3 ideas
| 6457 | Sensations are mental, but sense-data could be mind-independent [Vesey] |
| Full Idea: Whereas a sensation is by definition mental, a sense-datum might be mind-independent. | |
| From: Godfrey Vesey (Collins Dictionary of Philosophy [1990], p.266) | |
| A reaction: This seems to be what Russell is getting at in 1912, as he clearly separates sense-data from sensations. Discussions of sense-data always assume they are mental, which may make them redundant - but so might making them physical. |
| 20057 | Philosophy of action studies the roles of psychological states in causing behaviour [Mele] |
| Full Idea: The central task of the philosophy of action is the exploration of the roles played by a collection of psychological states in the etiology of intentional behaviour. | |
| From: Alfred R. Mele (Springs of Action [1992], p.3), quoted by Rowland Stout - Action 5 'Psychological' | |
| A reaction: Stout glosses this as a rather distinctive view, which endorses the causal theory of action (as opposed to citing reasons and justifications for actions). A key debate is whether the psychological inputs really do cause the outputs. |
| 468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |
| Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice. | |
| From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where? |