10 ideas
| 12170 | Amusement rests on superiority, or relief, or incongruity [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: There are three common accounts of amusement: superiority theories (Hobbes's 'sudden glory'), 'relief from restraint' (Freud on jokes), and 'incongruity' theories (Schopenhauer). | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Laughter [1982], §5) | |
| A reaction: All three contain some truth. But one need not feel superior to laugh, and one may already be in a state of unrestraint. Schopenhauer seems closest to a good general account. |
| 12172 | Objects of amusement do not have to be real [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: It is a matter of indifference whether the object of amusement be thought to be real. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Laughter [1982], §7) | |
| A reaction: Sort of. If I say 'wouldn't it be funny if someone did x?', it is probably much less funny than if I say 'apparently he really did x'. The fantasy case has to be much funnier to evoke the laughter. |
| 12173 | The central object of amusement is the human [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: There are amusing buildings, but not amusing rocks and cliffs. If I were to propose a candidate for the formal object of amusement, then the human would be my choice, ...or at least emphasise its centrality. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Laughter [1982], §9) | |
| A reaction: Sounds good. Animal behaviour only seems to amuse if it evokes something human. Plants would have to look a bit human to be funny. |
| 12169 | Since only men laugh, it seems to be an attribute of reason [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: Man is the only animal that laughs, so a starting point for all enquiries into laughter must be the hypothesis that it is an attribute of reason (though that gets us no further than our definition of reason). | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Laughter [1982], §1) | |
| A reaction: I would be inclined to say that both our capacity for reason and our capacity for laughter (and, indeed, our capacity for language) are a consequence of our evolved capacity for meta-thought. |
| 12205 | There are two families of modal notions, metaphysical and epistemic, of equal strength [Edgington] |
| Full Idea: In my view, there are two independent families of modal notions, metaphysical and epistemic, neither stronger than the other. | |
| From: Dorothy Edgington (Two Kinds of Possibility [2004], Abs) | |
| A reaction: My immediate reaction is that epistemic necessity is not necessity at all. 'For all I know' 2 plus 2 might really be 95, and squares may also be circular. |
| 12207 | Metaphysical possibility is discovered empirically, and is contrained by nature [Edgington] |
| Full Idea: Metaphysical necessity derives from distinguishing things which can happen and things which can't, in virtue of their nature, which we discover empirically: the metaphysically possible, I claim, is constrained by the laws of nature. | |
| From: Dorothy Edgington (Two Kinds of Possibility [2004], §I) | |
| A reaction: She claims that Kripke is sympathetic to this. Personally I like the idea that natural necessity is metaphysically necessary (see 'Scientific Essentialism'), but the other way round comes as a bit of a surprise. I will think about it. |
| 12206 | Broadly logical necessity (i.e. not necessarily formal logical necessity) is an epistemic notion [Edgington] |
| Full Idea: So-called broadly logical necessity (by which I mean, not necessarily formal logical necessity) is an epistemic notion. | |
| From: Dorothy Edgington (Two Kinds of Possibility [2004], §I) | |
| A reaction: This is controversial, and is criticised by McFetridge and Rumfitt. Fine argues that 'narrow' (formal) logical necessity is metaphysical. Between them they have got rid of logical necessity completely. |
| 12208 | An argument is only valid if it is epistemically (a priori) necessary [Edgington] |
| Full Idea: Validity is governed by epistemic necessity, i.e. an argument is valid if and only if there is an a priori route from premises to conclusion. | |
| From: Dorothy Edgington (Two Kinds of Possibility [2004], §V) | |
| A reaction: Controversial, and criticised by McFetridge and Rumfitt. I don't think I agree with her. I don't see validity as depending on dim little human beings. |
| 12174 | Only rational beings are attentive without motive or concern [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: It is only rational beings who can be attentive without a motive; only rational beings who can be interested in that in which they have no interest. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Laughter [1982], §12) | |
| A reaction: Rational beings make long term plans, so they cannot prejudge which things may turn out to be of interest to them. Scruton (a Kantian) makes it sound a little loftier than it actually is. |
| 468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |
| Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice. | |
| From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where? |