39 ideas
| 3099 | Inference is never a conscious process [Harman] |
| Full Idea: Inference is never a conscious process. | |
| From: Gilbert Harman (Thought [1973], 11.2) |
| 3077 | Reasoning might be defined in terms of its functional role, which is to produce knowledge [Harman] |
| Full Idea: Reasoning could be treated as a functionally defined process that is partly defined in terms of its role in giving a person knowledge. | |
| From: Gilbert Harman (Thought [1973], 3.6) |
| 3092 | If you believe that some of your beliefs are false, then at least one of your beliefs IS false [Harman] |
| Full Idea: If a rational man believes he has at least some other false beliefs, it follows that a rational man knows that at least one of his beliefs is false (the one believed false, or this new belief). | |
| From: Gilbert Harman (Thought [1973], 7.2) |
| 3093 | Any two states are logically linked, by being entailed by their conjunction [Harman] |
| Full Idea: Any two states of affairs are logically connected, simply because both are entailed by their conjunction. | |
| From: Gilbert Harman (Thought [1973], 8.1) |
| 3098 | Deductive logic is the only logic there is [Harman] |
| Full Idea: Deductive logic is the only logic there is. | |
| From: Gilbert Harman (Thought [1973], 10.4) |
| 3094 | You don't have to accept the conclusion of a valid argument [Harman] |
| Full Idea: We may say "From P and If-P-then-Q, infer Q" (modus ponens), but there is no rule of acceptance to say that we should accept Q. Maybe we should stop believing P or If-P-then-Q rather than believe Q. | |
| From: Gilbert Harman (Thought [1973], 10.1) |
| 3084 | Our underlying predicates represent words in the language, not universal concepts [Harman] |
| Full Idea: The underlying truth-conditional structures of thoughts are language-dependent in the sense that underlying predicates represent words in the language rather than universal concepts common to all languages. | |
| From: Gilbert Harman (Thought [1973], 6.3) |
| 3080 | Logical form is the part of a sentence structure which involves logical elements [Harman] |
| Full Idea: The logical form of a sentence is that part of its structure that involves logical elements. | |
| From: Gilbert Harman (Thought [1973], 5.2) |
| 3081 | A theory of truth in a language must involve a theory of logical form [Harman] |
| Full Idea: Some sort of theory of logical form is involved in any theory of truth for a natural language. | |
| From: Gilbert Harman (Thought [1973], 5.2) |
| 12215 | The existence of numbers is not a matter of identities, but of constituents of the world [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: On saying that a particular number exists, we are not saying that there is something identical to it, but saying something about its status as a genuine constituent of the world. | |
| From: Kit Fine (The Question of Ontology [2009], p.168) | |
| A reaction: This is aimed at Frege's criterion of identity, which is to be an element in an identity relation, such as x = y. Fine suggests that this only gives a 'trivial' notion of existence, when he is interested in a 'thick' sense of 'exists'. |
| 12211 | It is plausible that x^2 = -1 had no solutions before complex numbers were 'introduced' [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: It is not implausible that before the 'introduction' of complex numbers, it would have been incorrect for mathematicians to claim that there was a solution to the equation 'x^2 = -1' under a completely unrestricted understanding of 'there are'. | |
| From: Kit Fine (The Question of Ontology [2009]) | |
| A reaction: I have adopted this as the crucial test question for anyone's attitude to platonism in mathematics. I take it as obvious that complex numbers were simply invented so that such equations could be dealt with. They weren't 'discovered'! |
| 12209 | The indispensability argument shows that nature is non-numerical, not the denial of numbers [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: Arguments such as the dispensability argument are attempting to show something about the essentially non-numerical character of physical reality, rather than something about the nature or non-existence of the numbers themselves. | |
| From: Kit Fine (The Question of Ontology [2009], p.160) | |
| A reaction: This is aimed at Hartry Field. If Quine was right, and we only believe in numbers because of our science, and then Field shows our science doesn't need it, then Fine would be wrong. Quine must be wrong, as well as Field. |
