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: If causes were non-existent everything would have been produced by everything, and at random. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.18) |
| 1895 | Causes are either equal to the effect, or they link equally with other causes, or they contribute slightly [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: The majority say causes are immediate (when they are directly proportional to effects), or associate (making an equal contribution to effects), or cooperant (making a slight contribution). | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.15) |
| 17682 | A universe couldn't consist of mere laws [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: A universe could hardly consist of laws and nothing else. | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 06.4) | |
| A reaction: Hm. Discuss. How does a universe come into existence, if there are no laws to guide its creation? |
| 17662 | Science depends on laws of nature to study unobserved times and spaces [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: The scientist trying to establish the geography and history of the unobserved portion of the universe must depend upon what he takes to be the laws of the universe. | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 01.1) | |
| A reaction: This does seem to be the prime reason why we wish to invoke 'laws', but we could just as well say that we have to rely on induction. Spot patterns, then expect more of the same. Spot necessities? Mathematics is very valuable here, of course. |
| 17690 | Oaken conditional laws, Iron universal laws, and Steel necessary laws [Armstrong, by PG] |
| Full Idea: Three degress of law: 1) 'Oaken laws' where all Fs that aren't Hs are Gs; 2) 'Iron' laws where all Fs are Gs; and 3) 'Steel' laws where all Fs must be Gs. | |
| From: report of David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 10.4) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
| A reaction: [My summary of Armstrong's distinction] One response is to say that all laws are actually Oaken - see Mumfor and Mumford/Lill Anjum. It's all ceteris paribus. |
| 17670 | Newton's First Law refers to bodies not acted upon by a force, but there may be no such body [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: Newton's First Law of Motion tells us what happens to a body which is not acted upon by a force. Yet it may be that the antecedent of the law is never instantiated. It may be that every body that there is, is acted upon by some force. | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 02.7) |
| 8582 | Regularities are lawful if a second-order universal unites two first-order universals [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
| Full Idea: Armstrong's theory holds that what makes certain regularities lawful are second-order states of affairs N(F,G) in which the two ordinary first-order universals F and G are related by a certain dyadic second-order universal N. | |
| From: report of David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983]) by David Lewis - New work for a theory of universals 'Laws and C' | |
| A reaction: [see Lewis's footnote] I take the view (from Shoemaker and Ellis) that laws of nature are just plain regularities which arise from the hierarchy of natural kinds. We don't need a commitment to 'universals'. |
| 17671 | A naive regularity view says if it never occurs then it is impossible [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: It is a Humean uniformity that no race of ravens is white-feathered. Hence, if the Naive Regularity analysis of law is correct, it is a law that no race of ravens is white-feathered, that is, such a race is physically impossible. A most unwelcome result. | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 02.6) | |
| A reaction: Chapters 2-4 of Armstrong are a storming attack on the regularity view of laws of nature, and this idea is particularly nice. Laws must refer to what could happen, not what happens to happen. |
| 17681 | The laws of nature link properties with properties [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: There is an utterly natural idea that the laws of nature link properties with properties. | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 06.3) | |
| A reaction: Put it this way: given that properties are expressions of invariant powers, the interaction of two properties will (ceteris paribus) be invariant, and laws are just invariances in natural behaviour. |
| 16246 | Rather than take necessitation between universals as primitive, just make laws primitive [Maudlin on Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: My own view is simple: the laws of nature ought to be accepted as ontologically primitive. …They are preferable in point of familiarity to such necessitation relations between universals. | |
| From: comment on David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983]) by Tim Maudlin - The Metaphysics within Physics 1.4 | |
| A reaction: I think you make natures of things primitive, and reduce laws to regularities and universals to resemblances. Job done. Natures are even more 'familiar' as primitives than laws are. |
| 9480 | Armstrong has an unclear notion of contingent necessitation, which can't necessitate anything [Bird on Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: The two criticisms levelled against Armstrong are that it is unclear what his relation of contingent necessitation is, and that it is unclear how it is able to necessitate anything. | |
| From: comment on David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983]) by Alexander Bird - Nature's Metaphysics 3.1.2 | |
| A reaction: I suppose someone has to explore the middle ground between the mere contingencies of Humean regularities and the strong necessities of scientific essentialism. The area doesn't, however, look promising. |
| 1901 | If all atoms, times and places are the same, everything should move with equal velocity [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: If objects are reducible to atoms, and each thing passes in an atomic time with its own first atom into an atomic point of space, then all moving things are of equal velocity. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.77) |
| 1899 | Does the original self-mover push itself from behind, or pull itself from in front? [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: Self-movement must move in some particular direction, but if it pushes it will be behind itself, and if it pulls it will be in front of itself. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.68) | |
| A reaction: This is the same as Aquinas's First Way of proving God's existence. |
| 1900 | If time and place are infinitely divided, it becomes impossible for movement ever to begin [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: If bodies, and the places and times when they are said to move, are divided into infinity, motion will not occur, it being impossible to find anything which will initiate the first movement. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.76) |
| 1903 | If motion and rest are abolished, so is time [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: Since time does not seem to subsist without motion or even rest, if motion is abolished, and likewise rest, time is abolished. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.141) |
| 1904 | Time must be unlimited, but past and present can't be non-existent, and can't be now, so time does not exist [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: There can't be a time when there was no time, so time is not limited; but unlimited time means past and present are non-existent (so time is limited to the present), or they exist (which means they are present). Time does not exist. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.142) |
| 1905 | How can time be divisible if we can't compare one length of time with another? [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: Time is clearly divisible (into past, present and future), but it can't be, because a divisible thing is measured by some part of itself (divisions of length), but the two parts must coincide to make the measurement (e.g. present must coincide with past). | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.143) |
| 1891 | How can we agree on the concept of God, unless we agree on his substance or form or place? [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: How shall we be able to reach a conception of God when we have no agreement about his substance or his form or his place of abode? | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.3) |
| 1892 | The existence of God can't be self-evident or everyone would have agreed on it, so it needs demonstration [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: The existence of God is not pre-evident, for if it was the dogmatists would have agreed about it, whereas their disagreements show it is non-evident, and in need of demonstration. | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.6) |
| 1893 | If God foresaw evil he would presumably prevent it, and if he only foresees some things, why those things? [Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: If God had forethought for all, there would be no evil in the world, yet they say the world is full of evil. And if he forethinks some things, why those and not others? | |
| From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.9) |