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9576
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Multiplicity in general is just one and one and one, etc. [Husserl]
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Full Idea:
Multiplicity in general is no more than something and something and something, etc.; ..or more briefly, one and one and one, etc.
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From:
Edmund Husserl (Philosophy of Arithmetic [1894], p.85), quoted by Gottlob Frege - Review of Husserl's 'Phil of Arithmetic'
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A reaction:
Frege goes on to attack this idea fairly convincingly. It seems obvious that it is hard to say that you have seventeen items, if the only numberical concept in your possession is 'one'. How would you distinguish 17 from 16? What makes the ones 'multiple'?
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9575
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Husserl identifies a positive mental act of unification, and a negative mental act for differences [Husserl, by Frege]
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Full Idea:
Husserl identifies a 'unitary mental act' where several contents are connected or related to one another, and also a difference-relation where two contents are related to one another by a negative judgement.
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From:
report of Edmund Husserl (Philosophy of Arithmetic [1894], p.73-74) by Gottlob Frege - Review of Husserl's 'Phil of Arithmetic' p.322
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A reaction:
Frege is setting this up ready for a fairly vicious attack. Where Hume has a faculty for spotting resemblances, it is not implausible that we should also be hard-wired to spot differences. 'You look different; have you changed your hair style?'
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9851
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Husserl wanted to keep a shadowy remnant of abstracted objects, to correlate them [Dummett on Husserl]
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Full Idea:
Husserl saw that abstracted units, though featureless, must in some way retain their distinctness, some shadowy remnant of their objects. So he wanted to correlate like-numbered sets, not just register their identity, but then abstractionism fails.
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From:
comment on Edmund Husserl (Philosophy of Arithmetic [1894]) by Michael Dummett - Frege philosophy of mathematics Ch.12
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A reaction:
Abstractionism is held to be between the devil and the deep blue sea, of depending on units which are identifiable, when they are defined as devoid of all individuality. We seem forced to say that the only distinction between them is countability.
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23896
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We see our character as a restricting limit, but also as an unshakable support [Weil]
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Full Idea:
Our character appears to us as a limit by which we do not want to be imprisoned, …but also as a support that we want to believe is unshakable.
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From:
Simone Weil (On the Concept of Character [1941], p.100)
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A reaction:
A nice perception. It is fairly easy to criticise, or even laugh at, one's own actions, but extremely hard to criticise our own character. Maybe we all wish we were more determined in our projects, but not much else.
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23893
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We don't see character in a single moment, but only over a period of time [Weil]
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Full Idea:
Character is constant over a period of time; the way a person is at a single moment does not at all reflect the character of this person. We do, however, concede that character changes.
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From:
Simone Weil (On the Concept of Character [1941], p.98)
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A reaction:
I do think, though, that there are moments in behaviour which are hugely revealing of character, even in a single remark. But I agree that most single moments do not show much.
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23895
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We modify our character by placing ourselves in situations, or by attending to what seems trivial [Weil]
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Full Idea:
We can modify our character, by putting ourselves in circumstances that will act on us from the outside, …or by the orientation of our attention in the moments that appear most insignificant or indifferent in our lives.
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From:
Simone Weil (On the Concept of Character [1941], p.99)
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A reaction:
I've never seen anyone address this question (apart from Aristotle's emphasis on training habits). Choosing your source for current affairs information strikes me as very important. What you read, what you watch, who you spend time with…
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