| 12214 | 'Exists' is a predicate, not a quantifier; 'electrons exist' is like 'electrons spin' [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: The most natural reading of 'electrons exist' is that there are electrons while, on our view, the proper reading should be modeled on 'electrons spin', meaning every electron spins. 'Exists' should be treated as a predicate rather than a quantifier. | |
| From: Kit Fine (The Question of Ontology [2009], p.167) | |
| A reaction: So existence IS a predicate (message to Kant). Dunno. Electrons have to exist in order to spin, but they don't have to exist in order to exist. But they don't have to exist to be 'dead'. |
| 12212 | Just as we introduced complex numbers, so we introduced sums and temporal parts [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: Just as one can extend the domain of discourse to include solutions to the equation 'x^2=-1' so one can extend the domain of discourse to include objects that satisfy the condition 'x is the sum of the G's' or 'x is a temporal part of the object b at t'. | |
| From: Kit Fine (The Question of Ontology [2009], p.164) | |
| A reaction: This thought lies behind Fine's 'Proceduralism'. I take it that our collection of abstracta consists entirely of items we have either deliberately or unthinkingly 'introduced' into our discourse when they seemed useful. They then submit to certain laws. |
| 12216 | Real objects are those which figure in the facts that constitute reality [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: The real objects are the objects of reality, those that figure in the facts by which reality is constituted. | |
| From: Kit Fine (The Question of Ontology [2009], p.172) | |
| A reaction: And these need to be facts over and above the basic facts. Thus, does the 'equator' constitute reality, over and above the Earth being a rotating sphere? Does 'six' constitute reality, over and above all the possible groups of six objects? |
| 12218 | Being real and being fundamental are separate; Thales's water might be real and divisible [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: Being the case in reality and being fundamental are not sufficient for one another. If one agrees with Thales that the world is composed of water, and with Aristotle that water is indefinitely divisible, then water would be real but not fundamental. | |
| From: Kit Fine (The Question of Ontology [2009], p.174) | |
| A reaction: Presumably the divisibility would make a reductionist account of water possible. The Atlantic Ocean is real, but water molecules would have a more prominent place in the ontology of any good metaphysician. |
| 12217 | For ontology we need, not internal or external views, but a view from outside reality [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: We need to straddle both of Carnap's internal and external views. It is only by standing outside of reality that we are able to occupy a standpoint from which the constitution of reality can be adequately described. | |
| From: Kit Fine (The Question of Ontology [2009], p.174) | |
| A reaction: See Idea 4840! I thoroughly approve of this idea, which almost amounts to a Credo for the modern metaphysician. Since we can think outside our room, or our country, or our era, or our solar system, I think we can do what Fine is demanding. |
| 12213 | Ontological claims are often universal, and not a matter of existential quantification [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: I suggest we give up on the account of ontological claims in terms of existential quantification. The commitment to the integers is not an existential but a universal commitment, to each of the integers, not to some integer or other. | |
| From: Kit Fine (The Question of Ontology [2009], p.167) | |
| A reaction: In classical logic it is only the existential quantifier which requires the domain to be populated, so Fine is more or less giving up on classical logic as a tool for doing ontology (apparently?). |
| 3100 | You have to reaffirm all your beliefs when you make a logical inference [Harman] |
| Full Idea: Since inference is inference to the best total account, all your prior beliefs are relevant and your conclusion is everything you believe at the end. So, you constantly reaffirm your beliefs in inference. | |
| From: Gilbert Harman (Thought [1973], 12.1) |
| 3089 | Only lack of imagination makes us think that 'cats are animals' is analytic [Harman] |
| Full Idea: That 'cats are animals' is often cited as an analytic truth. But (as Putnam points out) the inability to imagine this false is just a lack of imagination. They might turn out to be radio-controlled plastic spies from Mars. | |
