10 ideas
12312 | The real essence of a thing is its powers, or 'dispositional properties' [Copi] |
Full Idea: With respect to scientific usage, we can say that the real essence of a thing will consist very largely of powers or, in modern terms, dispositional properties. | |
From: Irving M. Copi (Essence and Accident [1954], p.718) | |
A reaction: Once again, Copi is a hero. I personally love the word 'powers' in metaphysics (and dislike the word 'properties', which is lost in a fog of confusion). See Molnar on 'powers' and Mumford on 'dispositions'. |
10937 | Essential properties are the 'deepest' ones which explain the others [Copi, by Rami] |
Full Idea: The 'explanatory characterization' says that the essential properties of an object are the object's deepest explanatory properties, which explain the other properties of the object - and which Copi claims is mind-independent. | |
From: report of Irving M. Copi (Essence and Accident [1954]) by Adolph Rami - Essential vs Accidental Properties §2 | |
A reaction: It is, of course, normal to see a good explanation as being dependent on the interests of the audience. Perhaps this account should be in terms of causal powers. See Shoemaker on properties. |
12308 | In modern science, nominal essence is intended to be real essence [Copi] |
Full Idea: In the sphere of scientific enquiry the distinction between real and nominal essence tends to disappear; the scientist's classification of things is intended to be in terms of their real essences. | |
From: Irving M. Copi (Essence and Accident [1954], p.716) | |
A reaction: Thus we have disputes over what is the 'real' classification of natural kinds such as animals. There is not much point in a classification system that does not at least reflect some aspects of reality. |
12303 | Within the four types of change, essential attributes are those whose loss means destruction [Copi] |
Full Idea: If we can distinguish the different kinds of change (alteration, locomotion, growth, diminution), then we can say that a given attribute is essential to an object if its loss would result in the destruction of that object. | |
From: Irving M. Copi (Essence and Accident [1954], p.707-8) | |
A reaction: As Copi is aware, this is a necessary condition for a property for essence, but not sufficient. If an attribute were necessary but non-essential, its loss would also be destruction. We say the essential attributes must also have some explanatory role. |
7776 | Metaphors just mean what their words literally mean [Davidson] |
Full Idea: Metaphors mean what the words, in their most literal interpretation, mean, and nothing more. | |
From: Donald Davidson (What Metaphors Mean [1978], p.30) | |
A reaction: This pronouncement must be the result of Davidson anguishing over the truth conditions for metaphors, which are usually either taken to have a 'metaphorical meaning', or to be abbreviated similes. He solved his problem at a stroke! Plausible. |
7777 | We accept a metaphor when we see the sentence is false [Davidson] |
Full Idea: It is only when a sentence is taken to be false that we accept it as a metaphor. | |
From: Donald Davidson (What Metaphors Mean [1978], p.40) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as a very nice and true generalisation, even though Davidson mentions "no man is an island" as a counterexample. We thirst for meaning, and switch to a second meaning when the first one looks peculiar. |
7775 | Understanding a metaphor is a creative act, with no rules [Davidson] |
Full Idea: Understanding a metaphor is as much a creative endeavour as making a metaphor, and as little guided by rules. | |
From: Donald Davidson (What Metaphors Mean [1978], p.29) | |
A reaction: This is good news for literature studies courses. Davidson's point is that the metaphor itself only gives you a literal meaning, so it doesn't tell you how to interpret it. It seems an attractive proposal. |
468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |
Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice. | |
From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where? |
12307 | Modern science seeks essences, and is getting closer to them [Copi] |
Full Idea: Modern science seeks to know the real essences of things, and its increasing successes seem to be bringing it progressively nearer to that goal. | |
From: Irving M. Copi (Essence and Accident [1954], p.715) | |
A reaction: This is from a notable pioneering paper, which outlined scientific essentialism even before Marcus and Kripke began to offer a modern account of essence to give it backing. Compare Popper, who thinks essences are will-o-the-wisps. |
12310 | Real essences are scientifically knowable, but so are non-essential properties [Copi] |
Full Idea: Contrary to Locke, I should hold that real essences are in principle knowable, and contrary to Aristotle, I should hold that non-essential or accidental properties can also be objects of scientific knowledge. | |
From: Irving M. Copi (Essence and Accident [1954], p.717) | |
A reaction: Copi has just become my hero. Aristotle's account of definition is on the brink of allowing fine-tuned essences, but he thinks universal understanding blocks knowledge of individuals. But cross-referencing of universals pinpoints individuals. |