21546
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We can't sharply distinguish variables, domains and values, if symbols frighten us [Russell]
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Full Idea:
Whoever is afraid of symbols can hardly hope to acquire exact ideas where it is necessary to distinguish 1) the variable in itself as opposed to its value, 2) any value of the variable, 3) all values, 4) some value.
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From:
Bertrand Russell (Review: Meinong 'Untersuchungen zur..' [1905], p.84)
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A reaction:
Not the best example, perhaps, of the need for precision, but a nice illustration of the new attitude Russell brought into philosophy.
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21545
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I prefer to deny round squares, and deal with the difficulties by the theory of denoting [Russell]
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Full Idea:
I should prefer to say that there is no such object as 'the round square'. The difficulties of excluding such objects can, I think, be avoided by the theory of denoting.
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From:
Bertrand Russell (Review: Meinong 'Untersuchungen zur..' [1905], p.81)
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A reaction:
The 'theory of denoting' is his brand new theory of definite descriptions, which makes implicit claims of existence explicit, so that they can be judged. Why can't we just say that a round square can be an intentional object, but not a real object?
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13097
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Force in substance makes state follow state, and ensures the very existence of substance [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
By the force I give to substances, I understand a state from which another state follows, if nothing prevents it. ...I dare say that without force, there would be no substance.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Lelong [1712], 1712), quoted by Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J - Substance and Individuation in Leibniz 7.1
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A reaction:
[the whole quote is interesting] This remark, more than any other I have found, places force at the centre of Leibniz's metaphysics. He is using it to resist Spinoza's one-substance view.
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