|
8242
|
Philosophy aims at what is interesting, remarkable or important - not at knowledge or truth [Deleuze/Guattari]
|
|
Full Idea:
Philosophy does not consist in knowing, and is not inspired by truth. Rather, it is categories like Interesting, Remarkable, or Important that determine success or failure.
|
|
From:
G Deleuze / F Guattari (What is Philosophy? [1991], 1.3)
|
|
A reaction:
Speak for yourself. I wonder what the criteria are for 'Interesting' or 'Important'. They can't seriously count 'remarkable' as a criterion of philosophical success, can they? There can be remarkable stupidity.
|
|
8223
|
The plague of philosophy is those who criticise without creating, and defend dead concepts [Deleuze/Guattari]
|
|
Full Idea:
Those who criticise without creating, those who are content to defend the vanished concept without being able to give it the forces it needs to return to life, are the plague of philosophy.
|
|
From:
G Deleuze / F Guattari (What is Philosophy? [1991], 1.1)
|
|
A reaction:
This seems to be the continental view of analytical philosophy, that it is pathetically conservative. I would offer MacIntyre as a response, who gives a beautiful analysis of why the super-modern view is dead. The French are hopelessly romantic.
|
|
8224
|
'Eris' is the divinity of conflict, the opposite of Philia, the god of friendship [Deleuze/Guattari]
|
|
Full Idea:
'Eris' is the Greek divinity of discord, conflict, and strife, the complementary opposite of Philia, the divinity of union and friendship.
|
|
From:
G Deleuze / F Guattari (What is Philosophy? [1991], 1.2 n)
|
|
A reaction:
Are these actual gods? This interestingly implies that the wonders of dialectic and Socrates' elenchus are simply aspects of friendship, which was elevated by Epicurus to the highest good. The Greeks just wanted wonderful friends and fine speeches.
|
|
8222
|
Concepts are superior because they make us more aware, and change our thinking [Deleuze/Guattari]
|
|
Full Idea:
If one concept is 'better' than an earlier one, it is because it makes us aware of new variations and unknown resonances, it carries out unforeseen cuttings-out, it brings forth an Event that surveys (survole) us.
|
|
From:
G Deleuze / F Guattari (What is Philosophy? [1991], 1.1)
|
|
A reaction:
I don't get much of that, but it is certainly in tune with the Kuhn/Feyerabend idea that what science can generate is fresh visions, rather than precisely expanded truths. Personally I consider it dangerous nonsense, but I thought I ought to pass it on.
|
|
8329
|
Either causal relations are given in experience, or they are unobserved and theoretical [Sosa/Tooley]
|
|
Full Idea:
There is a fundamental choice between the realist approach to causation which says that the relation is immediately given in experience, and the view that causation is a theoretical relation, and so not directly observable.
|
|
From:
E Sosa / M Tooley (Introduction to 'Causation' [1993], §1)
|
|
A reaction:
Even if immediate experience is involved, there is a step of abstraction in calling it a cause, and picking out events. A 'theoretical relation' is not of much interest there if no observations are involved. I don't think a choice is required here.
|
|
8248
|
Phenomenology says thought is part of the world [Deleuze/Guattari]
|
|
Full Idea:
According to phenomenology, thought depends on man's relations with the world - with which the brain is necessarily in agreement because it is drawn from these relations.
|
|
From:
G Deleuze / F Guattari (What is Philosophy? [1991], Conclusion)
|
|
A reaction:
The development of externalist views of mind, arising from the Twin Earth idea, seems to provide a link to continental philosophy, where similar ideas are found in Husserl, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. So study science, psychology, or sociology?
|
|
8245
|
The logical attitude tries to turn concepts into functions, when they are really forms or forces [Deleuze/Guattari]
|
|
Full Idea:
Logic is reductionist not accidentally, but essentially and necessarily: following the route marked out by Frege and Russell, it wants to turn the concept into a function (...when actually a concept is a form, or a force).
|
|
From:
G Deleuze / F Guattari (What is Philosophy? [1991], 2.6)
|
|
A reaction:
[Last part on p.144] I'm not sure that I understand 'form or force', but the idea that concepts are mere functions is like describing something as 'transport', without saying whether it is bus/bike/train.. Is a concept a vision, or a tool?
|
|
8324
|
The problem is to explain how causal laws and relations connect, and how they link to the world [Sosa/Tooley]
|
|
Full Idea:
Causal states of affairs encompass causal laws, and causal relations between events or states of affairs; two key questions concern the relation between causal laws and causal relations, and the relation between these and non-causal affairs.
|
|
From:
E Sosa / M Tooley (Introduction to 'Causation' [1993], §1)
|
|
A reaction:
This is the agenda for modern analytical philosophy. I'm not quite clear what would count as an answer. When have you 'explained' a relation? Does calling it 'gravity', or finding an equation, explain that relation? Do gravitinos explain it?
|
|
8328
|
Causation isn't energy transfer, because an electron is caused by previous temporal parts [Sosa/Tooley]
|
|
Full Idea:
The temporal parts of an electron (for example) are causally related, but this relation does not involve any transfer of energy or momentum. Causation cannot be identified with physical energy relations, and physicalist reductions look unpromising.
|
|
From:
E Sosa / M Tooley (Introduction to 'Causation' [1993], §1)
|
|
A reaction:
This idea, plus Idea 8327, are their grounds for rejecting Fair's proposal (Idea 8326). It feels like a different use of 'cause' when we say 'the existence of x was caused by its existence yesterday'. It is more like inertia. Destruction needs energy.
|
|
8325
|
The dominant view is that causal laws are prior; a minority say causes can be explained singly [Sosa/Tooley]
|
|
Full Idea:
The dominant view is that causal laws are more basic than causal relations, with relations being logically supervenient on causal laws, and on properties and event relations; some, though, defend the singularist view, in which events alone can be related.
|
|
From:
E Sosa / M Tooley (Introduction to 'Causation' [1993], §1)
|
|
A reaction:
I am deeply suspicious about laws (see Idea 5470). I suspect that the laws are merely descriptions of the regularities that arise from the single instances of causation. We won't explain the single instances, but then laws don't 'explain' them either.
|