8 ideas
16608 | Ockham was an anti-realist about the categories [William of Ockham, by Pasnau] |
Full Idea: Ockham is the scholastic paradigm of anti-realism with respect to the categories. | |
From: report of William of Ockham (Summula philosophiae naturalis [1320]) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 05.3 | |
A reaction: These are the ten categories mentioned in Aristotle's book 'Categories'. |
16599 | Ockham says matter must be extended, so we don't need Quantity [William of Ockham, by Pasnau] |
Full Idea: Ockham regards Quantity as an entirely superfluous ontological category, …because matter is intrinsically extended. | |
From: report of William of Ockham (Summula philosophiae naturalis [1320]) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 04.4 |
16681 | Matter gets its quantity from condensation and rarefaction, which is just local motion [William of Ockham] |
Full Idea: Matter is made to have a greater or lesser quantity not through its receiving any absolute accident, but through condensation and rarefaction alone. Parts come more or less close together, which can happen with local motion. | |
From: William of Ockham (Summula philosophiae naturalis [1320], I.13), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 15.1 | |
A reaction: This is Ockham at his most modern, rejecting the odd idea of Quantity in favour of a modern corpuscular view of the mere motions of matter. |
12205 | There are two families of modal notions, metaphysical and epistemic, of equal strength [Edgington] |
Full Idea: In my view, there are two independent families of modal notions, metaphysical and epistemic, neither stronger than the other. | |
From: Dorothy Edgington (Two Kinds of Possibility [2004], Abs) | |
A reaction: My immediate reaction is that epistemic necessity is not necessity at all. 'For all I know' 2 plus 2 might really be 95, and squares may also be circular. |
12207 | Metaphysical possibility is discovered empirically, and is contrained by nature [Edgington] |
Full Idea: Metaphysical necessity derives from distinguishing things which can happen and things which can't, in virtue of their nature, which we discover empirically: the metaphysically possible, I claim, is constrained by the laws of nature. | |
From: Dorothy Edgington (Two Kinds of Possibility [2004], §I) | |
A reaction: She claims that Kripke is sympathetic to this. Personally I like the idea that natural necessity is metaphysically necessary (see 'Scientific Essentialism'), but the other way round comes as a bit of a surprise. I will think about it. |
12206 | Broadly logical necessity (i.e. not necessarily formal logical necessity) is an epistemic notion [Edgington] |
Full Idea: So-called broadly logical necessity (by which I mean, not necessarily formal logical necessity) is an epistemic notion. | |
From: Dorothy Edgington (Two Kinds of Possibility [2004], §I) | |
A reaction: This is controversial, and is criticised by McFetridge and Rumfitt. Fine argues that 'narrow' (formal) logical necessity is metaphysical. Between them they have got rid of logical necessity completely. |
12208 | An argument is only valid if it is epistemically (a priori) necessary [Edgington] |
Full Idea: Validity is governed by epistemic necessity, i.e. an argument is valid if and only if there is an a priori route from premises to conclusion. | |
From: Dorothy Edgington (Two Kinds of Possibility [2004], §V) | |
A reaction: Controversial, and criticised by McFetridge and Rumfitt. I don't think I agree with her. I don't see validity as depending on dim little human beings. |
468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |
Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice. | |
From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where? |