| From: Gilbert Harman (Thought [1973], 6.7) |
| 3088 | Analyticity is postulated because we can't imagine some things being true, but we may just lack imagination [Harman] |
| Full Idea: Analyticity is postulated to explain why we cannot imagine certain things being true. A better postulate is that we are not good at imagining things. | |
| From: Gilbert Harman (Thought [1973], 6.7) |
| 3101 | Memories are not just preserved, they are constantly reinferred [Harman] |
| Full Idea: I favour the inferential view of memory over the preservation view. …One constantly reinfers old beliefs. | |
| From: Gilbert Harman (Thought [1973], 12.1) | |
| A reaction: This has a grain of truth, but seems a distortion. An image of the old home floats into my mind when I am thinking about something utterly unconnected. When we search memory we may be inferring and explaining, but the same applies to searching images. |
| 3074 | People's reasons for belief are rarely conscious [Harman] |
| Full Idea: The reasons for which people believe things are rarely conscious. | |
| From: Gilbert Harman (Thought [1973], 2.2) | |
| A reaction: Probably correct. The interesting bit is when they bring the beliefs into consciousness and scrutinise them rationally. Philosophers routinely overthrow their natural beliefs in this way. |
| 3097 | We don't distinguish between accepting, and accepting as evidence [Harman] |
| Full Idea: There is no distinction between what we accept as evidence and whatever else we accept. | |
| From: Gilbert Harman (Thought [1973], 10.4) |
| 6369 | In negative coherence theories, beliefs are prima facie justified, and don't need initial reasons [Harman, by Pollock/Cruz] |
| Full Idea: According to Harman's negative coherence theory it is always permissible to adopt a new belief - any new belief; because beliefs are prima facie justified you do not need a reason for adopting a new belief. | |
| From: report of Gilbert Harman (Thought [1973]) by J Pollock / J Cruz - Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) §3.4.1 | |
| A reaction: This must be placed alongside the fact that we don't usually choose our beliefs, but simply find ourselves believing because of the causal impact of evidence. This gives an unstated rational justification for any belief - something caused it. |
| 3096 | Coherence avoids scepticism, because it doesn't rely on unprovable foundations [Harman] |
| Full Idea: Scepticism is undermined once it is seen that the relevant kind of justification is not a matter of derivation from basic principles but is rather a matter of showing that a view fits in well with other things we believe. | |
| From: Gilbert Harman (Thought [1973], 10.4) | |
| A reaction: I would (now) call myself a 'coherentist' about justification, and I agree with this. Coherent justification could not possibly deliver certainty, so it must be combined with fallibilism. |
| 3095 | Induction is an attempt to increase the coherence of our explanations [Harman] |
| Full Idea: Induction is an attempt to increase the explanatory coherence of our view, making it more complete, less ad hoc, more plausible. | |
| From: Gilbert Harman (Thought [1973], 10.2) |
| 3073 | We see ourselves in the world as a map [Harman] |
| Full Idea: Our conception of ourselves in the world is more like a map than a story. | |
| From: Gilbert Harman (Thought [1973], Pref) | |
| A reaction: Dennett offer the 'story' view of the self (Ideas 7381 and 7382). How do we arbitrate this one? A story IS a sort of map. Maps can extend over time as well over space. I think the self is real, and is a location on a map, and the hero of a story. |
| 3076 | Defining dispositions is circular [Harman] |
| Full Idea: There is no noncircular way to specify dispositions; for they are dispositions to behave given certain situations, and the situations must be include beliefs about the situation, and desires concerning it. | |
| From: Gilbert Harman (Thought [1973], 3.3) | |
| A reaction: This is nowadays accepted dogmatically as the biggest objection to behaviourism, but it could be challenged. Your analysis may begin by mentioning beliefs and desires, but if you keep going they may eventually fade out of the picture. |
| 3075 | Could a cloud have a headache if its particles formed into the right pattern? [Harman] |
| Full Idea: If the right pattern of electrical discharges occurred in a cloud instead of in a brain, would that also be a headache? | |
| From: Gilbert Harman (Thought [1973], 3.2) | |
