11 ideas
| 6950 | You can be rational with undetected or minor inconsistencies [Harman] |
| Full Idea: Rationality doesn't require consistency, because you can be rational despite undetected inconsistencies in beliefs, and it isn't always rational to respond to a discovery of inconsistency by dropping everything in favour of eliminating that inconsistency. | |
| From: Gilbert Harman (Rationality [1995], 1.2) | |
| A reaction: This strikes me as being correct, and is (I am beginning to realise) a vital contribution made to our understanding by pragmatism. European thinking has been too keen on logic as the model of good reasoning. |
| 6954 | A coherent conceptual scheme contains best explanations of most of your beliefs [Harman] |
| Full Idea: A set of unrelated beliefs seems less coherent than a tightly organized conceptual scheme that contains explanatory principles that make sense of most of your beliefs; this is why inference to the best explanation is an attractive pattern of inference. | |
| From: Gilbert Harman (Rationality [1995], 1.5.2) | |
| A reaction: I find this a very appealing proposal. The central aim of rational thought seems to me to be best explanation, and I increasingly think that most of my beliefs rest on their apparent coherence, rather than their foundations. |
| 6955 | Enumerative induction is inference to the best explanation [Harman] |
| Full Idea: We might think of enumerative induction as inference to the best explanation, taking the generalization to explain its instances. | |
| From: Gilbert Harman (Rationality [1995], 1.5.2) | |
| A reaction: This is a helpful connection. The best explanation of these swans being white is that all swans are white; it ceased to be the best explanation when black swans turned up. In the ultimate case, a law of nature is the explanation. |
| 6952 | Induction is 'defeasible', since additional information can invalidate it [Harman] |
| Full Idea: It is sometimes said that inductive reasoning is 'defeasible', meaning that considerations that support a given conclusion can be defeated by additional information. | |
| From: Gilbert Harman (Rationality [1995], 1.4.5) | |
| A reaction: True. The point is that being defeasible does not prevent such thinking from being rational. The rational part of it is to acknowledge that your conclusion is defeasible. |
| 6953 | All reasoning is inductive, and deduction only concerns implication [Harman] |
| Full Idea: Deductive logic is concerned with deductive implication, not deductive reasoning; all reasoning is inductive | |
| From: Gilbert Harman (Rationality [1995], 1.4.5) | |
| A reaction: This may be an attempt to stipulate how the word 'reasoning' should be used in future. It is, though, a bold and interesting claim, given the reputation of induction (since Hume) of being a totally irrational process. |
| 6951 | Ordinary rationality is conservative, starting from where your beliefs currently are [Harman] |
| Full Idea: Ordinary rationality is generally conservative, in the sense that you start from where you are, with your present beliefs and intentions. | |
| From: Gilbert Harman (Rationality [1995], 1.3) | |
| A reaction: This stands opposed to the Cartesian or philosophers' rationality, which requires that (where possible) everything be proved from scratch. Harman seems right, that the normal onus of proof is on changing beliefs, rather proving you should retain them. |
| 468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |
| Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice. | |
| From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where? |
| 23169 | Democratic institutions become impossible in a fanatical democracy [Russell] |
| Full Idea: Even democracy, when it becomes fanatical, as it did …in the French Revolution, ceases to be Liberal. Indeed, a fanatical belief in democracy makes democratic institutions impossible. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Philosophy and Politics [1950], p.26) | |
| A reaction: Presumably this is because the supposed 'will of the people' is continually placed in opposition to the institutions. For example, there is a problem if a referendum is held, which produces a result in conflict with the institutions. |
| 23170 | Liberal opinions are tentative rather than dogmatic, and are always responsive to new evidence [Russell] |
| Full Idea: The essence of the Liberal outlook lies ...in how opinions are held: instead of being held dogmatically, they are held tentatively (as they are in science), and with a consciousness that new evidence may at any moment lead to their abandonment. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Philosophy and Politics [1950], p.26) | |
| A reaction: A nice assessment. Russell shows himself finally to be a Liberal. This flexible approach to opinions is what infuriates dogmatists from both the left and the right. It might be said that the basic evidence rarely changes. |
| 23172 | Empiricist Liberalism is the only view for someone who favours scientific evidence and happiness [Russell] |
| Full Idea: Empiricist Liberalism (not incompatible with democratic socialism) is, as in Locke's time, the only philosophy that can be adopted by a man who demands some scientific evidence for beliefs, and also desires human happiness more than some party or creed. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Philosophy and Politics [1950], p.31) | |
| A reaction: I like this way of presenting liberalism. In the modern world we are sunk if we don't pay attention to experts, so we all need a critical understanding of what counts as good evidence. Tricky in a world of lying media. |
| 23171 | Empiricism is ethically superior, because dogmatism favours persecution and hatred [Russell] |
| Full Idea: Empiricism is to be commended not only on the grounds of its greater truth, but also on ethical grounds. Dogma demands authority rather than intelligent thought; it requires persecution of heretics and unbelievers, and favours systematic hatred. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Philosophy and Politics [1950], p.31) | |
| A reaction: He links empiricism with the liberal outlook. At its best, the respect by empiricists for evidence is a sort of humility. |