Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Steps Towards a Constructive Nominalism' and 'Letters to Russell'

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5 ideas

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers

18253	I wish to go straight from cardinals to reals (as ratios), leaving out the rationals [Frege]
	Full Idea: You need a double transition, from cardinal numbes (Anzahlen) to the rational numbers, and from the latter to the real numbers generally. I wish to go straight from the cardinal numbers to the real numbers as ratios of quantities.
	From: Gottlob Frege (Letters to Russell [1902], 1903.05.21), quoted by Michael Dummett - Frege philosophy of mathematics 21 'Frege's'
	A reaction: Note that Frege's real numbers are not quantities, but ratios of quantities. In this way the same real number can refer to lengths, masses, intensities etc.

6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism

18166	The loss of my Rule V seems to make foundations for arithmetic impossible [Frege]
	Full Idea: With the loss of my Rule V, not only the foundations of arithmetic, but also the sole possible foundations of arithmetic, seem to vanish.
	From: Gottlob Frege (Letters to Russell [1902], 1902.06.22)
	A reaction: Obviously he was stressed, but did he really mean that there could be no foundation for arithmetic, suggesting that the subject might vanish into thin air?

8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta

17619	We renounce all abstract entities [Goodman/Quine]
	Full Idea: We do not believe in abstract entities..... We renounce them altogether.
	From: Goodman,N/Quine,W (Steps Towards a Constructive Nominalism [1947], p.105), quoted by Penelope Maddy - Defending the Axioms
	A reaction: Goodman always kept the faith here, but Quine decided to embrace sets, as a minimal commitment to abstracta needed for mathematics, which was needed for science. My sympathies are with Goodman. This is the modern form of 'nominalism'.

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta

18269	Logical objects are extensions of concepts, or ranges of values of functions [Frege]
	Full Idea: How are we to conceive of logical objects? My only answer is, we conceive of them as extensions of concepts or, more generally, as ranges of values of functions ...what other way is there?
	From: Gottlob Frege (Letters to Russell [1902], 1902.07.28), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 7 epigr
	A reaction: This is the clearest statement I have found of what Frege means by an 'object'. But an extension is a collection of things, so an object is a group treated as a unity, which is generally how we understand a 'set'. Hence Quine's ontology.

21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality

468	Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.]
	Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice.
	From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where?