| A reaction: The standard objection to functionalism is to propose absurd implementations of a mind, but probably only a brain could produce the right electro-chemical combination. |
| 3086 | Are there any meanings apart from in a language? [Harman] |
| Full Idea: The theory of language-independent meanings or semantic representations is mistaken. | |
| From: Gilbert Harman (Thought [1973], 6.5) | |
| A reaction: This would make him (in Dummett's terms) a 'philosopher of language' rather than a 'philosopher of thought'. Personally I disagree. Don't animals have 'meanings'? Can two sentences share a meaning? |
| 3078 | Speech acts, communication, representation and truth form a single theory [Harman] |
| Full Idea: The various theories are not in competition. The theory of truth is part of the theory of representational character, which is presupposed by the theory of communication, which in turn is contained in the more general theory of speech acts. | |
| From: Gilbert Harman (Thought [1973], 4.3) | |
| A reaction: Certainly it seems that the supposed major contenders for a theory of meaning are just as much complements as they are competitors. |
| 3090 | There is only similarity in meaning, never sameness in meaning [Harman] |
| Full Idea: The only sort of sameness of meaning we know is similarity in meaning, not exact sameness of meaning. | |
| From: Gilbert Harman (Thought [1973], 6.8) | |
| A reaction: The Eiffel Tower and le tour Eiffel? If you want to be difficult, you can doubt whether the word 'fast' ever has exactly the same meaning in two separate usages of the word. |
| 3082 | Ambiguity is when different underlying truth-conditional structures have the same surface form [Harman] |
| Full Idea: Ambiguity results from the possibility of transforming different underlying truth-conditional structures into the same surface form. | |
| From: Gilbert Harman (Thought [1973], 5.3) | |
| A reaction: Personally I would call a 'truth-conditional structure' a 'proposition', and leave it to the philosophers to decide what a proposition is. |
| 3079 | Truth in a language is explained by how the structural elements of a sentence contribute to its truth conditions [Harman] |
| Full Idea: A theory of truth for a language shows how the truth conditions of any sentence depend on the structure of that sentence. The theory will say, for each element of structure, what its contribution is. | |
| From: Gilbert Harman (Thought [1973], 5.1) | |
| A reaction: This just seems to push the problem of truth back a stage, as you need to know where the truth is to be found in the elements from which the structure is built. |
| 3085 | Sentences are different from propositions, since two sentences can express one proposition [Harman] |
| Full Idea: 'Bob and John play golf' and 'John and Bob play golf' are equivalent; but if they were to be derived from the same underlying structure, one or the other of Bob and John would have to come first; and either possibility is arbitrary. | |
| From: Gilbert Harman (Thought [1973], 6.4) | |
| A reaction: If I watch Bob and John play golf, neither of them 'comes first'. A proposition about them need not involve 'coming first'. Only if you insist on formulating a sentence must you decide on that. |
| 3087 | The analytic/synthetic distinction is a silly division of thought into encyclopaedia and dictionary [Harman] |
| Full Idea: No purpose is served by thinking that certain principles available to a person are contained in his internal encyclopaedia - and therefore only synthetic - whereas other principles are part of his internal dictionary - and are therefore analytic. | |
| From: Gilbert Harman (Thought [1973], 6.5) | |
| A reaction: If it led to two different ways to acquire knowledge, then quite a lot of purpose would be served. He speaks like a pragmatist. The question is whether some statements just are true because of some feature of meaning. Why not? |
| 3083 | Many predicates totally resist translation, so a universal underlying structure to languages is unlikely [Harman] |
| Full Idea: There are many predicates of a given language that resist translation into another language, …so it is unlikely that there is a basic set of underlying structures common to all languages. | |
| From: Gilbert Harman (Thought [1973], 5.4) | |
| A reaction: Not convincing. 'Structures' are not the same as 'predicates'. Once a language has mapped its predicates, that blocks the intrusions of differently sliced alien predicates. No gaps. |
| 468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |
| Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice. | |
| From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where? |