Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Proof that every set can be well-ordered' and 'Events and Their Names'

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4 ideas

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / e. Countable infinity

15897	Zermelo realised that Choice would facilitate the sort of 'counting' Cantor needed [Zermelo, by Lavine]
	Full Idea: Zermelo realised that the Axiom of Choice (based on arbitrary functions) could be used to 'count', in the Cantorian sense, those collections that had given Cantor so much trouble, which restored a certain unity to set theory.
	From: report of Ernst Zermelo (Proof that every set can be well-ordered [1904]) by Shaughan Lavine - Understanding the Infinite I

7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events

8978	Events are made of other things, and are not fundamental to ontology [Bennett]
	Full Idea: Events are not basic items in the universe; they should not be included in any fundamental ontology...all the truths about them are entailed by and explained and made true by truths that do not involve the event concept.
	From: Jonathan Bennett (Events and Their Names [1988], p.12), quoted by Peter Simons - Events 3.1
	A reaction: Given the variable time spans of events, their ability to coincide, their ability to contain no motion, their blatantly conventional component, and their recalcitrance to individuation, I say Bennett is right.

21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality

468	Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.]
	Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice.
	From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where?

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata

10364	Facts are about the world, not in it, so they can't cause anything [Bennett]
	Full Idea: Facts are not the sort of item that can cause anything. A fact is a true proposition (they say); it is not something in the world but is rather something about the world.
	From: Jonathan Bennett (Events and Their Names [1988], p.22), quoted by Jonathan Schaffer - The Metaphysics of Causation 1.1
	A reaction: Compare 10361. Good argument, but maybe 'fact' is ambiguous. See Idea 10365. Events are said to be more concrete, and so can do the job, but their individuation also seems to depend on a description (as Davidson has pointed out).