9 ideas
| 16625 | In hylomorphism all the explanation of actions is in the form, and the matter doesn't do anything [Bacon] |
| Full Idea: Prime, common matter seems to be a kind of accessory and to stand as a substratum, whereas any kind of action seems to be a mere emanation of form. So it is that forms are given all the leading parts. | |
| From: Francis Bacon (Philosophical Studies 1611-19 [1617], p.206), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 07.2 | |
| A reaction: This is a very striking criticism of hylomorphism. The revolution was simple - that actually matter seems to do all the real work, and the form can take a back seat. |
| 12608 | Concepts are distinguished by roles in judgement, and are thus tied to rationality [Peacocke] |
| Full Idea: 'Concept' is a notion tied, in the classical Fregean manner, to cognitive significance. Concepts are distinct if we can judge rationally of one, without the other. Concepts are constitutively and definitionally tied to rationality in this way. | |
| From: Christopher Peacocke (Truly Understood [2008], 2.2) | |
| A reaction: It seems to a bit optimistic to say, more or less, that thinking is impossible if it isn't rational. Rational beings have been selected for. As Quine nicely observed, duffers at induction have all been weeded out - but they may have existed, briefly. |
| 12605 | A sense is individuated by the conditions for reference [Peacocke] |
| Full Idea: My basic Fregean idea is that a sense is individuated by the fundamental condition for something to be its reference. | |
| From: Christopher Peacocke (Truly Understood [2008], Intro) | |
| A reaction: For something to actually be its reference (as opposed to imagined reference), truth must be involved. This needs the post-1891 Frege view of such things, and not just the view of concepts as functions which he started with. |
| 12607 | Fregean concepts have their essence fixed by reference-conditions [Peacocke] |
| Full Idea: The Fregean view is that the essence of a concept is given by the fundamental condition for something to be its reference. | |
| From: Christopher Peacocke (Truly Understood [2008], 2.1) | |
| A reaction: Peacocke is a supporter of the Fregean view. How does this work for concepts of odd creatures in a fantasy novel? Or for mistaken or confused concepts? For Burge's 'arthritis in my thigh'? I don't reject the Fregean view. |
| 12609 | Concepts have distinctive reasons and norms [Peacocke] |
| Full Idea: For each concept, there will be some reasons or norms distinctive of that concept. | |
| From: Christopher Peacocke (Truly Understood [2008], 2.3) | |
| A reaction: This is Peacocke's bold Fregean thesis (and it sounds rather Kantian to me). I dislike the word 'norms' (long story), but reasons are interesting. The trouble is the distinction between being a reason for something (its cause) and being a reason for me. |
| 12604 | Any explanation of a concept must involve reference and truth [Peacocke] |
| Full Idea: For some particular concept, we can argue that some of its distinctive features are adequately explained only by a possession-condition that involves reference and truth essentially. | |
| From: Christopher Peacocke (Truly Understood [2008], Intro) | |
| A reaction: He reached this view via the earlier assertion that it is the role in judgement which key to understanding concepts. I like any view of such things which says that truth plays a role. |
| 12610 | Encountering novel sentences shows conclusively that meaning must be compositional [Peacocke] |
| Full Idea: The phenomenon of understanding sentences one has never encountered before is decisive against theories of meaning which do not proceed compositionally. | |
| From: Christopher Peacocke (Truly Understood [2008], 4.3) | |
| A reaction: I agree entirely. It seems obvious, as soon as you begin to slowly construct a long and unusual sentence, and follow the mental processes of the listener. |
| 468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |
| Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice. | |
| From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where? |
| 16624 | Stripped and passive matter is just a human invention [Bacon] |
| Full Idea: Stripped and passive matter seems nothing more than an invention of the human mind. | |
| From: Francis Bacon (Philosophical Studies 1611-19 [1617], p.206), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 07.2 | |
| A reaction: Bacon seems to me to get too little credit in the history of philosophy, because he is just seen as a progenitor of science. His modern views predate most radical 17th C thought by 20 years. |