21844
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The history of philosophy is an agent of power: how can you think if you haven't read the great names? [Deleuze]
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Full Idea:
The history of philosophy has always been the agent of power in philosophy, and even in thought. It has played the oppressor's role: how can you think without having read Plato, Descartes, Kant and Heidegger.
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From:
Gilles Deleuze (A Conversation: what is it? What is it for? [1977], I)
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A reaction:
I find it hard to relate to this French 1960s obsession with everybody being oppressed in every conceivable way, so that 'liberation' is the only value that matters. If you ask why liberty is needed, you seem to have missed the point.
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21546
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We can't sharply distinguish variables, domains and values, if symbols frighten us [Russell]
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Full Idea:
Whoever is afraid of symbols can hardly hope to acquire exact ideas where it is necessary to distinguish 1) the variable in itself as opposed to its value, 2) any value of the variable, 3) all values, 4) some value.
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From:
Bertrand Russell (Review: Meinong 'Untersuchungen zur..' [1905], p.84)
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A reaction:
Not the best example, perhaps, of the need for precision, but a nice illustration of the new attitude Russell brought into philosophy.
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21839
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When I meet objections I just move on; they never contribute anything [Deleuze]
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Full Idea:
Not reflection, and objections are even worse. Every time someone puts an objection to me, I want to say: 'OK, OK, let's get on to something else'. Objections have never contributed anything.
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From:
Gilles Deleuze (A Conversation: what is it? What is it for? [1977], I)
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A reaction:
I know it is heresy in analytic philosophy, but I love this! In analytic seminars you can barely complete your first sentence before someone interrupts. It's like road range - the philosophical mind state is always poised to attack, attack.
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21842
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Don't assess ideas for truth or justice; look for another idea, and establish a relationship with it [Deleuze]
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Full Idea:
You should not try to find whether an idea is just or correct. You should look for a completely different idea, elsewhere, in another area, so that something passes between the two which is neither in one nor the other.
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From:
Gilles Deleuze (A Conversation: what is it? What is it for? [1977], I)
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A reaction:
Neither relativism nor dialectic. Sounds like just having fun with ideas, but a commentator tells me it is a strategy for liberating our thought, following an agenda created by Nietzsche.
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21850
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Dualisms can be undone from within, by tracing connections, and drawing them to a new path [Deleuze]
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Full Idea:
It is always possible to undo dualisms from the inside, by tracing the line of flight which passes between the two terms or the two sets …and which draws both into a non-parallel evolution. At least this does not belong to the dialectic.
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From:
Gilles Deleuze (A Conversation: what is it? What is it for? [1977], II)
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A reaction:
Deleuze disliked Hegel's version of the dialectic. Not clear what he means here, but he is evidently groping for an alternative account of the reasoning process, which is interesting. Deleuze hates rigid dualisms.
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21545
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I prefer to deny round squares, and deal with the difficulties by the theory of denoting [Russell]
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Full Idea:
I should prefer to say that there is no such object as 'the round square'. The difficulties of excluding such objects can, I think, be avoided by the theory of denoting.
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From:
Bertrand Russell (Review: Meinong 'Untersuchungen zur..' [1905], p.81)
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A reaction:
The 'theory of denoting' is his brand new theory of definite descriptions, which makes implicit claims of existence explicit, so that they can be judged. Why can't we just say that a round square can be an intentional object, but not a real object?
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21843
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People consist of many undetermined lines, some rigid, some supple, some 'lines of flight' [Deleuze]
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Full Idea:
Things, people, are made up of varied lines, and they do not necessarily know which line they are on or where they should make the line which they are tracing pass; there is a whole geography in people, with rigid lines, supple lines, lines of flight etc.
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From:
Gilles Deleuze (A Conversation: what is it? What is it for? [1977], I)
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A reaction:
An example of Deleuze creating a novel concept, in order to generate a liberating way of seeing our lives. His big focus is on 'lines of flight' (which, I think, are less restrained by local culture than the others).
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21848
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Some lines (of flight) are becomings which escape the system [Deleuze]
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Full Idea:
There are lines which do not amount to the path of a point, which break free from structure - lines of flight, becomings, without future or past, without memory, which resist the binary machine. …The rhizome is all this.
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From:
Gilles Deleuze (A Conversation: what is it? What is it for? [1977], II)
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A reaction:
The binary machine enforces simplistic either/or choices. I assume the 'lines' are to replace the Self, with something much more indeterminate, active and changing.
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